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Abstract
TLS is one of the most widely deployed cryptographic protocols on the Internet; it is
used to protect the confidentiality and integrity of transmitted data in various client-server
protocols. Its non-standard use of cryptographic primitives, however, makes it hard to
formally assess its security. It is in fact difficult to use traditional (well-understood) security
notions for the key-exchange (here: handshake) and the encryption/authentication (here:
record layer) parts of the protocol due to the fact that, on the one hand, traditional game-
based notions do not easily support composition, and on the other hand, all TLS versions
up to and including 1.2 combine the two phases in a non-standard way.
In this paper, we provide a modular security analysis of the handshake in TLS version 1.2
and a slightly sanitized version of the handshake in the current draft of TLS version 1.3,
following the constructive cryptography approach of Maurer and Renner (ICS 2011). We
provide a deconstruction of the handshake into modular sub-protocols and a security proof
for each such sub-protocol. We also show how these results can be combined with analy-
ses of the respective record layer protocols, and the overall result is that in all cases the
protocol constructs (unilaterally) secure channels between the two parties from insecure
channels and a public-key infrastructure. This approach ensures that (1) each sub-protocol
is proven in isolation and independently of the other sub-protocols, (2) the overall security
statement proven can easily be used in higher-level protocols, and (3) TLS can be used in
any composition with other secure protocols.
In more detail, for the key-exchange step of TLS 1.2, we analyze the RSA-based and
both Diffie-Hellman-based variants (with static and ephemeral server key share) under a
non-randomizability assumption for RSA-PKCS and the Gap Diffie-Hellman assumption,
respectively; in all cases we make use of random oracles. For the respective step of TLS 1.3,
we prove security under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption in the standard model. In
all statements, we require additional standard computational assumptions on other primi-
tives. In general, since the design of TLS is not modular, the constructive decomposition is
less fine-grained than one might wish to have and than it is for a modular design. This paper
therefore also suggests new insights into the intrinsic problems incurred by a non-modular
protocol design such as that of TLS.
∗Part of the work done while at ETH Zu¨rich. Author is supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation
(SNF).
†Part of the work done while at Aarhus University supported by the Danish Council for Independent Research
via DFF Starting Grant 10-081612.
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1 Introduction
One of the most important applications of cryptography is the establishment of secure commu-
nication channels between two entities (e.g. a client and a server), and the protocol most widely
used for this purpose is SSL/TLS. A key goal of research in cryptography is to provide security
proofs for cryptographic protocols. This task is particularly difficult if the considered protocol
has not been designed with provable security in mind, as is the case for SSL/TLS.
Initially developed by Netscape as the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol [Hic95], the
SSL/TLS protocol family suffered from several vulnerabilities; this led to the development of a
number of subsequent protocol versions, each one fixing flaws discovered in the previous version.
The most recent standardized protocol version is known as Transport Layer Security (TLS) ver-
sion 1.2 [DR08], but there is also a working draft for version 1.3 [DR15] which modifies the pro-
tocol considerably. While the initial protocol was developed for protecting HTTP connections
between a browser and a web server, many current Internet protocols including, e.g., SMTP or
IMAP for transmitting e-mails and LDAP for accessing directories, have been extended to al-
low for securing the transmission with TLS. Because of its practical importance, the security of
SSL/TLS has attracted a lot of attention in the literature, see e.g. [WS96, Pau99, Kra01, CK02,
JK02, Bar04, HSD+05, MSW08, MT10, PRS11, AP12, BFCZ12, FHM+12, GIJ+12, JKSS12,
ABP+13, AP13, BFK+13a, BFS+13, GKS13, KSS13, KPW13, BMM+15], in chronological or-
der.
1.1 Overview and Previous Work
The TLS protocol consists of two parts, the handshake—essentially a key-exchange protocol that
can be used with either unilateral or mutual authentication—and the record protocol—which
protects the transmission of application data using the key obtained during the handshake. The
TLS handshake offers several alternative key-exchange methods based on different cryptographic
primitives. In each session, the actual method is chosen depending on the implementation, the
available public keys, and the configuration. In all TLS versions up to and including 1.2, there
are three standard methods: based on RSA encryption, on a static certified Diffie-Hellman
key, or on signatures and an (ephemeral) Diffie-Hellman exchange, respectively. The draft for
TLS 1.3 does away with RSA and static Diffie-Hellman, and uses a sanitized version of the
ephemeral Diffie-Hellman based protocol. The typical setting is to only authenticate the server
to the client, but client authentication is also possible if the client has a certified public key.
While a sequence of results about the record protocol [Kra01, MT10, PRS11, BMM+15]
provides a comprehensive treatment thereof, the handshake protocol is not as well-understood.
The reason is that the protocol was not designed with provable security in mind (see details
in Section 1.2); it is inherently non-modular and uses cryptographic primitives in non-standard
ways, which severely complicates security proofs. One particular observation with respect to
non-modularity appearing in many analyses is that, in all versions up to 1.2, the final messages of
the handshake already use the keys that are agreed upon;1 this fact that prohibits an analysis of
the full handshake in common security models (e.g., [BR93, CK01, CK02]). Our analysis of the
initial part of the handshake can be interpreted as that the handshake without the final message
can indeed be seen as a key-exchange protocol. Comparing this definition to previous models,
our analysis covers the (game-based) notion of “key revealing” (because the distinguisher obtains
all generated keys), but no “adaptive state reveals” defined in some game-based models.2
Beyond that, because of the non-standard use of schemes and primitives, papers that analyze
1In the draft of TLS 1.3, specific keys are used for the protection of the final message.
2TLS-RSA and TLS-DH are in fact insecure with respect to state reveals.
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(parts of) TLS 1.2 must generally choose between analyzing a modified version of the protocol,
analyzing the original protocol in idealized models (such as the random oracle model), or using
tailor-made computational assumptions.
Proving modified protocols was an early approach towards obtaining an intuition of the
security of the TLS handshake. For example, [JK02] drop the final message of the handshake,
while [MSW08] do consider the final messages, but in an unencrypted form. A more extreme
approach is taken by Gajek et al. [GMP+08], who modify several details to achieve security in
the UC framework [Can01]. (As pointed out by Ku¨sters et al. [KT11] this additionally requires
the insertion of session identifiers into the protocol. Ku¨sters et al. also give a case study and
describe how one could model TLS more faithfully in the IITM [KT11] model.) However,
extending the security proof of a modified protocol to that of the real protocol is usually hard;
for SSL/TLS, it is nearly impossible.
Recent game-based analyses of TLS made important steps towards assessing the security of
the actual protocol. Jager et al. [JKSS12] treated the security of a specific configuration for the
key-exchange step, i.e. TLS-DHE. In their (game-based) analysis, Jager et al. consider both the
TLS handshake and the record protocol to be executed together. By treating the last message of
the handshake as the first message of the record protocol, they circumvent the problems related
to using one of the extracted keys for encryption during the key-exchange protocol. They showed
that the TLS handshake and the record protocol together achieve the tailor-made (game-based)
security notion “authenticated and confidential channel establishment,” under a specific, new
hardness assumption. A (slightly) more modular analysis is given by Brzuska et al. [BFS+13],
who view the TLS handshake and record protocol as a composition of a key agreement protocol
and a scheme for achieving secure communication. They weaken the usual key-exchange security
definitions and show explicitly that, under a specific notion of composition, the two parts can
be proved secure together, in a meaningful way. Thus, this approach enables a security proof
with some degree of modularity.
The recent work of Krawczyk, Paterson, and Wee [KPW13] extends the analysis of TLS-
DHE [JKSS12] to other handshake configurations, like TLS-DH and TLS-RSA, and it is to our
knowledge the most comprehensive analysis of TLS to date. Their approach is based on modeling
the TLS handshake by means of a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM). They also describe
how to instantiate the KEM to capture each configuration. Subsequently, they show that, if
the KEM attains a security notion known as Constrained CCA security (CCCA), the combined
protocol consisting of KEM and record layer attains the ACCE security notion introduced by
Jager et al. [JKSS12].
The same approach of using key encapsulation and key derivation was also taken recently by
Bhargavan et al. [BFK+13b]. In a work parallel to ours, they use the notion of agility and game-
based definitions in order to analyze a realistic form of TLS, including ciphersuite negotiation,
renegotiation, and resumption. This work co-evolved with ours; while their analysis is closer to
the implementation of the protocol, the advantage of our approach lies in the modularity of our
deconstruction and proofs. Additionally, our definitions also apply to TLS 1.3, which does not
hold for the KEM-based analyses of [KPW13, BFK+13b].
Results on using tools to verify TLS. Other approaches have used tools from mechanized
logic to analyze TLS. For example, the symbolic model approach of [Pau99, HSD+05, BFCZ12].
[BFCZ12] already experimented with an executable specification for TLS. In addition to the
purely symbolic ProVerif, they started to use CryptoVerif, a computationally faithful tool,
but for a rather coarse security model. Recently, [BFK+13a] broke with symbolic models and
gave a meaningful formal statement about miTLS, a standard compliant implementation of
TLS. They describe cryptographic idealizations of the cryptographic primitives of TLS which
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are indistinguishable by typed adversaries. This allows for a type-based and cryptographically
faithful verification of miTLS using a dialect of f∗ [SCF+11]. [BFK+13b] builds on [BFK+13a]
and focuses on the details of the TLS handshake using the EasyCrypt tool in addition to f∗.
As both EasyCrypt and constructive cryptography build on a simple, modular semantic
theory, we are planning on investigating the formal relation between constructive cryptography
and EasyCrypt’s new module system.
Previous results in constructive cryptography. Some related schemes have already been
analyzed following the constructive cryptography paradigm [MR11, Mau11]. Maurer and Tack-
mann [MT10] used this approach to analyze the TLS record protocol as a construction of a
secure channel from a shared key and insecure communication channels. Recently, Maurer at
al. [MTC13] described a unilateral key-exchange protocol in this model; the goal of their proto-
col is similar to the goal of the TLS configurations without client authentication; their protocol
is considerably simpler and secure under weaker assumptions, but does not allow to adaptively
choose cipher suites. The new key-exchange mode in TLS 1.3 follows the same ideas as the
protocol analyzed in [MTC13], which is based on a protocol called A-DHKE by Shoup [Sho99].
1.2 Contributions of this Paper
In this paper, we define and prove the security of TLS version 1.2 and a slightly sanitized
version of the drafted version 1.3 following the constructive cryptography paradigm of Maurer
and Renner [MR11]. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first ones to provide a provable-
security treatment of the drafted protocol TLS 1.3—with the caveat that we modify the protocol
to not encrypt the server’s certificate. We note that this change seems necessary for any kind
of security analysis, since encrypting the certificate (which is needed in the key computation)
introduces a circularity in the proof. We also note that the absence of the encryption does not
diminish the security of the resulting channel, though it may decrease the privacy guarantees
for the server. In the case of unilateral authentication, however, the maximum privacy that can
be achieved by TLS is anyway only against a passive attacker.
In constructive cryptography, the (security) guarantees provided to parties in a specific con-
text are formalized in terms of resources available to the parties, typically channels with certain
properties. Cryptographic protocols construct (desired) resources from assumed resources, and
the composition theorem of this framework guarantees that the protocol (using the resources
assumed by it) can then be used whenever the constructed resource is required (as an assumed
resource) in future constructions. This approach can be viewed as being akin to the OSI com-
munication model, in which the protocol(s) used at every OSI layer are handled in isolation, and
are then incorporated into the next layer of processing using a well-defined interface between
the two. In the same way, in constructive cryptography each construction is handled in isola-
tion, and the constructed resource can then be used in further constructions. Since the actual
security statement for the overall protocol is of a standardized form, in terms of a resource, it
is straightforward to use the protocol in a higher-level context, with the overall security proof
again following from the composition theorem.
This methodology favors a modular approach to provable security, in which even a complex
protocol can be de-constructed in layers, each of which can be analyzed in isolation, finally using
the composition theorem to prove the soundness of the entire approach. We show its power in
de-constructing the TLS/SSL protocol, and showing that our approach can easily be used to
prove that both TLS 1.2 (in all three modes of operation), and a slightly modified version of
TLS 1.3 construct unilaterally secure channels between clients and a server.
In this spirit, we show that SSL/TLS with unilateral authentication constructs a unilaterally
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secure communication channel from an insecure communication network such as the Internet, a
public-key infrastructure, and—in the case of TLS 1.2—a public random oracle (an idealization
of a hash function). We de-compose the TLS protocol into a sequence of sub-protocols that each
achieve a smaller construction step. Each step is then achieved by one or more cryptographic
schemes (like key-exchange mechanisms, key confirmation, symmetric encryption, and MAC),
or by security mechanisms (like nonces). The goal of each scheme or mechanism is to construct
an ideal resource, which then serves as an assumed resource in the next step. This approach
can be seen as an analogue to the layered structure in the network protocol stack, where for
instance IP provides end-to-end connectivity—constructing pairwise unreliable channels—and
TCP constructs reliable channels from these unreliable channels, and an application protocol
like FTP constructs a resource like file storage from the reliable communication channels.
The composition of all steps we analyze yields the complete TLS protocol, and the compo-
sition theorem guarantees the soundness of this approach. This method of analyzing the TLS
protocol has two main advantages:
1. The composition theorem (cf. [MR11, MT10, KMO+13]) guarantees that the TLS protocol
can be used, given the assumed resources, whenever an application or higher-level protocol
requires the type of secure channel described in our definitions.
2. As each step is proven in isolation and the steps are combined generically by the compo-
sition theorem,
(a) the analysis of each individual step becomes simpler, because it can be performed
independently of the other steps;
(b) if an alternative security analysis of one step is given, then one can immediately use
this proof without adapting the proofs of the remaining primitives. In particular,
by adapting the techniques of [JKSS12, KPW13] to prove the key-exchange steps
without a random oracle, we can immediately obtain a standard-model analysis of
the complete protocol without re-proving the remaining steps;
(c) further optional sub-protocols, like other symmetric ciphers or elliptic curve methods,
are integrated into our analysis by proving simply that they construct a specific step.
The security of the full protocol will then follow generically.
(d) Construction steps that are proven in isolation can directly be used in other protocols.
For example, our statement that the complete TLS protocol constructs a unilaterally
secure channel can be combined with the approach of authenticating the client by
transmitting a password as described in [MTC13].
Unfortunately, TLS tries hard to resist this modularization, and it also uses many techniques
heuristically: the cryptographic keys intended to protect the payload are also used for the
confirmation (here called “finished”) messages, the pseudo-random function is keyed with a
non-uniform key, and various protocol messages are unnecessarily included in the confirmation
messages, to name a few. These unfortunate design choices complicate our analysis: sometimes
abstractions cannot be introduced at the intuitively appealing levels, often “auxiliary” data
must be passed through multiple protocol layers, and as the potential interference of different
protocol sessions is resolved only at a late stage, many protocol steps must be analyzed in a
complicated “multi-session” scenario.
Furthermore, it appears impossible to perform a reasonably modular analysis for the RSA-
PKCS variant of the handshake under the OW-PCA assumption [JK02], even in the random
oracle model. This is evidence that it is difficult to modularize the proof of the CCCA security of
the TLS key extraction mechanism of [KPW13] further unless one is willing to make additional
assumptions. Building on a recent result by [BFK+13b], we show that a reasonably weak non-
randomizability assumption that they call NR-PCA is sufficient for a more modular constructive
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proof. We describe these problems in more detail in Section 3.3.3.
Although various of the above mentioned obstacles could have been bypassed by modifying
the scheme, we kept our analysis close to the realistic TLS protocol. The result is a more
complicated analysis; however, the artifices are immanent to the protocol, not to our technique.
In total, we analyze the three main methods for the establishment of the master secret in the
handshake of TLS 1.2, namely TLS-DH, TLS-DHE, and TLS-RSA, as well the two main meth-
ods for protecting the payload messages in the record layer protocol, namely the Authenticate-
then-Encrypt combinations using a stream cipher resp. a block cipher in CBC-mode, and a
MAC. By the composition theorem, we obtain the security of all possible combinations. We use
the GapDH assumption for the Diffie-Hellman based cipher suites, the NR-PCA assumption for
RSA PKCS#7, pseudo-randomness for the stream and block ciphers, and strong unforgeability
for the MAC. Moreover, we require the hash function used in the handshake to be collision re-
sistant, and our proofs of the handshake protocols are based on the random oracle assumption.
For TLS 1.3, we use the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption in our standard-model proofs; we
additionally require the hash function to be collision resistant, HMAC to be a PRF (with two
different distributions for the keys), and the AEAD mode to be secure with respect to standard
security notions.
On the type of proven statements. Results on provable security differ with respect to (1)
the assumptions made and (2) the statement that is proved to follow from the assumptions. It is
important that the proved statement is of a form that allows for both comparisons of protocol
performance, and for direct use in the proof of a higher-level protocol. Security statements
should thus be exact (as opposed to asymptotic), giving precise upper bounds for the security
level guaranteed by a protocol. Furthermore, a key to analyzing and designing cryptographic
protocols is a modularization in which the role of each cryptographic primitive (e.g. encryption)
or mechanism (e.g. nonce exchange) is made explicit, and the security of its application is
proved in isolation, once and for all. The constructive cryptography framework provides a
sound instantiation of this approach.
As the systems model underlying our work has no notion of time, we currently cover neither
timing attacks nor forward secrecy (sometimes called “key corruptions”). Note that TLS-RSA
and TLS-DH are in fact insecure with respect to forward secrecy. Our security statements
are concrete (rather than asymptotic). In particular, all statements are parametrized in the
respectively relevant parameters such as the number of protocol sessions or the total length of
the transmitted messages. We prove exact reductions to parametrized games which are used to
formalize computational hardness of the underlying primitives; given concrete assumptions on
the computational hardness, our statements imply concrete bounds for the security of the TLS
protocol.
1.3 Outline
We now describe, at a high level, the cryptographic mechanisms used in TLS and the con-
structive steps they achieve. We start with a simplified description of the protocol in Figure 1,
where the notation 〈m〉κ denotes the encryption of a message m, possibly together with other
messages, under the key κ.
Decomposition into sub-protocols. At a high level, our analysis proceeds by repeatedly
“scraping off” a part of the protocol, starting at the beginning; at each step, we consider the
remainder of the protocol as the “payload” of the part we analyze. This permits us to then
7
Client Server
ηC ←$ N
ηC−−−−→
ηS ,cert ,keS←−−−− ηS ←$ N,
choose keS
choose keC , compute pmk ,
set msk← PRF(pmk , ηC |ηS),
obtain keys (κC , κS)← PRF(msk, . . . ),
set ξC ← PRF(msk, 1|ηC | . . . |keC)
keC ,〈ξC〉κC−−−−→
〈ξS〉κS←−−−−
compute pmk,
set msk← PRF(pmk , ηC |ηS),
obtain keys (κC , κS)← PRF(msk, . . . ),
set ξS ← PRF(msk, 2|ηC | . . . |〈ξC〉κC )
Authenticate-then-Encrypt payload ←−−→ Authenticate-then-Encrypt payload
Figure 1: The TLS 1.2 handshake as a message exchange
use the composition theorem to conclude the security of the entire protocol. We proceed in the
following steps.
1. Nonce generation. Each client chooses a nonce ηC ←$ N for a distribution N on the set of
nonces.
Since TLS is often used in a unilateral mode where a client has no distinguished name, the
client nonce can be seen as a “disposable name” that is (with high probability) unique to that
client—the purpose of this nonce is to separate protocol sessions of different clients.
This guarantee is formalized as a resource NAME, which provides a unique name to each
client.
2. Nonce exchange. The client sends the nonce ηC (which it obtained from the resource NAME).
The server chooses a nonce ηS ←$ N and sends it to the client.
The server uses the client nonce to identify the client—note that we focus on the unilateral
case where the client is not authenticated. The server nonce is less crucial in our analysis, but
to guarantee in the key derivation step (for which we make a random oracle assumption) that
the data in each session is unique, we assume uniqueness of the server nonce, losing a collision
term. However, if one analyzes the key derivation in more detail and not in the random oracle
model, the entropy contained in the server nonce may be a valuable input for extraction.
This guarantee is formalized as a resource SNET that outputs nonces (potentially chosen
adversarially) and associates them with the (fully) insecure communication channels giving no
guarantee of consistency.
3. Unilateral key exchange. The server chooses a key-exchange message keS according to the
chosen cipher suite (the message may be empty or a Diffie-Hellman element), and sends its
certificate cert and keS to the client. The client also chooses a key-exchange message keC
accordingly and sends it to the server. Both compute the pre-master key pmk according to the
chosen scheme, and compute the master secret key msk (at this step, we use a random oracle
instead of a PRF).
The core key-exchange protocol results in a pre-master secret, but the employed mechanisms
are too weak to achieve a meaningful security guarantee for this step alone. Obtaining the
master secret key msk by querying the random oracle “de-correlates” the keys obtained in
different sessions and also normalizes their distribution.
The complete step constructs a resource MSK that outputs uniform random keys (the msk)
to the client and the server; the keys may, however, be different in case the adversary interfered.
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4. Key expansion and generating confirmations. Both client and server compute keys κC and κS
and “finished” messages ξC and ξS via a pseudo-random function PRF keyed with msk. The
two finished messages are then encrypted, in a concatenation of all the messages in the protocol,
and sent.
Since the transmission of ξC and ξS in the protocol is protected by Authenticate-then-
Encrypt with the same keys as the payload messages, a modularization at the intuitively ap-
pealing point after performing the confirmation is impossible. Only after this protocol step can
we fully separate different “sessions,” as the computation of ξC and ξS still requires data which
is correlated between different sessions (e.g., the server certificate).
The behavior of this resource is similar to that of MSK with a different key space, but the
resource can now be described as the parallel composition of one (single-session) resource
KSP,∗
= =•
per client.
5. Channel setup and payload transmission. The channel setup consists of sending and verifying
the messages ξC and ξS protected with Authenticate-then-Encrypt with keys κC and κS , respec-
tively. If the verification succeeds, the client and server exchange payload messages protected
by Authenticate-then-Encrypt.
The resulting resource
∗   • is, for each client, one channel to the server which (at the
decision of the adversary) allows for either fully secure client-server communication, or for
server-adversary communication. The client notices which case occurs, the server does not.
Constructions achieved by the sub-protocols. We sketch the decomposition in Figure 2.
The resources NET (the network), PKI (the PKI), and RO (the random oracle) used by the
protocol are depicted on the right hand side, and the “converters” (each capturing a different
part of the protocol) are drawn as boxes. The first type of converter rnd generates a random
nonce. The sub-protocol consisting of one such converter per client constructs the resource
NAME that outputs a unique nonce to each client (modulo a collision term, which becomes
explicit in the security statement).
The second converter hec uses as resources NAME and the network NET, exchanges nonces
with the server via NET, and also transmits “payload” messages from higher-level protocols.
Together with the server’s converter hes, this constructs the “network with nonces,” denoted as
SNET. The construction statement can be written as
[NET,NAME]
hec,hes
=⇒ SNET.
The third converter is then alternatively one of dhc (for static DH), dhec (for ephemeral
DH), and rsac (for RSA-PKCS) depending on the cipher suite used in the handshake. All these
use the resources PKI and RO, as well as the resource SNET constructed by rnd and (hec, hes),
and construct, together with the server’s counterpart, a “master secret key” resource later called
“MSK”.
The statements for the following layers are (here for the static DH scheme and a set C of
clients)
[SNET,PKI,RO]
dhc,dhsG
=⇒ MSK, MSK expc,exps=⇒
⊗
C∈C
s
KSP,∗
= =•
{(C,S/ηC)
,
and
KSP,∗
= =• atec,ates=⇒ ∗   • .
In the above statements,
KSP,∗
= =• is a resource which is specified with respect to a single client and
the server, and the product together with the brackets signifies that there is an independent such
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resource corresponding to each client. (More details about the notation are in Section 2.) The
sub-protocol (expc, exps) expands the secret key and computes the confirmation messages ξC and
ξS , constructing the resource
KSP,∗
= =• . Finally, the sub-protocol (atec, ates) uses the confirmation
messages and also protects payload messages obtained from higher-level protocols, constructing
the unilaterally secure channel denoted as
∗   •.
ηC ←$ N
rnd
send ηC
get ηS
hec
get cert ,keS ,
verify cert ,
compute keC ,
send keC ,
compute pmk ,
compute msk
dhc/dhec
compute
ξC , ξS ,
κC , κS
expc
get ξS ,
check ξC ,
send ξC ,
transmit
payload
atec
NET
PKI
RO
ηCηC , ηSηC , ηS ,msk
cert ,keS ,keC
ξC , κC
ξS , κS
(verify, cert) →
← 0/1
pmk |master secret|ηC |ηS →
← msk
ηC , payload →
← ηS , payload
keC , . . . →
← cert , . . .← payload →
ξC , . . . →
← ξS , . . .
Figure 2: The TLS 1.2 handshake in terms of client converters
In Figure 2 it becomes apparent that the messages that are intended to be sent over the
network and are generated by a higher-level converter are passed through all lower-level con-
verters. Thus, all resources that we specify in the course of the analysis will also have to allow,
in addition to their main task, for the insecure transmission of messages. The reason for this
is that in the TLS protocol, “TLS fragments” (the messages in TLS are called fragments) are
sent over a TCP connection and processed in the order of their arrival. This feature intro-
duces (time-)dependencies between the resources; thus, they cannot be written as a parallel
composition of independent resources.
Our results on TLS can be summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (informal). Let C be a set of clients. The TLS protocol constructs, for each client
C ∈ C, one unilaterally secure channel ∗   • from NET, PKI, and RO, for the static Diffie-
Hellman, the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman, and the RSA mode. In more detail:
1. The (static) DH-based mode of TLS 1.2 achieves the construction under the following
assumptions: the GapDH assumption holds in the respective group, SHA-256 is collision
resistant, HMAC is a PRF, and the symmetric encryption and MAC schemes are secure.
2. The (ephemeral) DH-based mode of TLS 1.2 achieves the construction under the following
assumptions: the GapDH assumption holds in the respective group, the signature scheme
used by the server is unforgeable, SHA-256 is collision resistant, HMAC is a PRF, and
the symmetric encryption and MAC schemes are secure.
3. The RSA-based mode of TLS 1.2 achieves the construction under the following assump-
tions: RSA-PKCS#7 achieves the NR-PCA notion, SHA-256 is collision resistant, HMAC
is a PRF, and the symmetric encryption and MAC schemes are secure.
4. TLS 1.3 achieves the construction under the following assumptions: the Decisional Diffie-
Hellman assumption holds in the respective group, SHA-256 is collision resistant, HMAC
is a PRF (for two distributions of keys), and the employed AEAD encryption is secure
(according to standard notions).
A summary of the steps we take and the relevant security loss at each step is given in Fig-
ure 13 in the appendix. Note that we only include the details related to the security requirement
in the definition of construction, not to the availability requirement.
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2 Preliminaries and Notation
2.1 Notation
For a number n ∈ N, we use the notation [n] := {1, . . . , n}. Also, for a distribution X over a
set X , we write X ←$ X to denote that the random variable X is sampled from distribution X,
and we write X ←$ X to express that X is sampled uniformly at random from the set X . We
write B for the set {0, 1}8 of bytes.
2.2 Constructive Cryptography
The foundational idea of constructive cryptography [MR11, Mau11] is to specify both the as-
sumptions3 and the guarantees of protocols explicitly as resources, and to consider a protocol
as a construction of a (desired) resource from assumed resources. A resource is a shared func-
tionality accessed by several parties; in this work we consider different types of communication
channels and shared keys. The assumed resources formalize the setting in which a protocol is
used (such as a certain type of communication channel) and constructed resources describe the
functionality achieved by using the protocol on the assumed resources (such as a shared key or
a communication channel with stronger guarantees). A protocol in this setting is described as
a tuple of so-called converters; one per (honest) party.
2.3 Abstract Systems
Resources and converters are modeled as systems. At the highest level of abstraction (following
the hierarchy in [MR11]), systems are objects with interfaces by which they connect to (inter-
faces of) other systems; each interface is labeled with an element of some label set and connects
to only a single other interface. Multiple interfaces can be merged into a single interface; the
original interfaces are referred to as sub-interfaces of the composite interface. (Sub-interfaces
have labels relative to the composite interface; to refer to a sub-interface S of some interface I,
we write I/S.) This concept of abstract systems captures the topological structures that result
when multiple systems are connected in this manner. It does not, however, model the behavior
of systems, i.e., how the systems interact via their interfaces; statements about specific proto-
cols are statements at the next (lower) abstraction level. In this work, we describe all systems
in terms of (probabilistic) discrete systems.
Resources and converters. Resources in this work are systems with interfaces labeled by
elements of some label set L. A converter is a two-interface system which is directed in that
it has an inside and an outside interface. As a notational convention, we generally use upper-
case, bold-face letters (e.g., R, S), symbols (e.g., •− →), or upper-case sans-serif fonts to
denote resources, and lower-case Greek letters (e.g., α, β) or sans-serif fonts (e.g., enc, dec) for
converters. We denote by ΦL (or simply Φ if L is clear from the context) the set of all resources
with interface labels in L, and by Σ the set of all converters. We use two special converters, an
“identity” converter id and a “blocking” converter ⊥ that has an inactive outside interface.
System composition. The topology of a composite system is described using a term algebra,
where each expression starts from one resource on the right-hand side and is subsequently
extended with further terms on the left-hand side. An expression is interpreted in the way that
all interfaces of the system it describes can be connected to interfaces of systems which are
3The term “assumption” often refers to two different concepts: setup assumptions such as a network or a PKI,
and computational assumptions such as the hardness of certain problems. Here, we refer to setup assumptions.
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appended on the left. For instance, for a single resource R ∈ Φ, all its interfaces are accessible.
For I ∈ L, a resource R ∈ Φ, and a converter α ∈ Σ, the expression αIR denotes the composite
system obtained by connecting the inside interface of α to the I-interface of R; the outside
interface of α becomes the I-interface of the composite system. The system αIR is again a
resource. For two resources R and S, [R,S] denotes the parallel composition of R and S.
For each I ∈ L, the I-interfaces of R and S are merged and become the sub-interfaces of the
I-interface of [R,S]. A converter α that connects to the I-interface of [R,S] has two inside
sub-interfaces, where the first connects to R and the second connects to S (i.e., sub-interfaces
are ordered). Finally, we denote by id a special converter that forwards all messages from the
inside to the outside interface and vice versa, hence idIR ≡ R.
We introduce special notation for families of resources or converters: If we compose a family
of resources (Ri)i∈{1,...,n} (resp. converters (αi)i∈{1,...,n}) in parallel, we write this as a product
such as
⊗n
i=1 Rn (resp.
⊗n
i=1 αi). If we attach a family of converters α1, . . . , αn to interfaces
I1, . . . , In of a resource R, we write
∏n
i=1 αi
IiR.
Each setting is described by a cryptographic algebra with a certain label set L.
Definition 2. A cryptographic algebra for a label set L is a pair 〈Φ,Σ〉 consisting of a set of
resources Φ and a set of converters Σ, together with families of parallel composition operations
[·] : Φ∗ → Φ and [·] : Σ∗ → Σ, as well as connecting operations ·i· : Σ× Φ→ Φ. The algebra is
composition-order independent if
1. for all C1, C2 ∈ Σ, R ∈ Φ, and i, j ∈ L with i 6= j,
Ci1(C
j
2R) = C
j
2(C
i
1R), and
2. for all C1, . . . , Cm ∈ Σ, R1, . . . , Rm ∈ Φ, and i ∈ L,
[CJ ]
i[RJ ] =
[
Ci1R1, . . . , C
i
mRm
]
.
Distinguishers. A distinguisher D is a special type of system that connects to all interfaces
of a resource U and outputs a single bit at the end of its interaction with U. In the term algebra,
this appears as the expression DU, which defines a binary random variable. The distinguishing
advantage of a distinguisher D on two systems U and V is defined as
∆D (U,V) := |Pr(DU = 1)− Pr(DV = 1)|.
The advantage of a class D of distinguishers is defined as ∆D (U,V) := supD∈D∆D (U,V). The
distinguishing advantage measures how much the distribution of the output of D differs when
it is connected to either U or V. Intuitively, if no distinguisher (of a certain class) differentiates
between U and V, they can be used interchangeably in any environment of that class (otherwise
that specific environment could serve as a distinguisher).
Note that the distinguishing advantage is a pseudo-metric. In particular, it satisfies the
triangle inequality, i.e., ∆D (U,W) ≤ ∆D (U,V) + ∆D (V,W) for all resources U, V, and W
and distinguishers D. There is an equivalence relation on the set of resources (which is defined
on the level of discrete systems), denoted by U ≡ V, which means that ∆D (U,V) = 0 for all
distinguishers D.
Games. Games that capture properties such as unforgeability are two-interface systems that
at their left interface connect to some adversary or solver A and at the right interface output
a single bit (usually denoted W ). The performance of A in a game G is denoted as
ΓA(G) := PrAG(W = 1).
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Reductions. When relating (the hardness of) two problems such as distinguishing systems
or winning a game, it is convenient to use a special type of system C that translates one setting
into the other. Formally, C is a converter that has an inside and an outside interface. When it
is connected to a system S, which is denoted by CS, the inside interface of C connects to the
merged interfaces of S and the outside interface of C becomes the interface of the composed
system. C is called a reduction system (or simply reduction).
To reduce distinguishing two systems S,T to distinguishing two systems U,V, one describes
a reduction C such that CS ≡ U and CT ≡ V. Then, for all distinguishers D, we have
∆D (U,V) = ∆D (CS,CT) = ∆DC (S,T). The last equality follows from the fact that C can
also be thought of as being part of the distinguisher.
2.4 The Notion of Construction
The construction notion (cf. [Mau11]) requires two conditions: availability and security. For
the former, the behavior of the real resource (with the converters) must be indistinguishable to
the behavior of the ideal resource, if the “blocking” converter ⊥ is attached at the adversarial
interface (always denoted by the special label E) of both resources. For the latter requirement,
we demand the existence of a simulator which essentially emulates the behavior at the E-
interface of the real resource, while being connected to the corresponding interface of the ideal
resource. More formally:
Definition 3. Let ΦL and Σ be as above, and let ε1 and ε2 two functions mapping each
distinguisher D to a real number in [0, 1]. A protocol piL′ = (pi`)`∈L′ constructs resource S ∈ Φ
from resource R ∈ Φ with distance (ε1, ε2) and with respect the simulator σ, denoted
R
piL′ ,σ,(ε1,ε2)
==⇒ S,
if, for all distinguishers D, ∆
D
(
(piL′)L
′
piS
S⊥ER,⊥ES
)
≤ ε1(D) (availability),
∆D
(
(piL′)L
′
piS
SR, σES
)
≤ ε2(D) (security),
where (piL′)L
′
means attaching each pi` to interface `.
In the descriptions of the resources, we consider two different “modes:” one where the
converter ⊥ is attacked to the E-interface—this means that no attacker is present and formalizes
the availability/correctness of the protocol—and one where the converter is not attached—this
means that an attacker is present and may be attacking the communication; this condition
formalizes the security of the protocol.
The composition theorem. The statements we prove each show the security of one protocol
step in isolation, i.e. they prove for one protocol that it constructs some resource from one or
more assumed resources, possibly under some (computational) assumption. The composition
theorem now states that two such construction steps can be composed: if one (lower-level)
protocol constructs the resource that is assumed by the other (higher-level) protocol, then the
composition of those two protocols constructs the same resource as the higher-level protocol,
but from the resources assumed by the lower-level protocol, under the assumptions that occur
in (at least) one of the individual security statements.
To state the theorem, we extend the notation for parallel and sequential composition to
protocols, i.e., we write ψL′ ◦ piL′ or [pi(1)L′ , . . . , pi(m)L′ ] and mean that the respective operations
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apply to all converters individually. We also make use of the special converter id that behaves
transparently (i.e., allows access to the underlying interface of the resource). The protocol
where all parties have to converter id is denoted idL′ .
The composition theorem was first explicitly stated in [MT10], but the statement there was
restricted to asymptotic settings. Later, in [KMO+13], the theorem was stated in a way that
also allows to capture concrete security statements. The proof, however, still follows the same
steps as the one in [MT10]. For the statement of the theorem we assume the operation [·, . . . , ·]
to be left-associative; in this way we can simply express multiple resources using the single
variable U.
Theorem 4. Let R,S,T,U ∈ ΦL be resources, and let L′ := L \ {E}. Let piL′ and ψL′ be
protocols, σpi and σψ be simulators, and (ε
1
pi, ε
2
pi), (ε
1
ψ, ε
2
ψ) such that
R
piL′ ,σpi ,(ε1pi ,ε2pi)
==⇒ S and S
ψL′ ,σψ ,(ε1ψ ,ε
2
ψ)
==⇒ T.
Then
R
αL′ ,σα,(ε1α,ε2α)
==⇒ T
with αL′ = ψL′ ◦piL′ by composing all converters, σα = σpi ◦σψ, ε1α(D) = ε1pi(DψL′)+ε1ψ(D), and
ε2α(D) = ε
2
pi(DψL′) + ε2ψ(Dσpi
E), where DψL′ and DσpiE mean that D applies the converters at
the respective interfaces. Moreover
[R,U]
[piL′ ,idL′ ],[σpi ,id],(ε¯1pi ,ε¯2pi)
==⇒ [S,U],
with ε¯ipi(D) = ε
i
pi(D[·,U]), where D[·,U] means that the distinguisher emulates U in parallel.
Settings and interface sets considered in this work. The most important scenario we
consider in this work comprises multiple clients, one server, and one (explicit, external) ad-
versary. Some resources are easier described as the parallel composition of resources for fewer
parties and some protocol steps can be proven in such a simpler setting in isolation, i.e., with
respect to only one client, one server, and the adversary.
The simplified setting involving only two honest parties and one attacker is called the
{A,B,E}-setting and is used to analyze protocols and schemes like symmetric encryption or
MACs, cf. [MT10]. The (honest) parties’ interfaces are named A and B, and there is an explicit
adversarial interface E. Resources are in the set Φ{A,B,E}, and protocols are pairs of converters
pi = (pi1, pi2) for A and B, respectively.
Unilateral key-exchange protocols are used in a setting with multiple clients, one server, and
an explicit adversary. We consider a set C of clients, a server S, and an adversary E. Hence,
we consider a label set L = C ∪ {E,S}, resources are in the set ΦL, and a protocol consists of
a family (piC)C∈C of client converters and a server converter piS .
Constructions in the {A,B,E}-setting can be “lifted” to settings with more interfaces. Such
a lifting is described by an injective function τ : {A,B,E} → L, where we generally assume
τ(E) = E. Resources R ∈ Φ{A,B,E} are embedded into ΦL by providing the A and B-interfaces
as τ(A) and τ(B)-interfaces and inactive interfaces for all I ∈ L\ τ({A,B,E}). We denote this
resource by JRK(τ(A),τ(B),τ(E)) (we usually only write JRK(τ(A),τ(B))). A protocol pi = (pi1, pi2)
consisting of a pair of converters pi1 for A and pi2 for B becomes piL = (piI)I∈L with piτ(A) = pi1,
piτ(B) = pi2, and piI = id for all I /∈ τ({A,B,E}). Security statements transfer from the
{A,B,E}-setting to the L-setting since any distinguisher in the L-setting can be translated
into a distinguisher for the {A,B,E}-setting by simply emulating the inactive interfaces. (In
particular this is a mapping in the above described sense.)
14
2.5 Discrete Systems
The statements in this paper are statements about discrete systems, i.e., systems that commu-
nicate by receiving and sending messages. We consider asynchronous systems and do not model
time, this means that our definitions currently cover neither timing attacks nor forward secrecy
(sometimes called “key corruptions”).
We formalize these systems as random systems [Mau02, Mau13], i.e., families of conditional
probability distributions.
Definition 5. Let X and Y be sets. An (X ,Y)-random system F is an infinite sequence of
conditional probability distributions pF
Yi|XiY i−1 : Y × X i × Y i−1 → [0, 1] for i ≥ 1.
Random systems can be equivalently described by a sequence of conditional probability
distributions pF
Y i|Xi for i ≥ 1 that satisfy a compatibility condition, i.e., for any two i′ < i′′ the
distributions are consistent for the first i′ values.
A game as described in Section 2.3 is an (X ,Y)-system which interacts with its environment
by taking inputs X1, X2, . . . (considered as moves of the adversary) and answering with outputs
Y1, Y2, . . . . In addition, after every input it also outputs a bit indicating whether the game has
been won. This bit is monotone in the sense that it is initially set to 0 and that, once it has
turned to 1 (the game is won), it can not turn back to 0 (even if the game were continued).
This motivates the following definition, which captures the notion of game-winning.
Definition 6. For a (X ,Y × {0, 1})-system F the binary component Ai of the output (Yi, Ai)
is called a monotone binary output (MBO) if Ai = 1 implies Aj = 1 for j ≥ i. Such a system F
with MBO is also called a (discrete) game.
Any system F together with a monotone event sequence (MES) A = (A1, A2, . . . ) defined
on F (within any random experiment, see [Mau02]) can be seen as the game by extending
the output of F by an additional component which turns from 0 to 1 exactly when the MES
becomes false. We write FA to denote the system with the additional MBO. Conversely, for
a (X ,Y × {0, 1})-system F (with MBO) we write F− to denote the (X ,Y) system where the
binary component of the output is discarded.
The adversary (or game winner) and the game are connected via their interfaces; i.e., the
adversary specifies the inputs Xi and obtains the outputs Yi of the game. To formulate “tradi-
tional” game-based definitions in this language, the game, often denoted as G with additional
super- and subscripts, allows the adversary A to issue “oracle queries” via that interface. We
usually denote the special monotone output bit as W . For a game G and an adversary A, we
define the game-winning probability after q steps (queries) as
ΓAq (G) := PAG(Wq = 1).
For an adversary A that halts after (at most) q steps, we write ΓA(G) := ΓAq (G).
Two systems with MBOs can be equivalent as games, which captures only that they behave
equivalently as long as the game is not won.
Definition 7. Two (X ,Y × {0, 1})-systems with MBO, S and T, are equivalent as games,
denoted S
g≡ T, if, for i ≥ 1,
pSY i,Ai=0|Xi = p
T
Y i,Ai=0|Xi .
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2.6 Insecure Communication Channels and TLS Fragments
The TLS protocol transmits its data via a TCP connection which transmits a byte stream. At
the lowest level, the TLS record protocol then partitions this byte stream into fragments, each
fragment corresponding to one message sent in the TLS protocol. Technically, each fragment
consists of four fields:
1. the content type of the transmitted message, which signals whether the message is a
change cipher spec request, an alert, a handshake message, or application data,
2. the protocol version,
3. the length of the following payload, and
4. the payload message itself.
For simplicity, we model the communication channels that we assume as channels that transmit
TLS fragments, ignoring the part of the protocol that converts the fragments into the TCP
byte stream and vice versa. The plaintext contained in a TLS plaintext fragment is of length at
most 214 = 16384 bits, and a TLS ciphertext fragment is of length at most 214 + 2048 = 18432
bits (plus 5 bytes of header). We generally write B≤` := ⋃0≤i≤`{0, 1}i.
3 Constructing the Master Secret
3.1 The Assumed Resources
The resources we assume for the TLS protocol are: an insecure network (obtained by using the
TCP/IP protocol in the Internet), a public-key infrastructure which we view as allowing the
server to send one message (its public key) authentically to all clients, and a random-oracle
resource, outputting consistent random values for user (and adversary) input.
The “Internet” network resource. The insecure network is described as a parallel compo-
sition of insecure channels. There are two such channels between each potential client and the
server (one in each direction). Technically, the TLS protocol is run via a TCP connection which
transmits byte streams; TLS partitions such a byte stream into TLS fragments that correspond
to the messages sent by higher protocol layers. These fragments are the lowest layer that we
consider in our analysis; for us, an insecure communication channel is one that transmits a
sequence of TLS fragments.
Insecure channel −
No attacker present:
Repeatedly: Upon input a message m ∈ B≤18432 at the A-interface, output m at the
B-interface;
Attacker present:
Repeatedly: Upon input a message m ∈ B≤18432 at the A-interface, output m at the
E-interface.
Repeatedly: Upon input a message m ∈ B≤18432 at the E-interface, output m at the
B-interface.
As TLS builds on TCP, we can envision the insecure channels to be identified by the clients’
TCP sockets, i.e., an address in the set ATCP = {0, 1}32 × {0, 1}16. Consequently, the entire
network resource, which we denote by NET, is defined as the parallel composition of resources⊗
C∈ATCP J[−, −]K(C,S/C).
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The public-key infrastructure. For the case of unilateral authentication (i.e., only the
server has a certificate and the clients are not authenticated), we describe a “simple” resource
that allows the server to authenticate its public key toward all clients. This task is, in a real
protocol, achieved by using certificates obtained from some certification authority.
The resource PKI provides one “client” interface for each C ∈ C, as well as a “server”
interface S, and an “eavesdropper” interface E. The resource is parametrized by a distribution
F over functions f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ that depends on the scheme used to construct the resource,
which might be, as in the case of TLS, X.509. For more details on X.509 see Appendix A.1.
Public-Key Infrastructure Resource PKIF
Choose a function f ← F.
No attacker present:
• On input a message (register, x) at the S-interface with x ∈ {0, 1}∗, output s = f(x)
at the S-interface.
• On input (verify, x, s) at some interface C ∈ C:
– If x was input at the S-interface and the response was s, then output 1.
– Otherwise, output 0.
Attacker present:
• On input a message (register, x) at the S-interface with x ∈ {0, 1}∗, output s = f(x)
at the S-interface. Additionally output (x, s) at the E-interface.
• On input (verify, x, s) at some interface C ∈ C:
– If x was input at the S-interface and the response was s, then output 1.
– Otherwise, output 0.
Related papers following the constructive cryptography paradigm, such as [CMT13, MTC13],
model the capability of authentically transmitting a single message such as a public key to
other parties as an authenticated single-message channel. This simpler formalization is gener-
ally preferable because it abstracts from the scheme with which the authentication is achieved;
however, in the case of TLS the certificates issued by the certification authority (i.e., the bit
strings) are actually used within higher levels of the protocol, in particular, the certificates are
included in the computation of the “finished” message.
Uniqueness of certificates. The description of the certification resource PKIF described
above formalizes that the encoding of certificates is unique: the verification is successful if and
only if exactly the same pair (x, s) has occurred previously. This assumption is justified because
the X.509 certificates are transmitted in TLS via DER encoding, which guarantees that every
data structure has a unique representation.
The random oracle. The random oracle is a resource that can be queried at all interfaces
with strings x ∈ {0, 1}∗, and for each new string, it responds with a uniform output of length k.
If some input was queried (at any interface) before, then the random oracle answers consistently.
(If the E-interface is not blocked, the queries at that interface are answered consistently with
the queries at the other interfaces.)
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Random Oracle ROk
On input a string x ∈ {0, 1}∗ at some interface:
• if x was queried before at some (potentially other) interface, respond with the same
value as in that query;
• otherwise, draw a uniformly random y ∈ {0, 1}k and respond with y.
3.2 Session Naming
In the setting of unilateral key exchange, clients do not a priori possess any information that
differentiates them from other clients. To prevent protocol sessions from interfering with each
other, however, it is necessary to cryptographically bind some unique information to each ses-
sion. In the TLS protocol, the client’s nonce can serve this purpose. In fact, this nonce can be
seen as a “unique name”, as it is—with high probability—unique for honest clients.
3.2.1 Choosing Unique Nonces
Unique names are formalized as a resource that provides to each honest party a unique value.
This resource does not have a (non-trivial) E-interface since it merely models the fact that each
client can locally choose a unique name; there is no requirement that the chosen names need to
be known to other parties. For a set N of names and a set C ⊆ ATCP such that |N | ≥ |C|, the
resource NAME parametrized by an injective function ρ : C → ρ(C) ⊆ N assigns to each client
C ∈ C a unique name η = ρ(C) ∈ N .
Unique name resource NAMEρ for ρ : C → N
At each interface C ∈ C, output ρ(C).
Choosing a nonce at random from some distribution N over the set N also implements this
resource; thus, the resource is constructed without any setup assumptions. In more detail, let
rnd be the converter that chooses a nonce η←$ N at random and outputs η at the outside
interface. The client nonces in TLS consist of a 28 byte random string to which the date and
time are prepended, so N = {0, 1}256. As the nonce contains 224 bits of randomness, any pair
of two clients chooses the same nonce with probability at most
(|C|
2
)
2−224, where |C| is the total
number of client sessions (see [MTC13, Lemma 7]). In the following, we use the symbol N to
denote the distribution used in TLS.
3.2.2 Separating Network Sessions
The client’s nonce ηC is sent to the server which uses it to identify that particular client’s
session. While the nonces used by honest clients as obtained from the NAME resource are
unique, the server does not prevent the adversary from starting many sessions with the same
nonce. Hence, we index the sessions by pairs sid = (ηC , e) ∈ N × N. Furthermore, the server
also chooses a nonce ηsid ←$ N for this session and sends it to the client. This nonce exchange
protocol constructs, from the resources NAMEρ for some injective mapping ρ : C → N and NET,
a resource denoted by SNET.
The resource SNET, which is described in Figure 3, has interfaces labeled C ∈ C for the
clients, a server’s interface S which has one sub-interface for each pair (η, e), where η ∈ N is the
client’s nonce and e ∈ [n] is a counter indicating how many sessions have been initiated with
nonce η, and an adversary’s interface called E. To simplify further construction steps, we rule
out collisions for server nonces in the SNET resource below, in sessions that are associated to
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the same client nonce (i.e., sid = (ηC , e) and sid
′ = (ηC , e′)). The reason is that by making the
pairs of clients and server nonces unique, we guarantee that any two sessions obtain their keys
by querying different parts of the random oracle. Technically, our SNET resource will check,
when generating a server nonce for a particular client nonce, whether the same server nonce has
already been generated for that client nonce. Note that the server nonce has the same structure
as the client nonce, thus the security loss is analogous.
Augmented Network Resource SNETN,ρ,n
The resource is parametrized by a nonce distribution N, an injective function ρ : C → N ,
and n ∈ N.
No attacker present: For each C ∈ C choose a nonce ηsid ←$ N with sid = (ρ(C), 1), out-
put (ρ(C), ηsid ) at interface C and ηsid at interface sid , and provide bidirectional channels
between those two interfaces.
Attacker present: Initialize eη = 0 for all η ∈ N . For each C ∈ C, output the nonce ηC
at the interface C and forward all messages input at interface C to the sub-interface E/C.
Additionally:
• Upon input (ack, η˜) at interface E, if eη˜ ≤ n, then for sid = (η˜, eη˜) choose a nonce
ηsid uniformly at random from N \ {ηsid1 , . . . , ηsideη˜−1} (where side = (η˜, e)), out-
put ηsid at the E/sid - and the S/sid -interfaces, and increase eη˜. Then, forward all
communication between the interfaces S/sid and E/sid .
• Upon input (deliver, C, η˜) with C ∈ C, output the server’s nonce η˜ at the interface C.
Then, forward all messages between input at the sub-interface E/C at the interface C.
Figure 3: The network resource that additionally outputs nonces.
The resource SNETN,ρ,n is constructed (from NAMEρ and NET) by the protocol (hec, hesn)
described as follows, where the server’s converter hesn is parametrized by the maximum number
of sessions it accepts per client nonce.
Client converter hec: (Each such converter connects to an interface C ∈ C ⊆ ATCP which has
three sub-interfaces: one each for sending messages to, and respectively receiving messages
from the server, and a third sub-interface for obtaining the nonce.) Get a nonce ηC ∈ N
from the resource NAMEρ, output it at the outside interface and send it via the sending
sub-interface. Forward all messages input at the outside interface to the first inside sub-
interface. Upon receiving η˜ at the receiving sub-interface, output η˜ at the outside interface.
Afterward, forward all messages obtained at the second inside sub-interface to the outside
interface.
Server converter hesn: Initially set eη = 1 for each η ∈ N .
• Upon receiving a nonce η˜C at an inside C-sub-interface for some C ∈ ATCP, if
eη˜C ≤ n, then choose a nonce ηsid ←$ N, send ηsid via the C-sub-interface at the
inside. Output ηsid at outside ˜sid -sub-interface with ˜sid = (η˜C , eη˜C ), and increment
eη˜C by 1.
• Afterward, forward all messages between the outside sub-interfaces associated to ˜sid
and the inside C-sub-interfaces.
We prove the following (security) statement.
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Lemma 8. Let C ⊆ ATCP and let ρ : C → N be an injective mapping. The protocol (hec, hesn)
constructs the resource SNETN,ρ,n from the resources NET and NAMEρ. In more detail, for the
simulator σ in the proof:
[NET,NAMEρ]
(hec,hesn),σ,(0,ε)
==⇒ SNETN,ρ,n,
with ε(D) :=
(
n
2
) · 2−224 for all distinguishers D.
Proof.
Availability. Apart from outputting nonces at the server’s side, there is one main difference
between the real resource, [NET,NAMEρ], and the ideal resource, SNETN,ρ,n: the server sessions
in SNETN,ρ,n are denoted by tuples (η, e), where η is the client nonce and e ∈ [n] is the index of
the session between the server and that particular client; by contrast, the server sessions in NET
are denoted as TCP addresses. Since η is unique (by the properties of NET), this difference is
strictly nominal, and the server’s converter hesn takes care of it.
Security. We prove the security statement in two steps. In the first step we modify the
ideal resource SNETN,ρ,n and define a resource H which behaves exactly like SNETN,ρ,n except
that it does not check for collisions in server nonce values. We first argue that SNETN,ρ,n
and H behave identically, up to a difference of
(
n
2
) · 2−224. Indeed, the two resources behave
differently only when, for some nonce η˜, the resource H outputs a duplicate nonce ηsid = ηsid ′
for sid = (η˜, e) 6= (η˜, e′) = sid ′. A collision in two of at most n sessions occurs with probability(
n
2
) · 2−224.
Let R :=
∏
C∈C hec
Chesn
S⊥E [NET,NAMEρ]. In the second step, we show R and S′ := σEH
are equivalent, for the following σ described below. (Note that intuitively S′ (and indeed the
ideal resource SNETN,ρ,n) has no security properties with respect to the message transmission,
e.g. integrity or confidentiality. Indeed, SNETN,ρ,n describes a network that exchanges nonces
correctly between clients and servers, with the additional property that no two sessions share
the same nonces.) The simulator σ behaves as follows:
• Initialization. Set eη = 1 for all η ∈ N . For each C ∈ C, simulate ρ(C) as being
transmitted on J−K(C,S/C).
• Output client messages. All messages obtained via the inside C-sub-interface are output
as transmitted via J−K(C,S/C).
• Delivery of client’s nonce. On input a nonce η˜ at the outside sub-interface corresponding
to a channel J−K(C,S/C), if eη˜ ≤ n, then input (ack, η˜) at the inside interface, set
sid = (η˜, eη˜), and increase eη˜. Obtain a nonce at the inside interface, call it ηsid , and
output ηsid at the outside interface as transmitted via J −K(C,S/C). All messages obtained
via the inside sid -sub-interface are output as transmitted via J −K(C,S/C), all messages
input at the outside sub-interface corresponding to channel J−K(C,S/C) are input at the
inside sid -sub-interface.
• Delivery of the server’s nonce. On input the first message (a nonce η˜) at the outside sub-
interface corresponding to a channel J −K(C,S/C), input (deliver, C, η˜) at the inside
interface. All messages input afterward at the outside sub-interface corresponding to
channel J −K(C,S/C) are input at the inside C-sub-interface.
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We argue that the simulation is perfect. Firstly, the simulator correctly instantiates the
sessions between clients and server. Indeed, in both cases, consistent server sub-interfaces are
used because the counters eηC are updated whenever a nonce ηC is delivered to the server.
The equivalence then follows from three observations:
• For each C ∈ C, first the nonce ηC is output and then all messages input at the C-interface
are output at the E-sub-interface corresponding to J−K(C,S/C) in both cases.
• On input the first message, a nonce η˜, at the E-interface of some channel J−K(C,S/C),
both the real and the ideal systems will respond with a nonce ηsid ←$ N for sid = (η˜, eη˜),
and also in both cases the output at the interface S/sid is (ηC , ηsid ). Afterward, the
communication between the interfaces S/sid and the E-interfaces of the channels corre-
sponding to C ′ is forwarded in both cases.
• On input the first message, a nonce η˜, at the E-interface of some channel J −K(C,S/C),
both the real and the ideal systems output η˜ at the C-interface. Afterward, the commu-
nication between the interface C and the E-interfaces of the channels corresponding to C
is forwarded in both cases.
This concludes the proof.
3.3 Constructing the Shared Key
The next step, following the structure of our outline, is constructing the master secret key.
In more detail, we construct (from SNET, PKI, and RO) a resource denoted as MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n.
Intuitively, this resource represents the result of the core of the handshake itself, as the parties
output the master key for the session, from which other keys are derived.
We describe a (slightly) more general resource KEYN,ρ,AUX ,n,K below, because we will use it
in the analysis of TLS 1.3 also for modeling the premaster key (this is not possible in TLS 1.2).
This, described in Figure 4, has interfaces C ∈ C ⊆ ATCP for the clients, an interface S for the
server with sub-interfaces labeled sid = (η, e) ∈ N × [n], and an “adversarial” interface E, and
is parametrized by the maximum number n of sessions per client nonce. For the set C ⊆ ATCP,
consider an injective function ρ : C → N , which also parametrizes the resource. The resource
is further parametrized by a distribution AUX for the auxiliary information—this is important
for specifying the behavior of the resource in the availability case. More generally, this can be a
family of distributions to formalize that the auxiliary information in different sessions has some
correlated random information. The resource is additionally parametrized by a key space K.
The master secret key is instantiated with K = {0, 1}384, hence with this instantiation
MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n := KEYN,ρ,AUX ,n,K. In TLS 1.2, the resource MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n is constructed in
one of three ways: by relying on RSA encryption, by means of a Diffie-Hellman key-exchange
protocol with a static server key, and by means of an Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange,
with an ephemeral server key. Next, we assess the security in constructing the master secret
key resource using TLS-DH, TLS-DHE, and TLS-RSA.
3.3.1 Diffie-Hellman with a Static Server Key
The DH-based protocol consists of two types of converters, one converter dhc attached to each
client interface and one converter dhsG attached to the server interface. The protocol is run in
a DH-group G of prime order p, generated by some element g which is chosen when the server
certificate is generated, according to some distribution which we denote G. The client converter,
dhc, behaves as follows:
1. Obtain the nonces ηC and ηsid from SNETN,ρ,n.
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Shared Key Resource KEYN,ρ,AUX ,n,K
No attacker present: For each C ∈ C, choose a key κC ←$K, a nonce
ηsid ←$ N (with sid = (ρ(C), 1)), and auxiliary information auxC ←$ AUX , and output
(κC , ρ(C), ηsid , auxC) at interface C and (κC , ηsid , auxC) at the interface S/sid . Then,
behave as the parallel composition
⊗
C∈C J[−, −]K(C,S/ρ(C)).
Attacker present: Initialize eη = 1 for all η ∈ ρ(C).
• For each η ∈ N , upon input (ack, η) at the E-interface, if eη ≤ n, then choose ηsid
uniformly at random from N \ {ηsid0 , . . . , ηsideη˜−1} for sid = (η, eη), output ηsid at
the E-interface and increase eη.
• Upon input (key-c, C, aux , η˜) at the E-interface with aux ∈ {0, 1}∗, and η˜ ∈ N :
1. If η˜ = ηsid for some sid = (ρ(C), e) with e < eη, then set κC = κsid ; else draw
κC from K uniformly at random.
2. Output at the C-interface (κC , ρ(C), η˜, aux ).
Afterward, if at the C-interface a message m ∈ B≤18432 is input, output m at the
E-interface. Also, allow at the E-interface to inject messages m′ ∈ B≤18432, to be
output at the C-interface.
• Upon input (key-s, η, e, aux ) at the E-interface with e < eη, with sid = (η, e):
1. If, for C = ρ−1(η), (key-c, C, ∗, ηsid ) was input at the E-interface before (i.e.,
with the current server’s nonce), then set κsid = κC ; else draw κsid uniformly
at random from K.
2. Output at the sid -sub-interface of the S-interface (κsid , ηsid , aux ).
• Upon input (inject, η, e, aux , κ) at the E-interface, if e < eη, then output at the
sid = (η, eη)-sub-interface of the S-interface (κ, ηsid , aux ).
After either a (key-s, η, e, ∗) or a (inject, η, e, ∗, ∗), if at the S/sid -sub-interface (with
sid = (η, e)) a message m ∈ B≤18432 is input, output m at the E-interface. Also, allow at
the E-interface to inject messages m′ ∈ B≤18432 to be output at the S/sid -sub-interface.
Figure 4: The shared key resource.
2. Obtain value cert via SNETN,ρ,n, parse cert as ((G, pkS), s).4 Here we slightly abuse
syntax and write G to mean a description of the group G, including the generator g.5
3. Verify the server’s certificate by querying (verify, cert) at PKIF (if that fails, abort).
4. Choose a secret u ∈ {1, . . . , |G|} and send epkC = gu via SNETN,ρ,n.
5. Query pkuS |master secret|ηC |ηsid at RO384, receive κ.
6. Output (κ, ηC , ηsid , (epkC , cert)).
The server converter, dhsG , behaves as follows:
0. Sample a group G←$ G and generate a DH key pair (pkS , skS) = (gv, v). Register the
4In the specifications of TLS 1.2, if the public key is not extractable from certificates, for client and/or server,
a special message can be sent, which includes the public key. Here we restrict to the standard case.
5In particular, the X.509 certificate explicitly encodes the prime order p of the Galois field, the prime sub-order
q of the group, and the group generator g, of order q [HFPS99].
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public key pkS at PKIF via (register, (G, pkS)), obtaining the value cert = ((G, pkS), s).
For each of the sessions described by a pair (ηC , e):
1. Upon receiving the nonce ηsid at the inside interface, respond with the certificate cert .
2. Upon receiving ˜epkC ∈ G, query ˜epk
v
C |master secret|ηC |ηsid at RO384, receiving κ˜.
3. Output (κ˜, ηsid , ( ˜epkC , cert)) at the outer (ηC , e)-sub-interface.
We prove that the Diffie-Hellman-based protocol with static server key indeed constructs the
master secret. The distribution AUX associated with the resource MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n produces two
values. The first varies for each session and is an element g˜ ∈ G (namely the public key epkC ,
where G is sampled according to G). The second one is fixed for all sessions and is distributed
like the certificate cert .
Lemma 9. If the GapDH assumption holds with respect to the distribution G, then the protocol
(dhc, dhsG) constructs from [RO384, SNETN,ρ,n,PKIF] the resource MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n. In more detail,
for the simulator σ and the reduction C in the proof,
[RO384, SNETN,ρ,n,PKIF]
(dhc,dhsG),σ,(0,ε)
==⇒ MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n
such that for all D, ε(D) := ΓDC(GGapDHG ).
It might appear surprising that we obtain a tight reduction in the construction, given that
the security statement applies to a setting with multiple parallel sessions. The reason is that we
can exploit the random self-reducibility of the GapDH problem to “inject” the GGapDHG -challenge
into every session without changing the overall distribution.
Proof.
Availability. For availability, the ideal MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n resource outputs random values and
provides channels between the clients’ and the server’s interfaces that deliver all messages faith-
fully.
In the real resource the nonces are exchanged in SNETN,ρ,n—with no attacker present. The
certificate is correctly generated for the server’s public key pkS , and the client’s ephemeral public
key epkC is transmitted correctly. For the output, first note that the key κ, which is output
by RO384 in the real resource and is picked uniformly at random in the ideal resource, have
identical distributions—this is guaranteed by the RO384 resource. At the server’s sub-interfaces,
the consistent keys is delivered.
Finally, the auxiliary output aux is defined as (epkC , cert) and has the correct distribution
in both cases. Furthermore, once the initial exchanges are done, both resources behave like
insecure bidirectional channels in both directions. This verifies the availability condition.
Security. The simulator σ does the following:
• Initialization. Initially, set eη = 1 for all η ∈ N and define an (initially empty) map
R : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}384. Choose a function f ← F and a group G←$ G, generate the
server’s DH key pair (sk = v, pk = gv) for group G, compute s = f(G, pk) and output
cert = ((G, pk), s) at the outside interface to simulate the effect of an input (register, pk)
to PKIF.
• Delivery of the client nonce. Upon input of the type (ack, ηC) at the outside interface,
issue (ack, ηC) at the inside interface
6 and receive the generated ηsid for sid = (ηC , eηC ).
6For the analysis, note that in the ideal resource the keys output at the client, server, and E interfaces are
all independent of the input nonces; thus, it is not important whether the adversary has forwarded an honestly
generated ηC or injected a different η˜C .
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Output ηsid at the outside interface as coming from SNET, together with the certificate
cert , and increase eηC .
• Delivery of the server nonce. Upon input (key-s, C, η˜) at the outside interface and after
cert is delivered to C via SNET,7 generate u, epkC = g
u, and input (key-c, C, aux , η˜) at
the inside interface (where aux = (cert , epkC)). Simulate sending the DH element epkC
from C via SNETN,ρ,n, and register (η˜, epkC).
• Delivery of DH element. If some group element ˜epkC ∈ G is input at the outside sub-
interface sid = (η, e) with e ≥ eη, then:
– If ˜epkC corresponds to a recorded pair (ηsid ,
˜epkC) then issue (deliver, η, e, aux ) at
the inside interface, with aux = (cert , epkC);
– Otherwise, input (inject, η, e, aux , κ) at the inside interface, with aux = (cert , ˜epkC),
and with the value κ computed as follows: if ˜epk
v
C |master secret|η|ηsid is defined in
R, then use R( ˜epk
v
C |master secret|η|ηsid ); otherwise define it as a freshly sampled
value R( ˜epk
v
C |master secret|η|ηsid )←$ {0, 1}384 and use that.
• Simulation of random oracle. Whenever the adversary E or either of the honest parties are
supposed to query the RO384 resource, return a random element R(x)←$ {0, 1}384, unless
the same input was queried before (in that case, return the value that was previously
returned).
Denote R :=
∏
C∈C dhc
CdhsGS [RO384, SNETN,ρ,n,PKIF] and let S := σEMSKN,ρ,AUX ,n. We
first analyze the behavior of R and S in the initial queries.
• The exchange of the server’s nonces in the real and the ideal resource (the former using
SNET for it) is identical, the output at the E-interface having exactly the same distribu-
tions.
• The value cert has the same distribution in both cases.
• Injecting a value ˜epkC in a session between client C and the interface sid = (η, e), such
that the client C has already sent epkC 6= ˜epkC and computed its output, does not cause
discrepancies. In particular, as the keys are injected by the simulator and the random
oracle is simulated consistently, the simulation in this case is perfect, irrespective of any
queries the adversary makes to the random oracle.
Intuitively, the discrepancy between the two resources appears when the distinguisher ex-
pects a different output from the random oracle resource RO384 (in the real world) than the
output generated by the simulator (in the ideal world). This occurs (only) in sessions where
the key κ output by the client or server is obtained from RO384 via a query that is also asked
at RO384 by the adversary, whereas in the ideal world, the output at the client’s or server’s
interface is picked uniformly at random by MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n and the simulator cannot simulate
queries to RO384 consistently.
In the following, we show a reduction such that if such an event happens for some session,
this reduction outputs a solution to the GGapDHG game (see Appendix C.2)—in particular, the
distinguisher must be able to find the input value ˜epk
v
C by only knowing epkC = g
u and gv.
To simulate the environment for the distinguisher, the reduction will make “DDH-queries” at
GGapDHG , which enables it to simulate the random oracle consistently.
7Note that we simplify the certificate verification step in our analysis, confining ourselves to simply outputting
a bit, indicating validity/non-validity. In TLS, this is done in a more thorough manner, and several alert messages
are generated, depending on where the verification failed.
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We describe a reduction C that obtains (G, g, g1, g2) at the inside interface and starts sim-
ulating the setup using the group description (G, g) and g1 as the server’s public key (thus for
the simulated instance it holds that gv = g1), and otherwise behaves similar to S. To simulate
a group element sent by the client Ci, C chooses a value ri ∈ [|G|] uniformly at random and
simulates sending g˜i := g2 · gri .
As the reduction does not know the server’s secret, i.e. v, it has to make DDH-queries at
GGapDHG to answer random oracle queries consistently. In more detail, the simulation of queries
goes as follows. For administrative purposes, the reduction keeps track of what the distinguisher
knows about the random oracle by updating two lists, initially empty. One list, which we denote
as HH records queries of the form (x, η, ηsid , y) (the value y is the output to honest parties to
input of the form x|master secret|η|ηsid ). The second list is denotedHM and records malicious
deliveries of ˜epkC values by the distinguisher to the simulated server; the entries are of the form
( ˜epkC , η, ηsid , y), where y is the output returned by the reductions when simulating RO384 for
the maliciously injected input ˜epkC . The queries are answered by the reduction as follows:
• Whenever the random oracle is queried on input (x, η, ηsid ), first check if there exists an
entry (x, η, ηsid , y) ∈ HH and if so, output y; else check if DDH(g1, g2, x · g−ri1 ) = 1 for
some i ∈ {1, . . . , |C|} and if so, output x · g−ri1 as solution to GGapDHG . Else check for all
entries ( ˜epkC , η, ηsid , y) ∈ HM and return y if DDH( ˜epkC , g1, x) = 1. Otherwise, respond
with a random y and update the list HH ← HH ∪ {(x, η, ηsid , y)}.
• When the adversary delivers some group element ˜epkC to the server session sid , the reduc-
tion needs to simulate a random oracle query on input ( ˜epk
v
C , η, ηsid ), where v = logg g1.
As the reduction does not know v, it first checks if there is an entry ( ˜epkC , η, ηsid , y) ∈ HM ;
if such an entry exists, the reduction returns y; else, it checks if there exists an input of
the form (x, η, ηsid , y) ∈ HH such that DDH( ˜epkC , g1, x) = 1 and if such a value exists, it
returns it and updates HM ← HM ∪ {( ˜epkC , η, ηsid , y)}. If no such value exists then the
reduction returns a random value y, and also updates HM ← HM ∪ {( ˜epkC , η, ηsid , y)}.
We define MBOs E i = (Ei1, Ei2, . . . ) on the systems R, S, and C
(
GGapDHG
)−
as follows:
Eq becomes 1 if after q queries there has been a query (pmk |master secret|ηC |ηsid ) at the
random oracle, such that C = Ci, sid = (ηC , j) for some j ∈ [n], and pmk is the DH element
corresponding g1 and g˜i. We then set E =
∨n
i=1 E i. Note that for g1 = gu, g2 = gv (so
g˜i = g
v+ri) and pmk = gu(v+r1) = guv · guri = guv · gri1 , the reduction C always obtains the
correct guv = pmk · g−r11 .
Now it holds that RE
g≡ SE g≡ CE
(
GGapDHG
)−
, in particular all clients’ group elements
are uniformly distributed by their definition in dhc, σ, and C. Using Lemma 26 together
with the fact that C wins the game GGapDHG whenever the output E is provoked, formally
ΓDC(GGapDHG ) = Γ
D(CGGapDHG ) ≥ ΓD
(
CE
(
GGapDHG
)−)
, concludes the proof.
3.3.2 Diffie-Hellman with an Ephemeral Server Key
The construction of the master secret key resource using the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman mode
can be proven in two constructive steps. First, we use the signature scheme to construct a
network / −• from SNET and PKI; this network allows the server to send one message in each
session in an authenticated way. Second, we complete the analysis of the TLS-DHE mode by
using the resource / −• to transmit the group parameters and the server’s ephemeral public key.
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The authenticated transmission resource. The resource / −• has (client) interfaces C ∈
C ⊆ ATCP, a (server) interface S with sub-interfaces (η, e) ∈ N × N with e ∈ N, and an
(eavesdropper) interface E with sub-interfaces ATCP ∪ (N × N), and is parametrized by an
injection ρ : C → N , a distribution F over functions f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗, and a signature
scheme SIG = (gen, sign, vrf ) as defined in Appendix B.1. The resource is described in detail
in Figure 5.
The Authenticated Transmission / −•N,ρ,F,SIG,n
Initially, generate a key pair (sk , vk)← gen.
No attacker present:
• Initially, choose f ← F. Output aux = (vk , f(vk)) at interface S. For each η ∈ ρ(C)
and sid = (η, 1), sample ηsid ←$ N and output ηsid at interface S/sid .
• At each interface C ∈ C, output the nonce ρ(C). Then, all messages m input at C
are output at interface S/sid with sid = (ρ(C), 1).
• Upon input the first message m at interface S/sid with sid = (η, 1) with η ∈ ρ(C),
generate a signature s← sign(η|ηsid |m; sk), output s at interface S/sid , and output
(aux , ηsid ,m, s) at interface C = ρ
−1(η). (For inputs at interfaces S/(η, e) with e > 1
or η 6∈ ρ(C), no output is generated.)
• All further messages m′ input at interface S/sid with sid = (ρ(C), 1) for some C ∈ C
are output at interface C.
Attacker present: Initialize eη = 1 for all η ∈ N and a buffer B = ∅. Output vk at the
E-interface.
• Initially, obtain aux ∈ {0, 1}∗ at the E-interface. (This is supposed to contain the
certificate.) Output aux at the S-interface.
• At each interface C ∈ C, output the nonce ρ(C). Then, on input a message m ∈
B≤18432 at the C-interface, output m at the interface E/C.
• Upon input (ack, η) for η ∈ N at the E-interface, if eη ≤ n then draw ηsid uniformly
at random from N \ {ηsid1 , . . . , ηsideη˜−1} with sid i = (η, i), increase eη, and output
ηsid at interfaces S/sid and E/sid .
• Upon input the first message m at interface S/sid (with sid = (η, e) and e < eη,
otherwise ignore the input), generate a signature s ← sign(η|ηsid |m; sk), record
(η|ηsid |m, s) in B, output s at interface S/sid , and (m, s) at interface E/sid .
Afterward, if at interface S/sid a message m ∈ B≤18432 is input, output m at in-
terface E/sid . Also, allow at interface E/sid to inject messages m′ ∈ B≤18432 to be
output at interface S/sid .
• Upon input (deliver, C, η˜, m˜) at the E-interface (once for each C ∈ C), if there is a
record (η|η˜|m˜, s˜) ∈ B such that η = ρ(C), output (aux , η˜, m˜, s˜) at interface C.
Afterward, allow at interface E/C to inject messages m′ ∈ B≤18432 to be output at
the C-interface.
Figure 5: The network allowing the server to transmit, to each client, one message authentically.
TLS 1.2 variant.
The following protocol constructs / −•N,ρ,F,SIG,n from SNETN,ρ,n and PKIF: The client’s
converter vrf is based on the signature scheme SIG and behaves as follows:
0. Obtaining the nonce ηC ∈ N from SNETN,ρ,n, output ηC at the outside interface. Forward
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all messages from the outside to the inside interface. (Messages sent from the client to
the server.)
1. Obtain the server’s nonce ηsid ∈ N from SNETN,ρ,n.
2. Obtain the first message cert from SNETN,ρ,n. Query (verify, cert) at PKIF; abort if the
verification fails or if cert is not a well-formed certificate cert = (vk , f(vk)).
3. Obtain the second message m′ from SNETN,ρ,n and parse m′ as (m, s) (abort if that is
impossible). If vrf (ηC |ηsid |m, s; vk) = 1, then output (cert , ηC , ηsid ,m, s) at the outside
interface. (Otherwise abort.)
4. Forward all further messages from the inside to the outside interface. (Messages sent from
the server to the client.)
The server’s converter sgn provides at the outside “sessions” for all sid = (ηC , e) ∈ N × [n] and
behaves as follows:
0. Compute (sk , vk)← gen. Input vk at PKIF, obtaining a response s, and set cert = (vk , s).
Output cert at the outside interface (as auxiliary information).
For each session sid = (ηC , e)—i.e., the inputs/outputs at SNETN,ρ,n are at the corresponding
inside sub-interface sid , and the inputs/outputs at the outside interface are at sub-interface
sid—do:
1. Receiving a nonce ηsid from SNETN,ρ,n, output ηsid at the outside and send cert via
SNETN,ρ,n.
2. Obtaining a message m at the outside, compute s ← sign(ηC |ηsid |m; sk) and send (m, s)
via SNETN,ρ,n. Output s at the outside.
3. Forward messages between inside and outside.
Lemma 10. The protocol (vrf, sgn) for a particular signature scheme SIG = (gen, sign, vrf )
constructs / −•N,ρ,F,SIG,n from SNETN,ρ,n and PKIF, if the signature scheme SIG is unforgeable.
In more detail, for the simulator σ and the reduction C described in the proof,
[SNETN,ρ,n,PKIF]
(vrf,sgn),σ,(0,ε)
==⇒ / −•N,ρ,F,SIG,n,
with ε(D) := ΓDC(Guf-cma) for all distinguishers D.
Proof.
Availability. We first verify the availability condition. The keys (sk , vk) and the function
f have the same distribution in the real and the ideal case,8 the same holds for the auxiliary
information aux = (vk , f(vk)) output at interface S. Each interface S/sid with sid = (ηC , 1)
and ρ(C) = ηC outputs a random nonce ηsid also in both cases. On input the first message m at
interface S/sid , the same interface outputs a (valid) signature s for m, and the client’s interface
C outputs (aux , ηC , ηsid ,m, s) (since all messages can be parsed correctly, the verification of
the server’s certificate at PKIF succeeds, and the verification of the signature s succeeds by the
correctness of SIG). Afterward, messages input at interface C are output at interface S/sid
and vice versa—in the real case these are simply transmitted via SNETN,ρ,n.
Security. For proving the security condition, we consider the following simulator σ:
8In the composed scheme, we let F be the distribution that one gets by generating a key pair according to the
signature scheme used by the assumed public-key infrastructure, and then for a parameter x ∈ {0, 1}∗ the result
of f is the pair (x, s) with s← sign(x; sk).
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• Initially, σ obtains the public key vk at the inside interface, chooses a function f ← F,
and computes cert = (vk , f(vk)). Also, σ internally initializes eη = 1 for all η ∈ N , and
inputs cert as auxiliary information at the inside interface, and as output of PKIF at the
outside interface.
• Upon input (ack, η) for a nonce η ∈ N at the outside interface, set sid = (η, eη). If
eη ≤ n, then input (ack, η) at the inside interface. Obtain the nonce ηsid at the inside
interface, output ηsid as response of SNETN,ρ,n at the outside interface, and increase eη.
Also, output cert at the outside interface as being transmitted via SNETN,ρ,n in session
sid .
• Upon input (deliver, C, η˜) at the outside sub-interface corresponding to SNETN,ρ,n, if
this is the first such query for C, record the nonce as ηsid := η˜ for sid = (ρ(η), ∗).
• When obtaining an output (m, s) at the inside sub-interface sid with sid = (η, e), output
(m, s) as being transmitted on SNETN,ρ,n as the second message via the corresponding
sub-interface. Mark sid as “active”.
• When receiving at the outside sub-interface corresponding to SNETN,ρ,n the first message
m˜1 to a client C, record C as “failed” if m˜1 6= cert .
• When receiving at the outside sub-interface corresponding to SNETN,ρ,n the second mes-
sage m˜2 = (m
′, s′) to a client C, if C is not marked as “failed” and, with sid = (ηC , ∗),
vrf (ηC |ηsid |m′, s′; vk) = 1, then input (deliver, C, ηsid ,m′) at the inside interface9 and
mark C as “active”.
• Communication is forwarded: for clients C ∈ C marked as “active,” messages m ∈ M
obtained at sub-interface C at the inside are output at the outside as being sent by C
via SNETN,ρ,n, and messages m
′ ∈ M obtained at the outside as input to SNETN,ρ,n
directed to C are input at sub-interface C at the inside. The analogous behavior applies
to the (server-bound) “active” sub-interfaces described by sid = (η, e).
Moreover, we use the reduction C that connects with the inside interface to the game Guf-cma
and provides at the outside interface an emulation of R :=
∏
C∈C vrf
CsgnS [SNETN,ρ,n,PKIF],
using the key pair (sk , vk) obtained from Guf-cma. Roughly, C emulates R, but computes
the certificate cert = (vk , f(vk)) using the verification key vk obtained from Guf-cma, and the
signatures s ← sign(ηC |ηsid |m; sk) in the converter sgn using signing queries to Guf-cma. A
“forgery” in the emulated execution can then be used to win the game Guf-cma (for the exact
definition of forgery see the MBO below; the forgery for Guf-cma is achieved by concatenating
the corresponding nonces and the message).
We define the following MBO E on the systems R, S := σE / −•N,ρ,F,SIG,n, and CGuf-cma
as the following “no forgery”-event: it becomes 1 once there is an input (m˜, s˜) at the E/sid -
interface with sid = (ηC , e) such that vrf (ηC |ηsid |m˜, s˜; vk) = 1—such that ηsid was generated as
a response in the S-session sid—unless there was an output (m˜, s˜′) at some interface E/sid ′ with
sid ′ = (η, e′) and ηsid ′ = ηsid before. Then, proving “game equivalence” and using Lemma 26
allows to conclude that the condition is fulfilled.
The equivalence can be seen as follows (we use the counter variables eη in the same way
they are defined in the systems, i.e., counting the number of sessions that have been initiated
with nonce η):
• Initially, both systems output the certificate cert = (vk , f(vk)), with vk and f chosen
according to the same distributions, as auxiliary information at the S-interface, and as
an output corresponding to PKIF at the E-interface. Additionally, for each C ∈ C, both
9This has an effect only if the corresponding message has been sent by the server before; if the signature is
forged, the real and ideal systems behave differently.
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systems output the client’s nonce ηC at the C-interface and forward messages from the
C-interface to the E/C-sub-interface.
• Upon input (ack, η) at the outside E-interface corresponding to SNETN,ρ,n, the system R
outputs a nonce ηsid at the E-interface of SNETN,ρ,n and the S/sid for sid = (η, eη), as
well as cert being sent via SNETN,ρ,n from the server-session sid to the client C (see the
description of sgn). In S, the nonce is generated according to the same distribution and
output at the same interfaces; the message cert is simulated correctly.
• Upon input (deliver, C, η˜) at the outside E-interface corresponding to SNETN,ρ,n, there
is no immediate output (neither for R nor for S).
• Upon delivering the first message m˜1 via SNETN,ρ,n to a client C, if m˜1 6= cert then, in R,
vrf aborts since either m˜1 is not a well-formed certificate or the verification at PKIF fails.
In S, σ marks C as “failed” in the same cases. There is no output, neither in R nor in S.
• Upon the first input m at the outside S/sid -interface with sid = (η, e), system R generates
a signature s for ηC |ηsid |m using the key sk (within sgn), outputs s at the same sub-
interface and the pair (m, s) at the E-interface of SNETN,ρ,n. Within S, the signature is
computed analogously by / −•N,ρ,F,SIG,n, also output at S/sid , and the message/signature
pair is output at the E-interface via σ.
• Upon delivering the second message m˜2 via SNETN,ρ,n to a client C, if m˜2 can be parsed
as a pair (m, s) such that, with sid = (ηC , ∗), vrf (ηC |ηsid |m, s; vk) = 1, then in R
(cert , ηsid ,m, s) is output at the C-interface (and nothing if vrf aborted earlier or because
the verification failed). By the definition of E , this means that there was an output (m, s′)
at some interface E/sid ′ with sid ′ = (ηC , e), ηC = ρ(C), and ηsid ′ = ηsid (where ηsid was
input via (deliver, C, ηsid )).
In S, the simulator σ also checks whether the message m˜2 can be parsed correctly, the
client has not “failed,” and the signature verifies for the message extended by prepending
the nonces ηC and ηsid with sid = (ηC , ∗), where the latter nonce was delivered to C as
the server’s nonce before. The MBO assures that there exists a corresponding record in
the buffer B, which means that the output of R and S is consistent if no forgery occurs,
i.e., the systems are equivalent as games.
• After a certain session (either C ∈ C or sid at S) has been initialized, messages input there
are output at the corresponding sub-interface of the E-interface and vice versa. This is
consistent in both R and S.
As the same arguments (with the exception that the signatures are obtained from Guf-cma but
have the same distribution) hold for the distribution in the case CGuf-cma, and each violation
of E can be used to win Guf-cma, this concludes the proof.
Constructing the key. The subsequent construction step is then achieved by the protocol
(dhec, dhesG), in which the server chooses for each session a (potentially fresh) Diffie-Hellman
group and element, which are sent as an authenticated message via / −•. We denote the
distribution over groups that the server uses by G; the only restriction implied by the TLS
standard is that the group specified as Z×p , where p is represented by at most 65535 bits [DR08,
page 51].10 We write dhesG wherever we want to make the distribution G used by the server
converter explicit.
The distribution AUX in this case consists of two parts. The first part is the same for
all sessions and consists of the certificate (i.e., depends on F and SIG of / −•N,ρ,F,SIG,n). The
distribution is described by (sk , vk) ← gen, f ←$ F, and then cert = (vk , f(vk)). The second
part is chosen independently for each session by doing the same process as in the protocol:
10We assume that the server picks a safe prime of appropriate size.
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choose a prime p ∈ N and a generator g ∈ Z×p according to the distribution G, and choose two
group elements g1, g2←$ Z×p uniformly at random.
The client’s converter dhec obtains ηC and (aux , ηsid ,m, s) at the inside interface, and then:
• Parse the message as p|g|g′ = m (abort if impossible).
• Choose u←$ {1, . . . , q} (with q = |Z×p |) and input gu at the inside interface.
• Query g′u|master secret|ηC |ηsid at RO384, in order to obtain a key κ ∈ {0, 1}384. Output
(κ, ηC , ηsid , aux |m|s|gu).
• Forward the following communication between the inside and the outside interfaces.
The server’s converter dhesG connects to the S-interface of / −•N,ρ,F,SIG,n. Both the inside and
outside interfaces have sub-interfaces sid = (ηC , e) ∈ N × [n]. The converter behaves as follows:
• Initially, receive aux on the inside interface.
• Upon obtaining a nonce ηsid at sub-interface sid = (ηC , e), choose a modulus p ∈ N
and a generator g ∈ Z×p according to the distribution G. Also, choose an exponent
v←$ {1, . . . , |Z×p |}. Send m = p|g|gv via the inside sub-interface sid . Obtain the signature
s at the inside interface in return.
• Upon receiving a group element g˜ in an (active) session sid = (ηC , e) at the inside interface,
query g˜v|master secret|ηC |ηsid at RO384, call the result κ. Output (κ, ηsid , aux |m|s|g˜)
at the outside sub-interface sid .
• Forward the following communication between the corresponding sub-interfaces sid of the
inside and the outside interface.
The described protocol indeed constructs the master secret key resource from the net-
work / −• and the random oracle RO384 under the assumption that the GapDH assumption
holds with respect to the distribution G.
Lemma 11. The protocol (dhec, dhesG) constructs from the assumed resources / −•N,ρ,F,SIG,n
and RO384 the resource MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n, under the GapDH assumption for G. More formally, for
the simulator σ and the reduction C described in the proof,
[ / −•N,ρ,F,SIG,n,RO384] (dhec,dhesG),σ,(0,ε)==⇒ MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n,
with ε(D) := n · |C| · ΓDC
(
GGapDHG
)
for all distinguishers D.
Proof.
Availability. We first prove the availability condition. The “ideal” system ⊥EMSKN,ρ,AUX ,n
chooses, for each session sid = (ηC , 1) with ρ(C) = ηC , a nonce ηsid , a key κC and auxil-
iary information auxC , and outputs (κC , ηsid , auxC), and afterward forwards communication
between C and S/sid .
The distribution in the case
∏
C∈C dhec
CdhesGS⊥E [ / −•N,ρ,F,SIG,n,RO384] is as follows. The
key κC for each client C is a uniformly random 384-bit string (the random oracle RO384 is queried
at distinct places as ηC is distinct by the assumption on ρ), the nonces ηsid for sid = (ηC , 1) are
distributed according to N, and the auxiliary information auxC has exactly the same distribution
as well. Moreover, after at both interfaces C and S/sid the above information is output, the
resource behaves as a bidirectional channel between those interfaces. This verifies the validity
of the condition.
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Security. The simulator basically needs to take care of the / −•N,ρ,F,SIG,n’s E-interface (be-
ginning with choosing some good aux ), and then needs to simulate the DH exchange, i.e., the
group and elements generated by the server as well as the element generated by the client. The
simulator σ behaves as follows:
• Throughout, σ keeps counters eη for each η ∈ N in the usual way (i.e., increase eη whenever
the nonce η is delivered to the server). Also, σ keeps a map R : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}384 which
is initially empty.
• Initially, obtain a string cert ∈ {0, 1}∗ at the outside interface (this is needed for the
auxiliary information).
• Upon input (ack, η) at the outside, input (ack, η) at the inside and obtain as response
ηsid for sid = (η, eη). Output ηsid at the outside interface. Also, choose a modulus
psid ∈ N and a generator gsid ∈ Z×psid according to G, as well as a value v←$ {1, . . . , qsid}
for qsid = |Z×psid |, compute g˜sid = gvsid and s ← sign(η|ηsid |psid |gsid |g˜sid ; sk), and output
(psid |gsid |g˜sid , s) at the outside sub-interface sid .
• Upon input (deliver, C, η˜, m˜) at the outside, if (ack, ηC) was input before, and there is a
session sid = (ηC , e) with η˜ = ηsid and m˜ = psid |gsid |g˜sid , then input (key-c, C, aux , ηsid )
with aux = cert |psid |gsid |g˜sid |g¯sid where g¯sid = gu for a uniformly random u ∈ {1, . . . , qsid}.
Simulate g¯sid as the first message transmitted from C to sid . (If any check fails, output
nothing—note that we simplify the protocol and do not handle error messages.)
• If a group element g′sid is delivered (i.e., input at the outside interface) to some instance
sid (and g′sid is a valid group element in the group with modulus psid ):
– if g′sid = g¯sid , then input (key-s, ηC , e, aux ) and aux = cert |psid |gsid |g˜sid |g¯sid (with
sid = (ηC , e)) at the inside interface;
– otherwise, for x = g′sid
v|master secret|ηC |ηsid , if R(x) is undefined, initialize it as
R(x)←$ {0, 1}384 and input (inject, ηC , e, aux , R(x)) at the inside interface with
sid = (ηC , e) and aux = cert |psid |gsid |g˜sid |g′sid .
• Simulate the random oracle, that is, on input x intended for RO384 at the E-interface, if
R(x) is not defined then set R(x)←$ {0, 1}384. Return R(x).
• Deliver messages faithfully for the sessions where the setup is complete, i.e., for clients
C ∈ C after a successful—i.e., one that was simulated before—(deliver, C, η˜, m˜) query,
and for server sessions sid = (η, e) after delivering a valid group element (valid with
respect to the group used in that session) in response to the authenticated message via/ −•N,ρ,F,SIG,n.
We first observe that the two systems R =
∏
C∈C dhec
CdhesGS [ / −•N,ρ,F,SIG,n,RO384] and
S = σEMSKN,ρ,AUX ,n are equivalent with respect to how they treat nonces; in particular, the
responses to (ack, η) are determined by choosing fresh parameters in both cases. The same
argument holds for the queries in which messages are forwarded in the sessions that completed
the setup.
For the queries (deliver, C, η,m), for delivering group elements to a session sid of the
server, and for querying the random oracle RO384, the difference between R and S is that in R,
all “keys” output at either C ∈ C or S/(ηC , e) for ηC ∈ N and e ∈ [n] are chosen consistently
with the random oracle queries, whereas in S they are not (in cases where both group elements
have been simulated).
We then describe reduction systems Ci,j for i ∈ [|C|] and j ∈ [n], which obtain at the inside
interface a modulus p, a generator g, and two group elements ga, gb. We assume that there is
some (e.g., lexicographic) ordering on the set C, i.e., the elements are C1, . . . , C|C|. All systems
Ci,j manage internally a map R : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}384 which is initially empty and is managed
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as a “random oracle with lazy evaluation”, i.e., whenever a look-up R(x) for x ∈ {0, 1}∗ in R
fails, the system will choose a fresh random value y ∈ {0, 1}384, store R(x) = y, and use y as the
result. The system Ci,j then behaves as follows (we stress that every query can be associated
with a (client’s) nonce η ∈ N , either because the nonce is given explicitly, or because the query
belongs to a session that is described by a nonce and a counter):
• for queries (at the S- and E-interfaces) that are related to nonces η ∈ N \ ρ(C), the
system Ci,j can easily reproduce the behavior of the real or ideal systems (their behavior
is equivalent for those queries);
• For queries that are related to a client C` resp. the nonce η` = ρ(C`) with ` 6= i, or
alternatively to (server) sessions (ρ(Ci), e) with e 6= j, emulate the entire sessions. Choose
the key output at C` and the corresponding sub-interface of the server (if there is a
consistent session, corresponding to the use of key-s in MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n) by computing as
in the protocol and then evaluating R.
• For the jth (ack, ρ(Ci))-query, emulate the server’s response using the parameters (i.e.,
the modulus p, the generator g, and the first group element ga) obtained at the inside
interface.
• For the query (deliver, Ci, η˜, m˜) at the sub-interface corresponding to / −•N,ρ,F,SIG,n:
– if η˜ = ηsid for sid = (ρ(Ci), j), and if the message would be admitted by / −•N,ρ,F,SIG,n,
then emulate the second group element gb obtained at the inside interface as a mes-
sage from Ci to sid . Choose κCi ∈R {0, 1}384 and emulate it at interface Ci.
– if η˜ = ηsid for sid = (ρ(Ci), e) and e 6= j, and if the message would be admitted by/ −•N,ρ,F,SIG,n, then emulate a uniformly chosen element of the group described in
m˜; choose the key κCi using the map R evaluated on g˜|master secret|ρ(Ci)|ηsid ,
where g˜ is the DH key that can be computed because Ci,j chose all parameters.
• Upon delivery of the first client’s message in session sid = (ρ(Ci), j), if the message
completes a consistent session with Ci, then emulate the output κCi at the sid -interface.
Otherwise, compute the server’s output according to the protocol.
• Queries x ∈ {0, 1}∗ to RO384 are answered by evaluating y = R(x) as described above and
answering with y. If x = g˜|master secret|ρ(Ci)|ηsid , where g˜ is a valid group element
with respect to the group Zp, use the queries at the inside interface to determine whether
gab = g˜ and, in case of success, input g˜ as solution at the inside interface and halt.
In the following, we use C∗,∗ wherever the indices i, j of Ci,j are irrelevant. Consider now the
following MBOs E i,j = (Ei,j1 , Ei,j2 , . . . ) for each pair (i, j) with i ∈ [|C|] and j ∈ [n], such that
Ei,jq is defined over the random systems C∗,∗
(
GGapDHG
)−
(and R, S):11 The MBO becomes 1
if after q queries there has been a query (pmk |master secret|ηC |ηsid ) at the random oracle,
such that C = Ci, sid = (ηC , j) and pmk is the DH element corresponding to session (i, j),
i.e., the DH element with respect to the server’s group element sent in session (ηC , j) and the
group element sent by Ci (given they are in the same group). Then define the MBO E via
Eq :=
∨
i,j E
i,j
q .
By definition of Ci,j and E , one can verify that RE g≡ CEi,j
(
GGapDHG
)− g≡ SE for all pairs
(i, j) ∈ [|C|]× [n]. Also, provoking the MBO E i,j in Ci,j
(
GGapDHG
)−
implies that the reduction
11The term
(
GGapDHG
)−
refers to the game GGapDHG without its Monotone Binary Output (MBO), see the last
paragraph of the proof.
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Ci,j is successful in winning G
GapDH
G , so
ΓDCi,j (GGapDHG ) = Γ
D(Ci,jG
GapDH
G ) ≥ ΓD
(
CE
i,j
i,j
(
GGapDHG
)−)
and ∑
i,j
ΓD
(
CE
i,j
i,j
(
GGapDHG
)−) ≥ ΓD(CE∗,∗ (GGapDHG )−)
by Lemma 27. The statement then follows using Lemma 26 and using the reduction C that
chooses any one of the Ci,j with i ∈ [|C|] and j ∈ [n] uniformly at random.
3.3.3 The RSA-PKCS Scheme
The RSA-PKCS-based protocol consists of the following two converters, which are based on the
RSA algorithms RSA = (gen, enc, dec) as specified in PKCS#7 [Kal98] (see also Appendix A.2).
The client’s converter rsac behaves as follows:
1. Obtain the nonces ηC and ηsid from SNETN,ρ,n.
2. Obtain a message cert = (pk , s) (supposed to be the server’s certificate) via SNETN,ρ,n.
3. Verify the server’s certificate by querying (verify, cert) at PKIF (if that fails, abort).
4. Choose a secret pmk ∈ {0, 1}384 as follows: concatenate the two-byte protocol version
identifier with a 46-byte uniformly random string, encrypt with the server’s public key pk
obtained from cert (resulting in a ciphertext c = enc(pmk ; pk)), and send c via SNETN,ρ,n.
5. Query pmk |master secret|ηC |ηsid at RO384, call the result κ.
6. Output (κ, ηC , ηsid , (cert , c)) at the outside interface.
7. Forward all further communication between the outside interface and SNETN,ρ,n.
The server’s converter rsas behaves as follows:
0. Generate an RSA key pair (pk , sk) = gen and register the public key pk at PKIF via
(register, pk), obtaining a value s, define cert = (pk , s).
For each of the sessions described by a pair sid = (ηC , e) ∈ N × [n]:
1. Upon receiving a nonce ηsid at sub-interface sid = (ηC , e), respond with the certificate cert .
2. Upon receiving a ciphertext c, decrypt ˜pmk = dec(c; sk). If ˜pmk = ⊥ or if the first two
bytes of ˜pmk do not match the two-byte protocol version identifier, choose a fresh value
for ˜pmk as in Step 4. of rsac.
3. Query ˜pmk |master secret|ηC |ηsid at RO384 and call the result κ˜.
4. Output (κ˜, ηsid , (cert , c)) at the (sid -sub-interface of the) outside interface.
5. Forward all further communication between the (sid -sub-interface of the) outside interface
and (the sid -sub-interface of) SNETN,ρ,n.
We show that the described protocol is secure under the NR-PCA assumption for PKCS#7,
i.e., it constructs the resource MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n. Here, the distribution AUX in this case consists
of two parts. The first part is the same for all sessions and consists of the certificate (i.e.,
depends on F of PKIF). The distribution is described by (sk , pk) ← gen, f ←$ F, and then
cert = (pk , f(pk)). The second part is chosen independently for each session by doing the same
process as in the protocol: choose pmk ∈ {0, 1}384 (as it is done in Step 4. of rsac) and compute
c = enc(pmk ; pk).
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Lemma 12. The protocol (rsac, rsas) constructs from [RO384, SNETN,ρ,n,PKIF] the master secret
key resource MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n, under the NR-PCA assumption for RSA = (gen, enc, dec), i.e., for
the simulator σ and the reductions Cq described in the proof,
[RO384, SNETN,ρ,n,PKIF]
(rsac,rsas),σ,(0,ε)
==⇒ MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n,
where for each distinguisher D, ε(D) = n · |C| · ΓDCqq (Gnr-pca) + q2368 .
Before proceeding with the formal proof, let us discuss some intuition. In the proofs of
Lemma 9 and Lemma 11, it is apparent when the pre-master secret value embedded in the
challenge to the reduction is delivered to the server. However, as we argue below, this is not
necessarily the case for TLS-RSA if one assumes like [JK02, KPW13] that RSA is OW-PCA.
Recall that in the RSA mode, the client chooses a random pre-master secret and encrypts it
under the server’s certified public key. Now, the argument would be that if the distinguisher
can distinguish between the MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n resource and the construction based on the RSA
encryption, then it can break the OW-PCA encryption (essentially it knows the pre-master
secret). The reduction to OW-PCA uses a “testing” PCA(·, ·) oracle, such that PCA(m, c)
outputs 1 iff. dec(c; sk) = m; in our case, this should permit the reduction to properly simulate
the random oracle.
In the case of RSA, there is a subtle problem which does not appear in the DH case. In
particular, whereas DH elements are not re-randomizable, if the OW-PCA encryption scheme is
re-randomizable, the distinguisher between two subsequent hybrids can inject a re-randomized
ciphertext which cannot be simulated accurately by the reduction. Recall that in the DHE
case, the hybrids were indexed by sessions, such that the input from the GapDH game was
inserted into a different session each time. If the distinguisher receives a challenge ciphertext
from the OW-PCA reduction, then re-randomizes it and sends it to the server in the “correct
session,” then the behavior of the two resources will differ, since for one of them the key output
of the client and server will coincide, whereas for the other, it will differ (recall that since the
randomized ciphertext will decrypt to the same plaintext as the challenge ciphertext, the pre-
master secret input into the random oracle is the same). For this reason, similar to [BFK+13b],
Lemma 12 above relies on the assumption that RSA-PKCS is not re-randomizable.12
Proof.
Availability. We first prove the availability condition. The “ideal” system ⊥EMSKN,ρ,AUX ,n
chooses for each session sid = (ρ(C), 1) a nonce ηsid , a key κC and auxiliary information auxC ,
and outputs (κC , ρ(C), ηsid , auxC) at the C interface and (κC , ηsid , auxC) at the interface S/sid ;
afterwards the communication is forwarded between C and S/sid .
The distribution in the case
∏
C∈C rsac
CrsasS [RO384, SNETN,ρ,n,PKIF] is as follows. The
key κC for each client C is a uniformly random 384-bit string (the random oracle RO384 is
queried at distinct places as ηC = ρ(C) is distinct by the assumption on ρ), the nonces ηsid are
chosen according to the distribution N, and the auxiliary information auxC has exactly the same
distribution as well. Moreover, after at both interfaces C and S/(ηC , 1) the above information
is output, the resource behaves as a bidirectional channel between those interfaces. This verifies
the validity of the availability condition.
12An alternative approach would be to be less modular and consider the entire protocol as a single unit, since
only the finished messages authenticate the exact ciphertext transmitted during the session. This is essentially
the path taken by Krawczyk et al. [KPW13].
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Security. In order to prove the validity of the security condition, consider the following sim-
ulator σ = σ(ρ) (parametrized by the function ρ of MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n):
• Initially, σ sets eη = 1 for all η ∈ N and defines an (initially empty) map R : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}384.
• Choose a function f ← F, sample (pk , sk)← gen, compute s = f(pk) and output cert =
(pk , s) at the outside interface to simulate the answer of an input (register, pk) to PKIF.
• Upon input (ack, η) for a nonce η ∈ N at the outside interface, set sid = (η, eη). If eη ≤ n,
then issue (ack, η) at the inside interface. Obtain the nonce ηsid at the inside interface
and output ηsid as response of SNETN,ρ,n at the outside interface; increment eη. Also,
output cert at the outside interface as being transmitted via SNETN,ρ,n from sid .
• Upon input (deliver, C, η˜) and after cert has been delivered via SNETN,ρ,n at the outside
interface, issue (key-c, C, aux , η˜) at the inside interface. The auxiliary information aux
consists of aux = (cert , c) where the ciphertext c is computed by encrypting a value pmk
(as in Step 4. of rsac) using public key pk . Output c at the outside interface as being
transmitted via SNETN,ρ,n from C and register (C, η˜, pmk).
• When obtaining a ciphertext c˜ at the outside sub-interface sid , with sid = (η, e), compute
˜pmk = dec(c˜; sk). If dec(c˜; sk) = ⊥ or if the first two bytes of ˜pmk do not match the
two-byte protocol version identifier, then choose ˜pmk uniformly at random instead. Then:
– If η ∈ ρ(C) and with C = ρ−1(η), in case ˜pmk corresponds to a previously recorded
triple (C, ηsid , ˜pmk), input (key-s, η, e, aux ) at the inside interface, with aux being
(cert , c˜).
– Otherwise, input (inject, η, e, aux , κ) at the inside interface, with aux = cert |c˜ with
the ciphertext c˜ just injected. The value κ is defined asR( ˜pmk |master secret|η|ηsid ).
(If ˜pmk |master secret|η|ηsid has not been queried to the random oracle before, de-
fine it as R( ˜pmk |master secret|η|ηsid )←$ {0, 1}384.)
• Simulate the random oracle, that is, on input x intended for RO384 at the E-interface, if
R(x) is not defined then set R(x)←$ {0, 1}384. Return R(x).
Define R :=
∏
C∈C rsac
CrsasS [RO384,SNETN,ρ,n,PKIF] and S := σ
EMSKN,ρ,AUX ,n. We start
by noting that the behavior of the two systems R and S is identical for the initial queries:
• The value cert has the same distribution in both resources.
• The responses to (ack, ηC) are determined by choosing fresh parameters in both cases.
• The distribution corresponding to messages forwarded in the sessions that completed the
setup is also the same in the two systems.
For the queries (deliver, C, η˜), for delivering a ciphertext to a session sid of the server, and
for querying the random oracle RO384, the difference between R and S is that in R all “keys”
output at either C ∈ C or S/(η, e) for η ∈ N and e ∈ [n] are chosen consistently with the random
oracle queries, whereas in S they are not (in cases where the ciphertext has been simulated).
The intuition behind the proof is that a distinguisher telling apart the two systems would have
to query the random oracle at such a point; however, as we argue below, the latter is not very
likely to happen as otherwise such a distinguisher can be used to break the NR-PCA assumption
for RSA = (gen, enc, dec) (see Appendix C.1). Recall that in this game the challenger produces
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a ciphertext c∗ corresponding to the encryption of a random message m∗ using public key pk ,
and the goal of the adversary is to produce a re-randomized ciphertext c′ 6= c∗ decrypting to
m∗, with the help of a PCA(·, ·) oracle (where PCA(m, c) outputs 1 iff dec(c; sk) = m).13
We now prove the security condition. We describe a series of reductions Ci,j,q with i ∈ [|C|],
j ∈ [n], and q ∈ N, where the indices pinpoint a session run for a nonce η corresponding
to a client C ∈ C and a corresponding nonce ηsid generated for session sid = (η, e), where
1 ≤ e ≤ eη ≤ n. We assume some (e.g. lexicographic) order  over the set of clients, and write
Ci to denote the i-th client with respect to this order. The reduction Ci,j,q uses the public key
pk and injects the challenge c∗ received from Gnr-pca, relies on the PCA queries it can make
at Gnr-pca, and it works as follows:
• Let (pk , c∗) be the input received from the inside interface with Gnr-pca.
• For all the sessions between a client C 6= Ci and for the sessions of Ci with server interfaces
(η, e) such that e 6= j, Ci,j,q uses pk to encrypt a pmk and generates the clients’ keys as
in the real resource.
• In the session between client Ci and the server session (η, j), the session is emulated using
c∗. In this case the output at the client and server interface is independent of the queries
made to RO384.
The simulation of the random oracle queries and server master secret keys goes into more
details as follows. Each of the reductions will keep two (initially empty) lists HP and HC .
List HP contains entries of the form (pmk , ηC , ηsid , y) while HC contains entries of the form
(c, η′C , η
′
sid , y
′). HP corresponds to random oracle queries, while HC corresponds to master
secret keys output at the server. The two lists need to be kept consistent, in the sense that if
for two entries ηC = η
′
C , ηsid = η
′
sid , and PCA(pmk , c) = 1 then y = y
′. Hence:
• Whenever the random oracle is queried on input pmk |master secret|ηC |ηsid at RO384,
first look for an entry (pmk , ηC , ηsid , y) in HP ; return the corresponding value y in case
such entry is found. Check for the entry (c˜, ηC , ηsid , y) inHC , and return the corresponding
y if PCA(pmk , c˜) = 1.
Otherwise, check if PCA(pmk , c∗) = 1:
– If this is the case, run c′ ← enc(pmk ; pk) with different randomness until c′ 6= c∗
and output c′ as the re-randomized ciphertext in Gnr-pca; note that, according to
PKCS#7, the above re-sampling requires to encrypt the plaintext with a different
random pad P ′ and two trials are sufficient.
– Else, respond with a random y and update the list HP accordingly.
• When some ciphertext c˜ is delivered to a server’s session sid = (η, e), search for an entry
(c˜, η, ηsid , y) in HC . Otherwise, check whether there is an entry ( ˜pmk , η, ηsid , y) in HP
such that PCA( ˜pmk , c˜) = 1. Return the corresponding value y in case either of these
entries is found; else, respond with a random y and update the list HC accordingly.
• If after q queries no ciphertext c′ has been returned to Gnr-pca, check whether HC contains
an entry (c, ηC , ηsid , ∗) such that C = Ci, sid = (ηC , j) and return c to Gnr-pca.
As for DHE, we use C∗,∗,q wherever the indices i, j of Ci,j,q are irrelevant and we consider
a monotone binary output (MBO) E i,j = (Ei,j1 , Ei,j2 , . . . ) for each pair (i, j) with i ∈ [|C|] and
j ∈ [n]. Here, Ei,jq is defined over the random systems C∗,∗,q′ (Gnr-pca)− (and R, S):14 The
13Note that in TLS the message space is of the formM = version number×{0, 1}368. The NR-PCA assumption
over this space is implied by the one on {0, 1}386, but one would loose an additional term 1
216
in the reduction.
14Note that q′ ranges over 1, 2, . . . independently of q as the MESs are defined for all reductions.
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MBO becomes 1 if after q queries there has been a query (pmk |master secret|ηC |ηsid ) at the
random oracle, such that C = Ci, sid = (ηC , j) and dec(c
∗, sk) = pmk or a ciphertext c has
been delivered in session sid = (ηC , j) with C = Ci such that dec(c
∗, sk) = dec(c; sk).15
We also define three MBOs F = (F1, F2, . . . ), F ′ = (F ′1, F ′2, . . . ), and F ′′ = (F ′′1 , F ′′2 , . . . )
which we need to “unify” slightly different distributions of outputs with respect to injections
of invalid ciphertexts. A ciphertext is invalid if it decrypts to ⊥ or if the first two bytes
of its plaintext do not match the two-byte protocol version identifier. In both R and S, if
an invalid ciphertext is injected in a session with nonces ηC and ηsid , a random pre-master
secret pmk∗ is chosen and the random oracle (either RO384 or R) is evaluated on the value
pmk∗|master secret|ηC |ηsid . Note that if the pre-master secret pmk∗ collides with a value
that was queried in combination with the same nonces ηC and ηsid before (either because it
was computed by the client or because it was queried directly at RO384 by the attacker), the
output of the random oracle, and hence at the server’s interface, would of course be consistent
with the previously obtained value. If the value pmk∗ has not been used before, the response of
the random oracle and hence the key output at the server’s interface are uniformly random and
independent of all previous values. The reduction C∗,∗,∗, however, cannot distinguish invalid
ciphertexts from ciphertexts decrypting to a pre-master secret that has not been used before (the
PCA query to Gnr-pca returns the same value on both), and hence always outputs a uniformly
random key.
The pre-master secret pmk∗ has 368 bits of entropy. Thus, after r different pre-master secrets
have been queried at the random oracle with the same nonces, the probability for the freshly
chosen pmk∗ to collide with a previously used value is r · 2−368. With the remaining probability
1 − r · 2−368, the query to the random oracle is fresh and the output distribution is uniform
(i.e., every value has probability 2−384). In case of C∗,∗,∗, an invalid ciphertext always leads to
a uniformly random output. As a result, an output of R or S on such a “dangerous” query
with respect to an invalid ciphertext is slightly more likely to collide with previous outputs.
We rectify the above difference in probabilities by defining the three monotone binary out-
puts F , F ′, and F ′′ (for R, S, and C∗,∗,∗, respectively) as follows.
• The MBO F for R becomes 1 once in a session with nonces ηC and ηsid , an invalid
ciphertext c˜ was input and lead to a query pmk∗|master secret|ηC |ηsid (where pmk∗
was chosen uniformly at random) to RO384, and the same query was also asked at RO384
either by rsac or via the E-interface.
• The MBO F ′ for S becomes 1 once in a session with nonces ηC and ηsid , an invalid
ciphertext c˜ was input and lead to a an evaluation on pmk∗|master secret|ηC |ηsid (where
pmk∗ was chosen uniformly at random) of R within σ, and the simulator σ computed an
RSA ciphertext from C = ρ−1(ηC) (if defined) with the same pre-master secret pmk∗ or
R was also evaluated on the same value because of a query at the outside interface.
The above two MBO F (resp. F ′) guarantee that, given that the MBO remains 0 during
a dangerous query, the output distribution is uniform. Using the value r defined above, this
means that, for every possible key κ, the probability of the MBO remaining 0 and the key κ
appearing is (1− r · 2−368) · 2−384. What remains to be done is defining an MBO F ′′ on C∗,∗,∗
that leads to the same output distribution for such queries. But as the distribution in that case
is uniform anyways, all that remains to be done is computing the probability for the MBO to be
provoked during a “dangerous” query (see below), and provoking the MBO with the respective
probability (independently of the value output by C∗,∗,∗. The probability is computed in more
detail as follows:
15Note that the event is well defined since for the RSA-PKCS scheme sk is uniquely defined by pk .
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• if the query is the first query pmk ′|master secret|η|η˜ for this value of pmk ′ to RO384,
where the first two bytes of pmk ′ match the two-byte protocol version identifier and an
invalid ciphertext was sent to session sid = (η, e) with nonce ηsid = η˜ before, then F ′′′
becomes 1 with probability 2−368;
• if the query is sending an invalid ciphertext c in session (η, e), then the probability is
computed by first counting the number r of distinct queries to RO384 and (potentially)
the output at the corresponding client ρ−1(η) that collide in terms of generated keys; then
F becomes 1 with probability r · 2−368.
Then define the MBOs E via Eq :=
∨
i,j E
i,j
q ∨ Fq, E ′ via E′q :=
∨
i,j E
i,j
q ∨ F ′q, and E ′′ via
E′′q :=
∨
i,j E
i,j
q ∨ F ′′q .
By the definition of Ci,j,q, E , E ′, and E ′′, one can verify that RE g≡ CE ′′i,j,q (Gnr-pca)−
g≡ SE ′
for all pairs (i, j, q) ∈ [|C|]× [n]× N. Also, provoking the MBO Ei,jq in Ci,j,q (Gnr-pca)− implies
that the reduction Ci,j is successful in winning G
nr-pca, so
Γ
DCi,j,q
q (G
nr-pca) = ΓDq (Ci,j,qG
nr-pca) ≥ ΓDq
(
CE
i,j
i,j,q (G
nr-pca)−
)
and
∑
i,j Γ
D
q
(
CEi,ji,j,q (G
nr-pca)−
)
+ ΓDq (C
F ′′
i,j,q (G
nr-pca)−) ≥ ΓDq
(
CE ′′∗,∗,q (Gnr-pca)
−
)
by Lemma 27.
The statement then follows using Lemma 26 and using the reduction Cq that chooses any one
of the Ci,j,q with i ∈ [|C|] and j ∈ [n] uniformly at random. The probability of provoking F ,
F ′, resp. F ′′ can be upper bounded by q · 2−368.
3.3.4 The Handshake in TLS 1.3
In this section, we consider a slightly modified version of the handshake in the suggested TLS 1.3.
What we modify is that the server’s Certificate and CertificateVerify are not encrypted.
This does not seem to have any impact on practical security beyond the statements proven here
(the server’s certificate is public anyway, and the CertificateVerify message is basically a
signature on a hash of all previous messages), but it allows us to make a security proof.
The modified authenticated transmission resource. As in Section 3.3.2, we begin by
modeling the construction that is achieved by the signature scheme, namely the construction
of a resource / −•′ that allows the server to transmit, in each session, a single message to the
client authentically. Unfortunately, we cannot re-use the resource and construction shown in
Section 3.3.2, for two reasons: first, since the signature computation now also includes the
first client message, this message is authenticated as well (this is required in the subsequent
construction step); second, the computation of the signature is changed. In TLS 1.2, only the
“contents” of the previously exchanged fragments is authenticated (but not, e.g., the packet
headers). In contrast, TLS 1.3 authenticates the complete fragments, including all headers.
The resource / −•′ has (client) interfaces C ∈ C ⊆ ATCP, a (server) interface S with sub-
interfaces (η, e) ∈ N × N with e ∈ N, and an (eavesdropper) interface E with sub-interfaces
ATCP∪ (N ×N), and is parametrized by an injection ρ : C → N , a distribution F over functions
f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗, a signature scheme SIG = (gen, sign, vrf ) as defined in Appendix B.1,
and a hash function h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k. The resource is described in detail in Figure 6.
The following protocol constructs / −•′N,ρ,F,SIG,n,h from SNETN,ρ,n and PKIF: The client’s
converter vrf is based on the signature scheme SIG and behaves as follows:
0. Obtaining the nonce ηC ∈ N from SNETN,ρ,n, output ηC at the outside interface. Forward
all messages m1,m2, . . . from the outside to the inside interface. (Messages sent from the
client to the server.)
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The Authenticated Transmission / −•′N,ρ,F,SIG,n,h
Initially, generate a key pair (sk , vk)← gen.
No attacker present:
• Initially, choose f ← F. Output aux = (vk , f(vk)) at interface S. For each η ∈ ρ(C)
and sid = (η, 1), sample ηsid ←$ N and output ηsid at interface S/sid .
• At each interface C ∈ C, output the nonce ρ(C). Then, all messages mC,1,mC,2, . . .
input at C are output at interface S/sid with sid = (ρ(C), 1).
• Upon input the first message m at interface S/sid with sid = (η, 1) with η =
ρ(C) for C ∈ C, such that mC,1 has already been input, generate a signa-
ture s ← sign(h(η|mC,1|ηsid |m|aux ); sk), output s at interface S/sid , and output
(aux , ηsid ,m, s) at interface C = ρ
−1(η). (For inputs at interfaces S/(η, e) with e > 1
or η 6∈ ρ(C), no output is generated.)
• All further inputs m′ at S/sid with sid = (ρ(C), 1) for some C ∈ C are output at C.
Attacker present: Initialize eη = 1 for all η ∈ N and a buffer B = ∅. Output vk at the
E-interface.
• Initially, obtain aux ∈ {0, 1}∗ at the E-interface. Output aux at the S-interface.
• At each interface C ∈ C, output the nonce ρ(C). Then, all messages mC,1,mC,2, . . . ∈
B≤18432 input at the C-interface are output at the interface E/C.
• Upon input (ack, η,m) for η ∈ N and m ∈ B≤18432 at the E-interface, if eη ≤ n
then draw ηsid uniformly at random from N \ {ηsid1 , . . . , ηsideη˜−1} with sid i = (η, i),
increase eη, and output (ηsid ,m) at interfaces S/sid and ηsid at E/sid . Then, allow
at E/sid to inject messages m′sid ,1,m
′
sid ,2, . . . ∈ B≤18432 to be output at S/sid .
• Upon input the first message m at interface S/sid (with sid = (η, e) and e < eη, oth-
erwise ignore the input), generate a signature s ← sign(h(η|m′sid ,1|ηsid |m|aux ); sk),
record (ρ−1(η), ηsid ,m, s) in B, output s at interface S/sid , and (m, s) at E/sid .
Afterward, if at S/sid a message m ∈ B≤18432 is input, output m at interface E/sid .
• Upon input (deliver, C) at the E-interface (once for each C ∈ C), if there is a record
(C, η˜, m˜, s˜) ∈ B, output (aux , η˜, m˜, s˜) at interface C.
Afterward, allow at E/C to inject messages m′ ∈ B≤18432 to be output at C.
Figure 6: The network allowing the server to transmit, to each client, one message authentically.
TLS 1.3 variant.
1. Obtain the server’s nonce ηsid ∈ N from SNETN,ρ,n.
2. Obtain the first message (m, cert , s) from SNETN,ρ,n. Query (verify, cert) at PKIF; abort
if the verification fails or if cert is not a well-formed certificate cert = (vk , f(vk)). If
vrf (h(ηC |m1|ηsid |m|cert), s; vk) = 1, then output (cert , ηC , ηsid ,m, s) at the outside inter-
face. (Otherwise abort.)
3. Forward all further messages from the inside to the outside interface. (Messages sent from
the server to the client.)
The server’s converter sgn provides at the outside “sessions” for all sid = (ηC , e) ∈ N × [n] and
behaves as follows:
0. Compute (sk , vk)← gen. Input vk at PKIF, obtaining a response s, and set cert = (vk , s).
Output cert at the outside interface (as auxiliary information).
For each session sid = (ηC , e)—i.e., the inputs/outputs at SNETN,ρ,n are at the corresponding
inside sub-interface sid , and the inputs/outputs at the outside interface are at sub-interface
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sid—do:
1. Receiving a nonce ηsid and the first message m from SNETN,ρ,n, output (ηsid ,m) at the
outside.
2. Forward all further messages m′sid ,1,m
′
sid ,2, . . . from the outside interface to the inside
interface.
3. Obtaining the first input m at the outside, compute s← sign(h(ηC |m′sid ,1|ηsid |m|cert); sk)
and send (m, cert , s) via SNETN,ρ,n. Output s at the outside.
4. Forward further messages from the outside interface to the inside interface.
Lemma 13. The protocol (vrf, sgn) for a particular signature scheme SIG = (gen, sign, vrf )
constructs / −•N,ρ,F,SIG,n from SNETN,ρ,n and PKIF, if the signature scheme SIG is unforgeable
and the hash function h is collision resistant. In more detail, for the simulator σ and the
reductions C and C′ described in the proof,
[SNETN,ρ,n,PKIF]
(vrf,sgn),σ,(0,ε)
==⇒ / −•′N,ρ,F,SIG,n,h,
with ε(D) := ΓDC(Guf-cma) + ΓDC
′
(GCR) for all distinguishers D.
Proof.
Availability. The availability condition follows almost as in Lemma 10. The only differences
are that the first message in each session must always be given by the client C ∈ C, and that
the signatures are computed differently.
Security. For proving the security condition, we consider the following simulator σ:
• Initially, σ obtains the public key vk at the inside interface, chooses a function f ← F,
and computes cert = (vk , f(vk)). Also, σ internally initializes eη = 1 for all η ∈ N , and
inputs cert as auxiliary information at the inside interface, and as output of PKIF at the
outside interface.
• For clients C ∈ C, messages mC,1,mC,2, . . . ∈M obtained at sub-interface C at the inside
are output at the outside as being sent by C via SNETN,ρ,n.
• Upon input (ack, η) for a nonce η ∈ N at the outside interface, set sid = (η, eη). If eη ≤ n,
then, upon the first message m′ directed to the server session sid obtained at the outside
interface, input (ack, η,m′) at the inside interface. Obtain the nonce ηsid at the inside
interface, output ηsid as response of SNETN,ρ,n at the outside interface, and increase eη.
Then, further messages m′sid ,1,m
′
sid ,2, . . . directed to the server session sid obtained at the
outside interface are also output at the inside.
• Upon input (deliver, C, η˜) at the outside sub-interface corresponding to SNETN,ρ,n, if
this is the first such query for C, record the nonce as ηsid := η˜ for sid = (ρ(η), ∗).
• When obtaining the first output (m, s) at the inside sub-interface sid with sid = (η, e),
output (m, cert , s) as being transmitted on SNETN,ρ,n as the second message via the
corresponding sub-interface. Mark sid as “active”.
• When receiving at the outside sub-interface corresponding to SNETN,ρ,n the first message
m˜1 = (m
′, cert ′, s′) to a client C, if cert ′ = cert and, with sid = (ηC , ∗), the verification
vrf (h(ηC |m′sid ,1|ηsid |m′|cert), s′; vk) = 1 succeeds, then input (deliver, C) at the inside
interface16 and mark C as “active”.
16This has an effect only if the corresponding message has been sent by the server before; if the signature is
forged, the real and ideal systems behave differently.
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• Further server-to-client communication is then also forwarded: Messages obtained at sub-
interface sid at the inside are output at the outside as being sent by the server in session sid
via SNETN,ρ,n. Also, for clients C ∈ C marked as “active,” messages m′ ∈M obtained at
the outside as input to SNETN,ρ,n directed to C are input at sub-interface C at the inside.
We complete the proof by describing two reductions C and C′ that connect with their
inside interfaces to the games Guf-cma and GCR, respectively. On a high level, the reduc-
tions emulate at the outside interface an emulation of R :=
∏
C∈C vrf
CsgnS [SNETN,ρ,n,PKIF],
where C uses the key pair (sk , vk) obtained from Guf-cma. Thereby, C computes the certifi-
cate cert = (vk , f(vk)) using the verification key vk obtained from Guf-cma, and the signa-
tures s ← sign(ηC |m′sid ,1|ηsid |m|cert ; sk) in the converter sgn using signing queries to Guf-cma.
A “forgery” in the emulated execution can then be used to win the game Guf-cma (for the exact
definition of forgery see the MBO below; the forgery for Guf-cma is achieved by concatenating
the corresponding nonces and the message). The reduction C′ emulates R until a collision
occurs in the hash function (this is easy to check because C′ knows all transmitted messages)
and, in case it finds a collision, uses it to win the game GCR.
We define the MBOs E and E ′ on the systems R, S := σE / −•′N,ρ,F,SIG,n,h, and C′GCR,
which capture collisions in the hash functions as well as forgeries for the signature scheme.
More concretely, E becomes 1 once there are two different “truncated handshakes,” i.e. mes-
sages and nonces all visible at the E-interface, such that the evaluation of the hash function
h on the two induced different inputs results in the same output. The MBO E ′ is defined to
become 1 once there is an input (m˜, s˜) at the E/sid -interface with sid = (ηC , e) such that
vrf (ηC |ηsid |m˜, s˜; vk) = 1—such that ηsid was generated as a response in the S-session sid—
unless there was an output (m˜, s˜′) at some interface E/sid ′ with sid ′ = (η, e′) and ηsid ′ = ηsid
before. Then, proving “game equivalence” of the systems with the MBOs E ∨ E ′ and using
Lemma 26 allows to conclude that the condition is fulfilled.
The equivalence can be seen as follows (we use the counter variables eη in the same way
they are defined in the systems, i.e., counting the number of sessions that have been initiated
with nonce η):
• Initially, both systems output the certificate cert = (vk , f(vk)), with vk and f chosen
according to the same distributions, as auxiliary information at the S-interface, and as
an output corresponding to PKIF at the E-interface. Additionally, for each C ∈ C, both
systems output the client’s nonce ηC at the C-interface and forward messages from the
C-interface to the E/C-sub-interface.
• Upon input (ack, η) at the outside E-interface corresponding to SNETN,ρ,n and the de-
livery of the first message m′ in session sid , the system R outputs a nonce ηsid at the
E-interface of SNETN,ρ,n and the S/sid for sid = (η, eη). In S, the nonce is generated
according to the same distribution and output at the same interfaces. Subsequently, mes-
sages input at the E/sid -sub-interface are output at the S/sid -sub-interface.
• Upon the first message m input at the outside S/sid -interface with sid = (η, e), system R
generates a signature s for h(ηC |m′|ηsid |m|cert) using the key sk (within sgn), outputs s
at the same sub-interface S/sid and the triple (m, cert , s) at the E-interface of SNETN,ρ,n.
Within S, the signature is computed analogously by / −•N,ρ,F,SIG,n, also output at S/sid ,
and the message/certificate/signature triple is output at the E/sid -sub-interface (with
the same distribution) via σ.
• Upon input (deliver, C, η˜) at the outside E-interface corresponding to SNETN,ρ,n, there
is no immediate output (neither for R nor for S).
• Upon delivering the first message m˜1 via SNETN,ρ,n to a client C, if m˜1 6= (m, cert , s)
output at the E-sub-interface corresponding to the same session before, or if the server’s
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nonce was not delivered faithfully in the same session (note that the client nonce defines
the session), then, in R, vrf aborts since: either m˜1 is not a well-formed certificate or the
verification at PKIF fails, or the verification of the signature fails—this is guaranteed by
the fact that otherwise either a collision in the hash function or a forgery of the signature
would occur. In S, σ marks C as “failed” in the same cases. There is no output, neither
in R nor in S.
• After a certain session (either C ∈ C or sid at S) has been initialized, messages input there
are output at the corresponding sub-interface of the E-interface and vice versa. This is
consistent in both R and S.
As the same arguments hold for the case C′GCR, and with the exception that the signatures
are obtained from Guf-cma but have the same distribution also in the case CGuf-cma, and each
violation of E ∨ E ′ can be used to win either GCR or Guf-cma, this concludes the proof.
Constructing the premaster secret. The construction step (we first only construct the
premaster secret) is then achieved by the protocol (dhe13c, dhe13s), in which the server chooses
for each session a (potentially fresh) Diffie-Hellman group and element, which are sent as an
authenticated message via / −•′. We denote the group used by the protocol by G.17
The distribution AUX in this case consists of two parts. The first part is the same for all
sessions and consists of the certificate (i.e., depends on F and SIG of / −•′N,ρ,F,SIG,n,h). The
distribution is described by (sk , vk) ← gen, f ←$ F, and then cert = (vk , f(vk)). The second
part is chosen independently for each session by doing the same process as in the protocol:
choose two group elements g1, g2←$G uniformly at random.
The client’s converter dhe13c initially obtains ηC at the inside interface, and then:
• Choose u←$ {1, . . . , q} (with q = |G|) and input gu at the inside interface.
• Receiving (aux , ηsid ,m, s), parse the message as g′ = m (abort if impossible; note that
m ∈ {0, 1}∗ while g ∈ G). Output (g′u, ηC , ηsid , aux |gu|m|s).
• Forward the following communication between the inside and the outside interfaces.
The server’s converter dhe13s connects to the S-interface of / −•′N,ρ,F,SIG,n,h. Both the inside
and outside interfaces have sub-interfaces sid = (ηC , e) ∈ N × [n]. The converter behaves as
follows:
• Initially, receive aux on the inside interface.
• Upon obtaining a nonce ηsid and a group element g˜ at sub-interface sid = (ηC , e), choose
an exponent v←$ {1, . . . , |G|}. Send m = gv via the inside sub-interface sid . Obtain the
signature s at the inside interface in return. Output (g˜v, ηsid , aux |g˜|m|s) at the outside
sub-interface sid .
• Forward the following communication between the corresponding sub-interfaces sid of the
inside and the outside interface.
The described protocol indeed constructs the master secret key resource from the net-
work / −•′ under the DDH assumption in the group G.
Lemma 14. The protocol (dhe13c, dhe13s) constructs from the assumed resource / −•′N,ρ,F,SIG,n,h
the resource KEYN,ρ,AUX ,n,K with K = G, under the DDH assumption for G = 〈g〉. More for-
mally, for the simulator σ and the reduction C1 and C2 described in the proof,
/ −•′N,ρ,F,SIG,n,h (dhe13c,dhe13s),σ,(ε1,ε2)==⇒ KEYN,ρ,AUX ,n,K,
17For now, we ignore the effects of different groups being available.
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with εi(D) := n · |C| · ∆DCi
(
(gA, gB, gAB), (gA, gB, gC)
)
, with A,B,C uniformly random from
the set {0, . . . , |G| − 1}, for all distinguishers D.
Proof.
Availability. We first show the availability condition. The “ideal” system ⊥EKEYN,ρ,AUX ,n,K
chooses, for each session sid = (ηC , 1) with ρ(C) = ηC , a nonce ηsid , a uniformly random
key κC ∈ K and auxiliary information auxC (which includes uniformly random group elements
from the key exchange), and outputs (κC , ηsid , auxC), and afterward forwards communication
between C and S/sid .
The distribution in the case
∏
C∈C dhe13c
Cdhe13sS⊥E
( / −•′N,ρ,F,SIG,n,h) is as follows. The
key κC for each client C is a group element in G which completes the Diffie-Hellman triples with
the group elements in the auxiliary information, the nonces ηsid for sid = (ηC , 1) are distributed
according to N, and the auxiliary information auxC has exactly the same distribution as well.
Moreover, after at both interfaces C and S/sid the above information is output, the resource
behaves as a bidirectional channel between those interfaces.
The proof is basically completed via a hybrid argument, where the sessions are ordered in
some particular way (e.g., by taking the lexicographic ordering on C and the natural one on the
sessions per associated nonce). The reduction C1 chooses one particular session for embedding
the challenge (the first two group elements as those exchanged in the protocol, all “smaller”
sessions are served with freshly chosen Diffie-Hellman triples, and all “greater” sessions are
served by purely random triples. A standard hybrid argument completes the proof of the
availability statement.
Security. The simulator basically needs to take care of the / −•′N,ρ,F,SIG,n,h’s E-interface (be-
ginning with choosing some good aux ), and then needs to simulate the DH exchange, i.e., the
group elements generated by the client and the server. The simulator σ behaves as follows:
• Throughout, σ keeps counters eη for each η ∈ N in the usual way (i.e., increase eη
whenever the nonce η is delivered to the server).
• Initially, obtain a string cert ∈ {0, 1}∗ at the outside interface (this is needed for the
auxiliary information).
• For each C ∈ C, sample a group element g¯sid = gu for a uniformly random u ∈ {1, . . . , |G|}
and output g¯sid at the E/C-sub-interface.
• Upon input (ack, η,m′) at the outside, where m′ is a valid group element (otherwise
abort), input (ack, η) at the inside and obtain as response ηsid for sid = (η, eη). Output
ηsid at the outside interface. Also, choose a value v←$ {1, . . . , |G|}, compute g˜sid = gv and
s ← sign(h(η|m′|ηsid |g˜sid |cert); sk), and output (g˜sid , s) at the outside sub-interface sid .
Furthermore
– if m′ = g¯sid , then input (κS , ηC , e, aux ) and aux = g¯sid |cert |g˜sid |s (with sid = (ηC , e))
at the inside interface;
– otherwise, input (inject, ηC , e, aux , g
′
sid
v) at the inside interface with sid = (ηC , e)
and aux = m′|cert |g˜sid |s.
• Upon input (deliver, C) at the outside, if (ack, ηC , g¯sid ) was input before, and there
is a session sid = (ηC , e) with η˜ = ηsid , then input (key-c, C, aux , ηsid ) with aux =
g¯sid |cert |g˜sid |s.
• Deliver messages faithfully for the sessions where the setup is complete.
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We first observe that the two systems R =
∏
C∈C dhe13c
Cdhe13sS
( / −•′N,ρ,F,SIG,n,h) and
S = σEKEYN,ρ,AUX ,n,K are equivalent with respect to how they treat nonces; in particular, the
responses to (ack, η, ∗) are determined by choosing fresh parameters in both cases. The same
argument holds for the queries in which messages are forwarded in the sessions that completed
the setup. For the group elements in a particular session sid , the difference between R and S is
that in R, all “keys” output at either C ∈ C or S/(ηC , e) for ηC ∈ N and e ∈ [n] are consistently
computed Diffie-Hellman keys, whereas in S they are uniformly random and independent of the
group elements simulated at the E-interface and included in the auxiliary information.
We then describe a reduction system C2, which obtains at the inside interface three group
elements g¯, g˜, gˆ ∈ G. We assume that there is some (e.g., lexicographic) ordering on the set
C, i.e., the elements are C1, . . . , C|C|. The system C2 then behaves as follows (we stress that
every query can be associated with a (client’s) nonce η ∈ N , either because the nonce is given
explicitly, or because the query belongs to a session that is described by a nonce and a counter):
• In the beginning, C2 chooses uniformly at random a session to embed the challenge (i.e.,
it chooses a client C¯ ∈ C and a session number e¯ at the server). Then, for C¯, output g¯ at
the E/C¯-sub-interface, and for each C ∈ C \ {C¯}, it chooses a value rC ∈ {0, . . . , |G| − 1}
and outputs grC at the E/C-sub-interface.
• For queries (at the S- and E-interfaces) that are related to nonces η ∈ N \ ρ(C), the
system C2 can easily reproduce the behavior of the real or ideal systems (their behavior
is equivalent for those queries).
• For a (ack, ηC , g¯C)-query (i.e., sid = (ηC , e) for some e ∈ N, and g¯C ∈ G—otherwise
return nothing):
– If g¯C is different from the group element chosen in that session before, choose a
random value rsid ∈ {0, . . . , |G| − 1}, compute the group element g˜rsid and the signa-
ture ssid = sign(h(ηC |g¯C |ηsid |grsid |cert); sk) and output (grsid , ssid ) at the E/sid -sub-
interface. Output g¯rsidC at the S/sid -sub-interface. Otherwise, if the group element
is forwarded faithfully:
– If the session is “smaller” than the one chosen for embedding the challenge, then (as
above) a random value is chosen and the response and key are computed as above.
– If C = C¯ and e = e¯, and if g¯C = g¯, then use g˜C = g˜ for the response and κC = gˆ for
the key.
– If the session is “greater” than the one chosen for embedding the challenge, then
use a purely random group element for the response, and another uniformly random
group element for the key.
• For the query (deliver, C) at the E/-sub-interface corresponding to / −•′N,ρ,F,SIG,n,h: if
the earlier transmission of the client’s group element together with the nonce has been
unmodified, then output the same key as in the server’s session.
The proof is concluded via a standard hybrid argument.
Constructing the handshake master secret. In the following step, we use the PMK
generated above and derive from it first the handshake master secret. The protocol achieving
this is as follows: Both client and server compute
hs ms = evalPRF(pms, handshake master secret, session hash).
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Here, pms is obtained from the previous KEYN,ρ,AUX ,n,K resource, and session hash can be
computed from the auxiliary information. We denote the converters by hsc and hss, respectively.
Lemma 15. The protocol (hsc, hss) constructs from the assumed resource KEYN,ρ,AUX ,n,K with
K = G the resource MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n, given that the hash function is collision resistant and HMAC
is a PRF when keyed with string representing a uniformly random element from G. More
formally, for the simulator σ and the reduction C and C′ described in the proof,
KEYN,ρ,AUX ,n,K
(hsc,hss),σ,(ε,ε)
==⇒ MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n,
such that for all distinguishers D, ε(D) := ΓDC(GCR) + |C| ·∆DC′ (prf UG,F).
Proof sketch. The availability and security cases are almost the same (the only interesting cases
are where a key not known to the attacker is expanded; the other cases can be treated easily).
If the session hash values used as input to the PRF are all distinct, and the keys to the PRF
are uniformly chosen, then the outputs of the PRFs are distinct samples. This is formalized
by a condition that corresponds to a collision in the output of a session hash (which can be
computed from the auxiliary information; also a reduction is easy to design), and then by a
hybrid argument replacing one-by-one for each C ∈ C the output of the PRF by a uniformly
random value in {0, 1}384.
4 Expanding the Key
The keys constructed in Section 3 are not directly used in the record layer protocols. In TLS 1.2,
the constructed master secret is expanded (using a PRF) to obtain keys for encryption and
MAC of the record protocol, as well as for the computation of the “finished” messages. In
TLS 1.3, the constructed handshake master secret is expanded (again, using a PRF) to obtain
the finished messages, keys for the authenticated encryption used to encrypt those messages,
and the actual master secret. This secret is then further expanded to obtain keys for the
authenticated encryption used to protect the actual payload messages.
The encryption of the “finished” messages is performed differently in TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3.
In particular, TLS 1.2 uses the record layer protocol with the same keys used to protect the
payload messages. In contrast, TLS 1.3 uses specific handshake keys derived from the handshake
master secret. To account for these differences, we have the resources constructed in this section
output the “finished” messages in the form where they are already protected by the record layer
scheme. This allows us to unify the subsequent protocol steps.
4.1 Key Expansion in TLS 1.2
The key expansion step in TLS 1.2 is described as a protocol (expc, exps), which uses a HMAC-
based PRF to generate sufficient key material (depending on the actual cipher suite) for two
encryption and two MAC keys (one key per purpose and direction). Furthermore, the converters
also generate the so-called “finished” messages which are used by the client and the server to
confirm the computed keys.
More formally, starting from the resource MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n, we expand the key using a pseudo-
random function (PRF); our goal is to construct the ideal resource
⊗
C∈CJKSP,∗= =•cphs,nK(C,S/ρ(C)).
An advantage of this description is that it is the parallel composition of multiple “single-client”
resources
KSP,∗
= =•cphs,n, which means all following protocol steps can be proven in a setting where
there is only a single client, and then composed using the generic composition theorem.
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The (extended) key space actually depends on the cipher suites in use. In this work,
we do not specifically focus on any of the cipher suites, but rather define a function cphs :
{CAuth, SAuth,CEnc, SEnc,CIV, SIV} → Z, which outputs the length of each of the follow-
ing keys: client write MAC key (κC,a), server write MAC key (κS,a), client write key (κC,e),
server write key (κS,e), client write IV (κC,IV ), server write IV (κS,IV ). Note that the last two
keys are often not generated, since they are only used for implicit nonce techniques, see [DR08].
Usually, the key length for each of the first four keys is 32 bytes, i.e. 256 bits. By convention,
if κC,IV , κS,IV are not generated, we write that cphs(κC,IV ) = cphs(κS,IV ) = 0. The set of all
possible keys (parsed as a concatenation of all the aforementioned keys, in the given order)
is denoted K. The derived keys for each sessions are, in this sequence, client write MAC key,
server write MAC key, client write key, server write key, client write IV, server write IV, and
the two “finished” messages which are of length 96 bits each.
We usually write the generated vectors as ~κ = (κC,a, κS,a, κC,e, κS,e, κC,IV , κS,IV , ξC , ξS),
with the lengths of the individual components indicated by cphs.
KSP,∗
= =•cphs,n
Set be = 0 for e ∈ [n] and bC = 0.
No attacker present: Output at both interfaces C and S/1 the same vector ~κ described
above. Subsequently, provide bidirectional channels between those two interfaces.
Attacker present:
• Upon input of the type (key-c, e) with e ∈ [n] ∪ {0} at the E-interface, if bC = 0,
then:a
1. If ~κe is undefined, draw ~κe at random as described above.
2. Output ~κe at the C-interface and set bC = 1.
Then, relay all communication between the interfaces C and E/C.
• On input (deliver) at the E/e-sub-interface, if be = 0, then:
1. If ~κe is undefined, draw ~κe at random as described above.
2. Output ~κe at the S/e-interface and set be = 1.
Then, relay all communication between the interfaces S/e and E/e.
• Upon input (inject, e, ~κ) with e ∈ [n], if be = 0 then output ~κ at interface S/e and
set be = 1. Then, relay all communication between the interfaces S/e and E/e.
aThe value e = 0 allows for client sessions that are not paired with any server session.
In TLS the session keys are obtained via a PRF based on HMAC, taking as input the master
secret value obtained in a previous step. Afterward, the client and server each generates a final
message by again querying the PRF keyed with the master secret value, on input the hash of a
concatenation of messages (basically the transcript of the session). This hash function, denoted
H , is required to be collision resistant. For the purpose of our analysis, we will assume that
the key material and the finished messages are derived by means of a pseudo-random function
PRF = (genPRF, evalPRF), with output length equal to max(|cphs(·)|, 96). For a more detailed
discussion how this is achieved in TLS, we refer the reader to Appendix A.3.
The client converter, expc, behaves as follows:
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1. Obtain the values (κ, ηC , ηsid ,m) from MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n, where m is a concatenation of mes-
sages.
2. Generate keys (κC,a, κC,e, κS,a, κS,e, κC,IV , κS,IV )← evalPRF(κ, key expansion|ηC |ηsid ).
3. Generate messages (ξC , δC) ← evalPRF(κ, client finished|H (ηC |ηsid |m|γ)) and (ξS ,
δS) ← evalPRF(κ, server finished|H (ηC |ηsid |m|cξC |γ)).18 In the above computation,
the constant γ stands for the “ChangeCipherSpec” message, whereas the value cξC is
computed as a function of ξC in a way that depends, as do the lengths of the computed
keys, on the adopted cipher suite (this corresponds to the encryption of the finished mes-
sage, computed in the record layer protocol).
4. Compute ξ¯C and ξ¯S by protecting ξC and ξS using the keys κC,a, κC,e, κS,a, κS,e and en-
cryption and authentication as specified by the cipher suite.
5. Output (κC,a, κC,e, κS,a, κS,e, κC,IV , κS,IV ) and (ξ¯C , ξ¯S).
The server converter, exps behaves as follows. For each of the sessions described by a pair
sid = (ηC , e) ∈ N × [n]:
1. Obtain the values (κ, ηsid ,m) from MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n, where m is a concatenation of messages.
2. Generate keys κC,a, κC,e, κS,a, κS,e, κC,IV , κS,IV ← evalPRF(κ, key expansion|ηC |ηsid ).
3. Generate “finished” messages (ξC , δC) ← evalPRF(κ, client finished|H (ηC |ηsid |m|γ))
and (ξS , δS)← evalPRF(κ, server finished|H (ηC |ηsid |m|cξC |γ)).
4. Compute ξ¯C and ξ¯S by protecting ξC and ξS using the keys κC,a, κC,e, κS,a, κS,e and en-
cryption and authentication as specified by the cipher suite.
5. Output (κC,a, κC,e, κS,a, κS,e, κC,IV , κS,IV ) and (ξC , ξS).
We aim for the statement that the protocol (expc, exps) constructs from MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n the
parallel composition of one copy of
KSP,∗
= =•cphs,n for each client C ∈ C, each such resource cor-
responding to a server’s sub-interface S/η for the nonce η = ρ(C) chosen by client C. This,
however, is not directly true since by the definition of the server’s converter exps, an attacker can
generate output at a server’s sub-interface S/η for client nonces η /∈ ρ(C). This is not an artifice
of our constructive treatment, but an inherent trait of protocols with unilateral authentication:
the key may be shared either between clients and servers or between attackers and servers. We
capture this feature at the level of the key expansion step by introducing “residual” resources
KSP,∗
= =•cphs,n for which the client’s interface is also provided as a sub-interface of the E-interface.
We denote the parallel composition of these resources as
⊗
(I,J)∈PJKSP,∗= =•cphs,nK(I,J), where the
double-bracket notation indicates that the interfaces of each one of the (three-interface) resource
KSP,∗
= =•cphs,n are provided as interfaces I and J for each (I, J) ∈ P.
We show the following result, where we describe the pseudo-random function PRF by a
converter prf and denote the system outputting a single 384-bit random string by U384 and the
uniform random function (with the same output length as PRF ) by F.
Lemma 16. The protocol (expc, exps) constructs
⊗
(I,J)∈PJKSP,∗= =•cphs,nK(I,J) from MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n,
for P := {(C, S/ρ(C)) : C ∈ C} ∪ {(E/η, S/η) : η /∈ ρ(C)}. The construction holds under the
assumption that the hash function H is collision resistant and the pseudo-random function
PRF is indistinguishable from a random function. In more detail, for the simulator σ and the
reductions C and C′ described in the proof,
MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n
(expc,exps),σ,(ε,ε)
==⇒
⊗
(I,J)∈P
JKSP,∗= =•cphs,nK(I,J)
18The “extra” bits δC and δS are discarded.
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such that for all distinguishers D, ε(D) := ΓDC(GCR) + |C| ·∆DC′ (prf U384,F).
Proof.
Availability. We show the availability condition. Let R⊥ :=
∏
C∈C expc
CexpsS⊥EMSKN,ρ,AUX ,n
and S⊥ := ⊥E
[⊗
(I,J)∈PJKSP,∗= =•cphs,nK(I,J)]. We notice that the main difference between the real
and ideal system (when the cheating bit is set to b = 0), is that the latter chooses the keys and
the finished messages (ξC , ξS) to be output at C and S/1 uniformly at random, whereas the
former computes such values via the PRF.
We introduce a first hybrid systems H⊥, to deal with possible collisions in the hash function
H . The system H⊥ is defined exactly as R⊥, with one difference: Whenever there exists two dis-
tinct tuples (ηC , ηsid ,m, cξC ) and (η
′
C , η
′
sid ,m
′, c′ξ′C ) such that either (ηC , ηsid , γ) and (η
′
C , η
′
sid , γ)
or (ηC , ηsid ,m, cξC , γ) and (η
′
C , η
′
sid ,m
′, c′ξ′C , γ) are a collision for H , then the corresponding out-
put of the hash function is re-sampled uniformly until a completely fresh (i.e., not previously
used) value is found. We argue that a distinguisher between the two systems R and H⊥ can
be used to build a reduction C breaking collision resistance of H . The reduction C connects
with the inside interface to the game GCR and provides at the outside interface an emulation of
R⊥, using a description of the hash function obtained from GCR. A “collision” in the emulated
execution can then be used to win the game GCR (for the exact definition of collision see the
MBO below).
We define the monotone binary output (MBO) E on the systems R, H⊥, and CGCR as
the following “collision” event: it becomes 1 once there are two distinct tuples (ηC , ηsid ,m, cξC )
and (η′C , η
′
sid ,m
′, c′ξ′C ) such that either (ηC , ηsid , γ) and (η
′
C , η
′
sid , γ) or (ηC , ηsid ,m, cξC , γ) and
(η′C , η
′
sid ,m
′, c′ξ′C , γ) are a collision for H . Clearly the random systems R and H⊥ are equiva-
lent conditioned on the MBO not being 1. Thus invoking Lemma 26 allows to conclude that
∆D (R,H⊥) ≤ ΓDC(GCR).
Next, we argue that a distinguisher between H⊥ and S⊥ can be used together with a
reduction C′ to distinguish the pseudo-random function PRF from a truly random function.
The reduction is actually a series of reductions C′i for i ∈ [|C|], where the index pinpoints one
client C ∈ C. We assume some (e.g. lexicographic) order  over the set of clients, and write
Ci to denote the i-th client with respect to this order. The reduction C
′
i makes 3 queries to
connected system and works as follows:
• For all the sessions between a client C  Ci, behave as in H⊥.
• For all the sessions between a client C ≺ Ci, behave as in S⊥.
• In the session between Ci and sid = (η, 1), forward x1 = key expansion|η|ηsid , x2 =
client finished|H (η|ηsid |m|γ) and x3 = server finished|H (η|ηsid |m|cx2 |γ) to the
connected system; note that the value cx2 can be computed as a function of x2 by only
knowing the cipher suite in use. Emulate the session using the corresponding values y1,
y2 and y3, received from the inside interface. (In case a collision is found, similar to the
MBO defined in H⊥, re-sample the output of the hash function uniformly.)
We note that if C′i is connected to F, then the values y1, y2 and y3 are uniform, whereas if C′i
is connected to prf U384, then they are computed as evalPRF(κ, x) for x ∈ {x1, x2, x3} and a
uniformly random key κ. Also, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ |C|, C′i prf U384 ≡ C′i+1F. Furthermore, as
C′0 = H⊥ prf U384 and C′|C|F = S⊥, the above argument concludes the proof of the availability
condition, where C′ chooses any one of the C′i uniformly at random.
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Security. To prove the security condition, consider the following simulator σ:
• Initially, σ sets eη = 1 for all η ∈ N . (The counters are kept consistent, i.e. they are
increased whenever the simulator receives at the outside interface an (ack, ∗) or (inject, ∗)
command.)
• Upon input (ack, η) at the outside interface, if eη ≤ n, then choose ηsid for sid = (η, eη)
and output ηsid at the outside interface as being transmitted via MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n.
• Upon input (key-c, C, aux , η˜) at the outside interface (the first time for this C ∈ C):
– If η˜ = ηsid for sid = (ρ(C), e
′) for some e′ < eρ(C), let e = e′,
– else, let e = 0.
Issue (key-c, e) at the C-sub-interface of
⊗
C∈CJKSP,∗= =•cphs,nK(C,S/ρ(C)). Afterward, forward
communication between the outside and the inside C-sub-interfaces.
• Upon input (deliver, η, e, aux ), if η ∈ ρ(C), e < eη, issue (deliver) at the E/ρ−1(η)-
sub-interface of the system
⊗
C∈CJKSP,∗= =•cphs,nK(C,S/ρ(C)).
• Upon input (inject, η, e, aux , κ) at the outside interface, define sid = (η, e) and compute
(κ˜C,a, κ˜S,a, κ˜C,e, κ˜S,e, κ˜C,IV , κ˜S,IV )← evalPRF(κ, key expansion|η|ηsid )
ξ˜C ← evalPRF(κ, client finished|H (η|ηsid |aux |γ))
ξ˜S ← evalPRF(κ, server finished|H (η|ηsid |aux |cξ˜C |γ)).
Then issue (inject, e, κ˜C,a, κ˜S,a, κ˜C,e, κ˜S,e, κ˜C,IV , κ˜S,IV , ξ˜C , ξ˜S) at the inside ρ
−1(η)-sub-
interface of
⊗
C∈CJKSP,∗= =•cphs,nK(C,S/ρ(C)).
• After either a (deliver, η, e, ∗) or an (inject, η, e, ∗, ∗), forward communication between
the outside and inside sid = (ρ(η), e) sub-interfaces.
For the sake of brevity, we use the notation R :=
∏
C∈C expc
CexpsSMSKN,ρ,AUX ,n as well as
S := σE
[⊗
(I,J)∈PJKSP,∗= =•cphs,nK(I,J)]. We notice that the only difference between R and S is
within (key-c, ∗) commands, as in the former the key material and the pair of values (ξC , ξS)
are computed via the PRF and the hash function, whereas in the latter they are sampled
uniformly. Similar to the availability proof, we consider a hybrid system H where we re-sample
outputs of H corresponding to distinct inputs generating a collision (until a “fresh” value is
found). Then one can describe a reduction C′′ that, together with a distinguisher telling apart
R and H, breaks the collision resistance of H . The description of the reduction is similar to
the one considered in the availability case, and is therefore omitted.
Finally, we argue that a distinguisher between H and S can be used to build a reduction C′′′
breaking the pseudo-randomness of the PRF. We remark that there is a single key κC associated
with client C, and the key at some interface S/(ρ(C), e) is either the same key κC or it is an
injected key. It follows that the the description of the reduction goes along the same lines to
the one considered for the availability proof. Put together, the above arguments conclude the
proof of the security condition.
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4.2 Key Expansion in TLS 1.3
The expansion in TLS 1.3 is computed differently. The underlying resource was defined to
output the handshake master secret, and hence the computations performed here are as follows:
• Compute the handshake session keys and the handshake finished message (encrypted with
the session keys—note that the resource outputs the “encrypted” version of the messages),
• compute the “main” master secret,
• compute the session keys for the main protocol,
• output the encrypted finished messages and all the session keys.
The next protocol step, which we describe as a protocol (expc13, exps13), uses a HMAC-
based PRF to generate sufficient key material (depending on the actual cipher suite) for two
encryption and two MAC keys (one key per purpose and direction). Furthermore, the converters
also generate the so-called “finished” messages which are used by the client and the server to
confirm the computed keys.
More formally, starting from the resource MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n, we expand the key using a pseudo-
random function (PRF); our goal is to construct the ideal resource
⊗
C∈CJKSP,∗= =•cphs,nK(C,S/ρ(C)).
An advantage of this description is that it is the parallel composition of multiple “single-client”
resources
KSP,∗
= =•cphs,n, which means all following protocol steps can be proven in a setting where
there is only a single client, and then composed using the generic composition theorem.
In TLS 1.3 the session keys are obtained via a PRF based on HMAC, taking as input the
handshake master secret value obtained in a previous step. Additionally, the client and server
each generates a finished message by again querying the PRF keyed with the handshake master
secret value, on input the hash of a concatenation of messages (basically the transcript of the
session). This hash function, denoted H , is required to be collision resistant. For the purpose
of our analysis, we will assume that the key material and the finished messages are derived
by means of a pseudo-random function PRF = (genPRF, evalPRF), with output length equal
to max(|cphs(·)|, 96). For a more detailed discussion how this is achieved in TLS, we refer the
reader to Appendix A.3.
The client converter, expc13, behaves as follows:
1. Obtain the values (κ, ηC , ηsid ,m) from MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n, where m is a concatenation of mes-
sages.
2. Compute the session hash h = H (m).
3. Compute handshake session keys for the authenticated encryption (from the handshake
master secret) as (κˆC , κˆS , κˆC,IV , κˆS,IV )← evalPRF(κ, key expansion|ηC |ηsid ).
4. Generate a master secret key κ¯← evalPRF(κ, extended master secret|h)
5. Generate keys (κC , κS , κC,IV , κS,IV )← evalPRF(κ¯, key expansion|ηC |ηsid ).
6. Generate confirmation messages (ξC , δC) ← evalPRF(κ, client finished|h) and (ξS ,
δS)← evalPRF(κ, server finished|h).19
7. Compute ξ¯C and ξ¯S by protecting ξC and ξS using the keys κˆC , κˆS , κˆC,IV , κˆS,IV and
authenticated encryption as specified by the cipher suite.
8. Output (κC , κS , κC,IV , κS,IV ) and (ξ¯C , ξ¯S).
The server converter, exps13 behaves as follows. For each of the sessions described by a pair
sid = (ηC , e) ∈ N × [n]:
19The “extra” bits δC and δS are discarded.
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1. Obtain the values (κ, ηsid ,m) from MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n, where m is a concatenation of messages.
2. Compute the session hash h = H (m).
3. Compute handshake session keys for the authenticated encryption (from the handshake
master secret) as (κˆC , κˆS , κˆC,IV , κˆS,IV )← evalPRF(κ, key expansion|ηC |ηsid ).
4. Generate a master secret key κ¯← evalPRF(κ, extended master secret|h)
5. Generate keys (κC , κS , κC,IV , κS,IV )← evalPRF(κ¯, key expansion|ηC |ηsid ).
6. Generate confirmation messages (ξC , δC) ← evalPRF(κ, client finished|h) and (ξS ,
δS)← evalPRF(κ, server finished|h).
7. Compute ξ¯C and ξ¯S by protecting ξC and ξS using the keys κˆC , κˆS , κˆC,IV , κˆS,IV and
authenticated encryption as specified by the cipher suite.
8. Output (κC , κS , κC,IV , κS,IV ) and (ξ¯C , ξ¯S).
The construction statement is almost the same as in Section 4; the only difference is that
the keys are computed differently.
We aim for the statement that the protocol (expc13, exps13) constructs from MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n
the parallel composition of one copy of
KSP,∗
= =•cphs,n for each client C ∈ C, each such resource
corresponding to a server’s sub-interface S/η for the nonce η = ρ(C) chosen by client C. This,
however, is not directly true since by the definition of the server’s converter exps13, an attacker
can generate output at a server’s sub-interface S/η for client nonces η /∈ ρ(C). This is not
an artifice of our constructive treatment, but an inherent trait of protocols with unilateral
authentication: the key may be shared either between clients and servers or between attackers
and servers. We capture this feature at the level of the key expansion step by introducing
“residual” resources
KSP,∗
= =•cphs,n for which the client’s interface is also provided as a sub-interface
of the E-interface. We denote the parallel composition of these resources as
⊗
(I,J)∈PJKSP,∗= =•cphs,nK(I,J), where the double-bracket notation indicates that the interfaces of each one of the (three-
interface) resource
KSP,∗
= =•cphs,n are provided as interfaces I and J for each (I, J) ∈ P.
We show the following result, where we describe the pseudo-random function PRF by a
converter prf and denote the system outputting a single 384-bit random string by U384 and the
uniform random function (with the same output length as PRF ) by F.
Lemma 17. The protocol (expc13, exps13) constructs the keys
⊗
(I,J)∈PJKSP,∗= =•cphs,nK(I,J) from
the handshake master secret MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n, for P := {(C, S/ρ(C)) : C ∈ C} ∪ {(E/η, S/η) :
η /∈ ρ(C)}. The construction holds under the assumption that the hash function H is collision
resistant and the pseudo-random function PRF is indistinguishable from a random function. In
more detail, for the simulator σ and the reductions C and C′ described in the proof,
MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n
(expc13,exps13),σ,(ε,ε)
==⇒
⊗
(I,J)∈P
JKSP,∗= =•cphs,nK(I,J)
such that for all distinguishers D, ε(D) := ΓDC(GCR) + 2 · |C| ·∆DC′ (prf U384,F).
Proof sketch. The proof proceeds almost exactly as the one of Lemma 16; the difference is that
the PRF is keyed with two different values per session (the handshake master secret and the
main master secret, respectively), and this is accounted for by an additional factor 2 in the
reduction. (The hybrid argument is performed over twice the number of intermediate steps.)
On a very high level: by the collision resistance of the hash function, and since the pairs of
nonces are unique by assumption, the inputs to the PRFs are either guaranteed to be the same
(at the client and the server), or guaranteed to be distinct (for “different” uses or sessions).
Then, by the assumption that the initial keys are unique, the remainder is reduced on the
pseudo-randomness of the assumed PRF.
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5 Constructing a Unilaterally Secure Channel
We describe the goal of the TLS record layer as constructing, from a unilateral key and inse-
cure communication channels, a bidirectional unilaterally secure communication channel. TLS
specifies several alternative cipher suites that are supposed to achieve this constructive step.
The most widely used ones are based on an Authenticate-then-Encrypt combination of a MAC
scheme and a symmetric encryption scheme, but [DR08] also specifies the possibility of using a
monolithic authenticated encryption scheme. In this section, we prove the Authenticate-then-
Encrypt modes based on [MT10], leaving the other cipher suites for future work.
As discussed in Section 1 and in previous work, the “finished” message of the TLS protocol
cannot be regarded as part of the handshake if one wants to prove a strong security notion
for the key. (The reason is that the actual key is used to protect the finished messages, which
allows to verify whether an obtained key is correct.) Hence, as [JKSS12], we prove the record
layer protocol including the finished messages and with the assumption of only a unilaterally
authenticated key. The resource we want to construct by the record protocol is the “unilateral”
channel
∗   •n described below.
∗   •n
No attacker present: Behave as a (secure multi-message) channel between interfaces C
and S/1.
Attacker present:
• Upon the first input (key-c, e) with e ∈ [n] at the E-interface (if e was not used
before), provide a secure multiple-use (i.e., keep a buffer of undelivered messages)
channel between C and S/e. In particular:
– On input a message m ∈ B≤16384 at the C-interface, output |m| at interface E.
– On input (deliver, client) at the E-interface, deliver the next message at S/e.
– On input a messagem′ ∈ B≤16384 at the S/e-interface, output |m′| at interface E.
– On input (deliver, server) at the E-interface, deliver the next message at C.
• After input (conquer, e) with e ∈ [n] at the E-interface (if e was not used before),
forward messages in B≤16384 bidirectionally between the S/e- and E/e-interfaces.
Generally, the record layer protocol is a pair of converters which both obtain at the re-
spective inside interfaces keys and finished messages (as given by the
KSP,∗
= =•-resource). The
client’s converter first sends the ξC-message (authenticated and encrypted), and then obtains,
decrypts, and checks the ξS-message. If the check succeeds, payload messages are processed and
transmitted. The server’s converter first waits for the (encrypted) ξC-message, decrypts, and
checks. If successful, the converter sends ξS authenticated and encrypted, and later processes
and transmits payload messages. More precisely, the two converters are described as follows.
The client’s converter behaves as follows.
1. Obtain at the inside interface keys κC,a, κC,e, κS,a, κS,e, κC,IV , κS,IV and “finished” mes-
sages ξC , ξS . Send the message ξC via the inside interface.
2. Upon receiving a message at the inside interface, compare it to ξS . If this step fails, abort.
3. Messages obtained at the outside interface are processed with the scheme(s) specified by
the respective cipher suite using the keys κC,a and κC,e and sent via the inside interface.
Further ciphertexts obtained at the inside interface are also processed with κS,e and κS,a,
the plaintexts are output at the outside interface. If any (MAC) verification fails, abort.
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The server’s converter behaves as follows:
1. Obtain at the inside interface keys κC,a, κC,e, κS,a, κS,e, κC,IV , κS,IV and “finished” mes-
sages ξC , ξS .
2. Upon receiving a message at the inside interface, compare it to ξC . If the above step fails,
abort. Send the message ξS via the inside interface.
3. Messages obtained at the outside interface are processed with the scheme(s) (using the
keys κS,a and κS,e) and sent via the inside interface. Further ciphertexts obtained at the
inside interface are processed (with κC,e and κC,a), the plaintexts are output at the outside
interface. If any (MAC) verification fails, abort.
5.1 Cipher Suites based on Stream Ciphers
The TLS standard [DR08] describes the record layer protocol based on stream ciphers in Sec-
tion 6.2.3.1, the standard cipher suites using this type of encryption scheme are based on the
cipher RC4. We prove the security following [MT10, Corollary 1] based on the assumption
that the stream cipher produces a stream of pseudo-random bits.20 In more detail, we formal-
ize the assumption on a stream cipher by requiring that the distinguishing advantage between
stream Uk (i.e., the stream generated by the cipher when initialized with a uniformly random
k-bit key) and U∗ (a stream of uniformly random bits21) is small. The scheme is formalized as
the pair (atec, ates) of converters.
Lemma 18. The protocol (atec, ates) constructs from
KSP,∗
= =• the channel ∗   •n, under the
assumptions that the used stream cipher is pseudo-random and HMAC is strongly unforgeable.
More formally, for the simulator σ and the reductions C, C′ described in the proof,
KSP,∗
= =• (atec,ates),σ,(0,ε)==⇒ ∗   •n,
with ε(D) := 2 ·∆DC (stream Uk,U∗) + 2 · ΓDC′
(
Gsuf-cma
)
for all distinguishers D.
Proof sketch. The validity of the availability condition follows because the resource
KSP,∗
= =• out-
puts the same keys and “finished” messages at interfaces C and S, so the verification of these
messages succeeds as atec and ates compute the same key streams and MACs.
To prove the validity of the security condition, we describe a simulator σ that initializes bits
be = 0 for each e ∈ [n]. Then:
• Upon input (key-c, e) at the outside interface, if e ∈ [n] and be = 0, then set be = 1 and
e¯ = e. Simulate the transmission of the client’s finished message (a uniform random string
of length 256 bits—96 bits “finished” message and 160 bits MAC) as the first message c1
from C to S/e.
• Once both (deliver) has been input at the outside interface and the first message c˜1 is
delivered to S in session e¯, if c1 = c˜1 then simulate a finished message from the server to
the client, again by choosing a 256-bit string c2 uniformly at random.
In the following, upon input the ith message length `i corresponding to a server message in
session e¯ at the inside interface, output a uniformly random string of length `i+160. Also,
whenever a message is delivered (via the outer interface) to the server session e¯, check
whether exactly the same messages were simulated as being sent by the client before. In
20As demonstrated in [ABP+13], the assumption that RC4 is pseudo-random is dangerous. The proof holds
for arbitrary stream ciphers.
21Formally, U∗ and stream allow to obtain the stream by querying for one bit at a time.
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this case, input (ack, C) at the inside interface, otherwise halt the server session e¯ (i.e.,
stop processing messages for this server session, and, in real implementations, send an
alert; however, for our treatment we omit alerts from the protocol description.).
• Once the first message c˜2 is delivered to C, if c2 = c˜2 then record the client as active.
In the following, upon input the ith message length `i corresponding to a client message at
the inside interface, output a uniformly random string of length `i + 160. Also, as above,
whenever a message is delivered to the client, if exactly the same sequence of message was
simulated as being sent by the server’s session e¯ before, then input (ack, S) at the inside
interface, otherwise halt the client (i.e., stop processing messages for the client—note that
we simplify the protocol and do not handle error messages).
• Upon input (inject, e, κ¯C,a, κ¯C,e, κ¯S,a, κ¯S,e, κ¯C,IV , κ¯S,IV , ξ¯C , ξ¯S) at the E-interface with
e ∈ [n] and be = 0, set be = 1 and record the values. When the first message is delivered
to the session e, check whether the message is a correctly MAC’ed and encrypted version
(with κ¯C,a and κ¯C,e) of ξ¯C (if not, abort the server session e). Respond with a correctly
MAC’ed and encrypted version (with κ¯S,a and κ¯S,e) of ξS .
Subsequently, MAC and encrypt messages sent in the server session e with the keys κ¯S,a
and κ¯S,e. For messages given at the outside interface for this session, decrypt with κ¯C,e
and verify the MAC with κC,a. In case of success, inject the resulting message via the
inside interface, otherwise halt the server session e.
First, we note that the simulation of all sessions except for e¯ is perfect, as the simulator
makes exactly the same computations as the protocol.
To prove the security statement, we use a hybrid system H1 similarly to σ
E ∗   •n with
the difference that the key stream is generated by the stream cipher with a uniformly random
key instead of uniformly at random. The reduction system C simulates all sessions similarly to
σE
∗   •n, but in session e¯ it uses the key stream from the connected system (with probability 12
it does so for the client while using a fully random stream for the server, with the remaining
probability it uses the given stream for the client and generates the server’s stream using the
stream cipher). This means that ∆D
(
atecCatesS
KSP,∗
= =• ,H1
)
≤ 2 · ∆DC (stream U128,U∗).
Then, we use [MT10, Corollary 1] twice, once for each direction, to obtain the statement
∆D
(
H1, σ
E ∗   •n) ≤ 2·ΓDC′ (Gsuf-cma) and apply the triangular inequality to conclude.
5.2 Cipher Suites based on CBC Encryption
The TLS standard [DR08] describes the record layer protocol based on CBC encryption in
Section 6.2.3.2, the standard cipher suites using this encryption mode are based on either 3DES
or AES. We prove the security following [MT10, Corollary 2], based on the assumption that the
used block cipher is a (super22) PRP. In more detail, we formalize the assumptions on the block
ciphers by requiring that the distinguishing advantage between bc Uk (i.e., the block cipher bc
with block length ` which might e.g. be 3DES or AES initialized with a uniformly random key
of appropriate length) and P` (a uniformly random permutation) is small, even allowing both
forward and backward queries.
In the following lemma, we use the converters atec′ and ates′ that implement the Authenticate-
then-Encrypt composition of a CBC-mode with block cipher bc and a strongly unforgeable MAC.
As we base the proof on [MT10, Corollary 2], it only applies to the case where the padding used
by TLS is unique in the sense that it is the shortest possible such padding (and no length-hiding
techniques are used).
22In the reduction, it is necessary to make inverse queries to the permutation. This is unclear in [MT10].
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Lemma 19. The protocol (atec′, ates′) constructs from
KSP,∗
= =• the channel ∗   •n, under the
assumptions that bc is a (super) PRP and HMAC is strongly unforgeable. More formally, for
the simulator σ and the reductions C, C′ described in the proof,
KSP,∗
= =• (atec
′,ates′),σ,(0,ε)
==⇒ ∗   •n,
with ε(D) := 2 ·∆DC (bc Uk,P`) + 2 · ΓDC′
(
Gsuf-cma
)
+ (ql)
2
2`−1 for all distinguishers D.
Proof sketch. The availability condition follows as in Lemma 18.
To prove the validity of the security condition, we describe a simulator σ that initializes bits
be = 0 for each e ∈ [n]. Then:
• Upon input (key-c, e) at the outside interface, if e ∈ [n] and be = 0, then set be = 1 and
e¯ = e. Simulate the transmission of the client’s finished message (a uniform random string
of length ` · ⌈256` ⌉ bits—96 bits “finished” message and 160 bits MAC, padded to the next
block size) as the first message c1 from C to S/e.
• Once both (deliver) has been input at the outside interface and the first message c˜1 is
delivered to S in session e¯, if c1 = c˜1 then simulate a finished message from the server to
the client, again by choosing a bit string c2 of appropriate length uniformly at random.
In the following, upon input the ith message length `i corresponding to a server message
in session e¯ at the inside interface, output a uniformly random string of length ` ·
⌈
`i+160
`
⌉
.
Whenever a message is delivered (via the outer interface) to the server session e¯, behave
as the simulator in Lemma 18.
• Once the first message c˜2 is delivered to C, if c2 = c˜2 then record the client as active.
In the following, upon input the ith message length `i corresponding to a client message
at the inside interface, output a uniformly random string of length ` ·
⌈
`i+160
`
⌉
. Also, as
above, whenever a message is delivered to the client, behave as the simulator in Lemma 18.
• Upon input (inject, e, κ¯C,a, κ¯C,e, κ¯S,a, κ¯S,e, κ¯C,IV , κ¯S,IV , ξ¯C , ξ¯S) at the E-interface with
e ∈ [n] and be = 0, set be = 1 and record the values. When the first message is delivered
to the session e, check whether the message is a correctly MAC’ed, padded, and encrypted
version (with κ¯C,a and κ¯C,e) of ξ¯C (if not, abort the server session e). Respond with a
correctly MAC’ed, padded, and encrypted version (with κ¯S,a and κ¯S,e) of ξS .
Subsequently, MAC, pad, and encrypt messages sent in the server session e with the
keys κ¯S,a and κ¯S,e. For messages given at the outside interface for this session, decrypt
with κ¯C,e and verify the padding and the MAC with κC,a. In case of success, inject the
resulting message via the inside interface, otherwise halt the server session e.
First, we note that the simulation of all sessions except for e¯ is perfect, as the simulator
makes exactly the same computations as the protocol.
To prove the security statement, we use a hybrid system H1 similarly to σ
E ∗   •n with
the difference that the CBC scheme is computed using a uniformly random permutation P`
(instead of bc). The reduction system C simulates all sessions similarly to σE
∗   •n, but
in session e¯ it uses the connected system (with probability 12 it does so for the client while
using a fully random permutation for the server, with the remaining probability it uses the
given permutation for the server and generates the server’s stream using bc). This means that
∆D
(
atec′Cates′S
KSP,∗
= =• ,H1
)
≤ 2 ·∆DC (bc Uk,P`). Then, we use [MT10, Corollary 2] twice,
once for each direction, to obtain the statement ∆D
(
H1, σ
E ∗   •n) ≤ 2 · ΓDC′ (Gsuf-cma)+
(ql)2
2`−1 and apply the triangular inequality to conclude.
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5.3 Cipher Suites based on AEAD Encryption
The current draft of TLS 1.3 [DR15] describes (only) a record layer protocol which is based
on authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD). This mode has been analyzed by
Badertscher et al. [BMM+15] in recent work. Their result can be “imported” into our work
along the lines of Sections 5.1 and 5.2.
We prove the security following [BMM+15, Theorems 1 and 2], based on the assumption that
the used authenticated encryption is secure. As described in Appendix C.5, we formalize the
security of authenticated encryption via the distinguishing advantage between the two systems
Gaead0 and G
aead
1 .
In the following lemma, we use the converters aeadc and aeads that use AEAD encryption
as described in [DR15] with sequence numbers as nonces. We base the proof on [BMM+15,
Theorems 1 and 2].
Lemma 20. The protocol (aeadc, aeads) constructs from
KSP,∗
= =• the channel ∗   •n, under the
assumption that the underlying AEAD cipher is secure. More formally, for the simulator σ and
the reduction C described in the proof,
KSP,∗
= =• (aeadc,aeads),σ,(0,ε)==⇒ ∗   •n,
with ε(D) := 2 ·∆DC (Gaead0 ,Gaead1 ) for all distinguishers D.
Proof sketch. The availability condition follows as in Lemma 18.
To prove the validity of the security condition, we describe a simulator σ that initializes bits
be = 0 for each e ∈ [n]. Then:
• Upon input (key-c, e) at the outside interface, if e ∈ [n] and be = 0, then set be = 1 and
e¯ = e. Simulate the transmission of the client’s finished message (a uniform random string
of length `(96) bits—96 bits “finished” message encrypted with AEAD cipher) as the first
message c1 from C to S/e.
• Once both (deliver) has been input at the outside interface and the first message c˜1 is
delivered to S in session e¯, if c1 = c˜1 then simulate a finished message from the server to
the client, again by choosing a bit string c2 of appropriate length uniformly at random.
In the following, upon input the ith message length `i corresponding to a server message
in session e¯ at the inside interface, output a uniformly random string of length `(`i).
Whenever a message is delivered (via the outer interface) to the server session e¯, behave
as the simulator in Lemma 18.
• Once the first message c˜2 is delivered to C, if c2 = c˜2 then record the client as active.
In the following, upon input the ith message length `i corresponding to a client message
at the inside interface, output a uniformly random string of length `(`i). Also, as above,
whenever a message is delivered to the client, behave as the simulator in Lemma 18.
• Upon input (inject, e, κ¯C , κ¯S , κ¯C,IV , κ¯S,IV , ξ¯C , ξ¯S) at the E-interface with e ∈ [n] and
be = 0, set be = 1 and record the values. When the first message is delivered to the session
e, check whether the message is a correct according to the AEAD scheme (with κ¯C) of
ξ¯C (if not, abort the server session e). Respond with a correctly AEAD encrypted version
(with κ¯S) of ξS .
Subsequently, AEAD encrypt messages sent in the server session e with the key κ¯S . For
messages given at the outside interface for this session, decrypt with κ¯C . In case of success,
inject the resulting message via the inside interface, otherwise halt the server session e.
First, we note that the simulation of all sessions except for e¯ is perfect, as the simulator
makes exactly the same computations as the protocol.
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To prove the security statement, we use [BMM+15, Theorems 1 and 2] twice, once for each
direction, to obtain the statement ∆D
(
aeadcAaeadsB, σE
∗   •n) ≤ 2 · ∆DC′ (Gaead0 ,Gaead1 )
via the triangular inequality.
6 Reconstructing TLS
In this section we argue that the composition of the converters we presented in Sections 3.3.2,
4, and 5 forms in fact the TLS protocol, and then give the full security statements for each of
the cipher suites.
Note that in our deconstruction of TLS, we use an intermediate converter that does not
appear in the TLS-DH and TLS-RSA versions, namely constructing the authenticated network
resource / −•N,ρ,F,SIG,n. As the difference between the TLS-DH/TLS-RSA and the TLS-DHE
protocols only appears in the construction of the master secret resource (in our de-construction,
obtaining the master key resource MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n from the nonce-exchange resource SNETN,ρ,n),
we only consider the TLS-DHE variant, noting that the same considerations hold for the TLS-
DH/TLS-RSA versions.
In fact, we describe TLS as a composition of a client TLS-DHE converter (denoted as
tlsdhec) and one server TLS-DHE converter. The client TLS-DHE converter tlsdhec represents
the composition of all the converters mounted at the client interfaces of our respective resources,
i.e., tlsdhec = atec ◦ expc ◦ dhec ◦ vrf ◦ hec. We explicitly outline the resulting tlsdhec converter
next:
1. hec: Obtain a (random) nonce ηC ∈ N (at the inside interface) and send it to the server
via the inside interface. Upon receiving nonce η˜ at the inside interface, output (ηC , η˜) at
the outside interface.
2. vrf: Upon receiving message cert at the inside interface corresponding to SNETN,ρ,n, query
(verify, cert) at the inside sub-interface corresponding to PKIF; abort if the verification
fails or if cert is not a well-formed certificate cert = (vk , f(vk)). Upon obtaining a sec-
ond message m′ from SNETN,ρ,n, parse m′ as (m, s) (abort if that is impossible). If
vrf (ηC |ηsid |m, s; vk) = 1, then output (cert , ηC , ηsid ,m, s) at the outside interface. (Oth-
erwise abort.)
3. dhec: Parse message m (obtained at the inside interface) as p|g|g′ = m (abort it im-
possible). Choose u←$ {1, . . . , q} (with q = |Z×p |) and input gu at the inside interface.
Query g′u|master secret|ηC |ηsid at RO384, in order to obtain a key κ ∈ {0, 1}384. Output
(κ, ηC , ηsid , aux |m|s|gu).
4. expc: Use the value κ to generate keys
(κC,a, κC,e, κS,a, κS,e, κC,IV , κS,IV )← evalPRF(κ, key expansion|ηC |ηsid ).
Using the concatenation of the previously transmitted messages m := cert |p|g|g′|s, com-
pute the “finished” messages (ξC , δC) ← evalPRF(κ, client finished|H (ηC |ηsid |m|γ))
and (ξS , δS) ← evalPRF(κ, server finished|H (ηC |ηsid |m|cξC |γ)). In the above compu-
tation, the constant γ stands for the “ChangeCipherSpec” message, whereas the value
cξC is computed as a function of ξC depending on the adopted cipher suite (in partic-
ular, ξC needs to be included in the hash of the message sent by the server). Output
(κC,a, κC,e, κS,a, κS,e, κC,IV , κS,IV ) and (ξC , ξS).
5. atec: Use the record layer scheme(s) specified by the cipher suite with the keys κC,a and
κC,e obtained at the inside interface, respectively, to process the message ξC (obtained
with the keys), and to computed and send the obtained ciphertext via the inside interface.
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Upon receiving a message at the inside interface, process it using the keys κS,e and κS,a.
Compare the plaintext to ξS . If any one of the above steps fails, abort. From this point
on, messages obtained at the outside interface are processed with the specified scheme(s)
using keys κC,a and κC,e and sent via the inside interface. Further ciphertexts obtained
at the inside interface are processed with the keys κS,e and κS,a, the plaintexts are output
at the outside interface. If any (MAC) verification fails, abort.
Note that the composite converter corresponds exactly to the client’s protocol in TLS, with
the specification that, in the expansion step, the client first computes ξS as the PRF, under the
key κ of the hash of all the past messages, including ξC . We note that our description of the
protocol omits several constants that appear in the original protocol.
The server converter tlsdhes connects to the S-interface, and is composed of all the converters
connected to the S-interface, i.e., tlsdhes = ates ◦ exps ◦ dhesG ◦ sgn ◦ hes. We explicitly outline
the resulting tlsdhes converter below:
1. hes: Upon receiving a nonce η˜C at the inside C-sub-interface for some C ∈ ATCP, choose
a nonce ηsid ←$ N, send ηsid via the inside C-sub-interface. Output ηsid at outside sub-
interface ˜sid .
2. sgn: Initially compute (sk , vk)← gen. Input vk at the inside sub-interface corresponding
to PKIF, obtaining a response s, and set cert = (vk , s). Output cert at the outside
interface (as auxiliary information). Subsequently, for each inside sub-interface sid = (η, e)
outputting a nonce output ηsid , output ηsid at the respective outside sub-interface and send
cert via SNETN,ρ,n (in the respective session). Obtaining a message m at the outside (sub-
interface for session sid), compute s← sign(ηC |ηsid |m, sk) and send (m, s) in session sid .
Output s at the respective outside sub-interface.
3. dhesG : Upon obtaining a nonce ηsid at the inside sub-interface sid = (ηC , e), choose a
modulus p ∈ N and a generator g ∈ Z×p according to the distribution G. Also, choose
an exponent v←$ {1, . . . , |Z×p |}. Input the value m = p|g|gv at the respective inside sub-
interface (obtaining a signature s in response). Upon receiving a group element g˜ at the
respective inside sub-interface, query g˜v|master secret|ηC |ηsid at RO384, call the result
κ. Output (κ, ηsid , aux |m|s|g˜) at the respective outside sub-interface.
4. exps: Obtaining (κ, ηsid , aux |m|s|g˜) at the inside sub-interface of session sid = (ηC , e), gen-
erate keys κC,a, κC,e, κS,a, κS,e, κC,IV , κS,IV ← evalPRF(κ, key expansion|ηC |ηsid ). De-
note m := cert |p|g|g′|s. Generate messages (ξC , δC) ← evalPRF(κ, client finished|
H (ηC |ηsid |m|γ)) and (ξS , δS) ← evalPRF(κ, server finished|H (ηC |ηsid |m|cξC |γ)). Out-
put (κC,a, κC,e, κS,a, κS,e, κC,IV , κS,IV ) and (ξC , ξS) at the outside sub-interface sid .
5. ates: There is one such converter for each nonce η ∈ N , which connects at the respective
sub-interface. Upon receiving a message at the inside interface, process the message
with the scheme(s) specified by the cipher suite using the keys κC,e and κC,a. Compare
the plaintext to ξC . If any one of the above steps fails, abort. Use again the specified
schemes, now using the keys κS,a and κS,e, to process the message ξS , and send the
obtained ciphertext via the inside interface. Messages obtained at the outside interface
are processed with the specified scheme(s) using the keys κS,a and κS,e and sent via the
inside interface. Further ciphertexts obtained at the inside interface are processed using
κC,e and κC,a, the plaintexts are output at the outside interface. If any (MAC) verification
fails, abort.
Note once more that this amounts to the server protocol in TLS-DHE. In the following
section we give the full security statements for all versions TLS-DH, TLS-DHE, and TLS-RSA.
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6.1 Full Security Statements
Summarizing the bounds obtained in the previous sections, the full security statements for
TLS-DH, TLS-DHE, and TLS-RSA are as follows. We write the theorems for the cipher suites
based on the stream cipher only, but the analogous theorems for the CBC-based cipher suites
are obtained in the same way.
We start by showing the complete security statement for a cipher suite based on TLS-DH
and a stream cipher.
Theorem 21. Let C ⊆ ATCP be a set of clients. The TLS-DH protocol constructs, for each
client C ∈ C, one unilaterally secure channel ∗   •n from NET, PKI, and RO384. Concretely,
for the simulator σ and the reductions C, C′, C′′, C′′′, C(iv), C(v), and C(vi) obtained by
composing those described in the lemmas:
[NET,PKI,RO384]
(tlsdhec,tlsdhes),σ,(ε1,ε2)
==⇒
⊗
(I,J)∈P
J ∗   •nK(I,J),
with ε1(D) :=
(|C|
2
) · 2−224 + ΓDC(GCR) + |C| ·∆DC′ (prf U384,F) and
ε2(D) :=
((n
2
)
+
(|C|
2
))
· 2−224 + ΓDC′′(GGapDHG ) + ΓDC
′′′
(GCR) + |C| ·∆DC(iv) (prf U384,F)
+ |C|
(
2 ·∆DC(v) (stream Uk,U∗) + 2 · ΓDC(vi)
(
Gsuf-cma
))
,
for all distinguishers D and with the set P defined as in Lemma 16.
Proof. For the availability condition, we lose a term
(|C|
2
)
2−224 in the construction of the resource
NAMEρ from scratch (see Section 3.2.1), and another term Γ
DC(GCR)+|C|·∆DC′ (prf U384,F) in
the construction of
[⊗
C∈CJKSP,∗= =•cphs,nK(C,S/ρ(C)),⊗η∈N\ρ(C)JR˜cphs,nK(S/η)] via (expc, exps) (see
Lemma 16). The converters ates connected to the interfaces corresponding to η ∈ N \ ρ(C) do
not obtain keys and hence remain inactive.
For the security condition, we again lose a term
(|C|
2
)
2−224 when constructing the resource
NAMEρ from scratch. We also lose: a term
(
n
2
)
2−224 in the construction of SNETN,ρ,n from
the resources NET and NAMEρ (see Lemma 8); a term Γ
DC(GGapDHG ) in the construction
of the resource MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n from the resource [RO384,SNETN,ρ,n,PKIF] (see Lemma 9); a
term ΓDC
′
(GCR) + |C| · ∆DC′′ (prf U384,F) in constructing the parallel composition of keys[⊗
C∈CJKSP,∗= =•cphs,nK(C,S/ρ(C)),⊗η∈N\ρ(C)JR˜cphs,nK(S/η)] via (expc, exps) (see Lemma 16); finally,
noting that we lose a term 2 ·∆DC′′′ (stream Uk,U∗) + 2 · ΓDC(iv)
(
Gsuf-cma
)
for each obtained
channel between a client and server. The |C|-many such channels are obtained by parallel
composition.
We obtain the following analogous statement for a cipher suite based on TLS-DHE together
with a stream cipher.
Theorem 22. Let C ⊆ ATCP be a set of clients. The TLS-DHE protocol constructs, for each
client C ∈ C, one unilaterally secure channel ∗   •n from NET, PKI, and RO384. Concretely,
for the simulator σ and the reductions C, C′, C′′, C′′′, C(iv), C(v), C(vi), and C(vii) obtained
by composing the reductions from the lemmas,
[NET,PKI,RO384]
(tlsdhec,tlsdhes),σ,(ε1,ε2)
==⇒
⊗
(I,J)∈P
J ∗   •nK(I,J),
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with ε1(D) :=
(|C|
2
) · 2−224 + ΓDC(GCR) + |C| ·∆DC′ (prf U384,F) and
ε2(D) := 2 ·
((n
2
)
+
(|C|
2
))
· 2−224 + ΓDC′′(Guf-cma) + n · |C| · ΓDC′′′(GGapDHG )
+ ΓDC
(iv)
(GCR) + |C| ·∆DC(v) (prf U384,F)
+ |C| ·
(
2 ·∆DC(vi) (stream Uk,U∗) + 2 · ΓDC(vii)
(
Gsuf-cma
))
,
for all distinguishers D and with the set P defined as in Lemma 16.
Proof. The proof of the availability condition follows exactly the same scheme as above. A
similar argument holds for the security condition, with the exception that we lose a term
ΓDC(Guf-cma) while constructing the resource / −•N,ρ,F,SIG,n from the resources SNETN,ρ,n and
PKIF (see Lemma 10), and then a term n · |C| · ΓDC(GGapDHG ) in constructing the resource
MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n from the resources RO384 and / −•N,ρ,F,SIG,n (see Lemma 11). The remainder of
the proof is as above.
The analogous result also holds with respect to a cipher suite based on TLS-RSA together
with a stream cipher. Note that the entire security statement is implicitly parametrized by
gen, the RSA key generation algorithm, which is specialized for the considered key length. In
particular, this affects the converters rsas and tlsrsas as well as the game Gnr-pca.
Theorem 23 (TLS-RSA). Let C ⊆ ATCP be a set of clients. The TLS-RSA protocol constructs,
for each client C ∈ C, one unilaterally secure channel ∗   •n from NET, PKI, and RO384.
Concretely, there are a simulator σ and reductions C, C′, C′′q , for q ∈ N, C′′′, C(iv), C(v), and
C(vi) such that:
[NET,PKI,RO384]
(tlsrsac,tlsrsas),σ,(ε1,ε2)
==⇒
⊗
(I,J)∈P
J ∗   •nK(I,J),
with P as defined in Lemma 16, ε1(D) :=
(|C|
2
) ·2−224 + ΓDC(GCR) + |C| ·∆DC′ (prf U384,F) and
ε2(D) :=
((n
2
)
+
(|C|
2
))
· 2−224 + n · |C| · ΓDC
′′
q
q (G
nr-pca) +
q
2368
+ ΓDC
′′′
(GCR)
+ |C| ·∆DC(iv) (prf U384,F) + |C|
(
2 ·∆DC(v) (stream Uk,U∗) + 2 · ΓDC(vi)
(
Gsuf-cma
))
.
Proof. The proof of the availability condition follows the same scheme as for DH. A similar ar-
gument holds for the security condition, except that we use the bounds for RSA for constructing
the resource MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n (see Lemma 12).
Finally, we combine the results for TLS 1.3 in the same way as above.
Theorem 24. Let C ⊆ ATCP be a set of clients. The TLS 1.3 protocol constructs, for each
client C ∈ C, one unilaterally secure channel ∗   •n from NET and PKI. Concretely, for
the simulator σ and the reductions C, C′, C′′, C′′′, C(iv), C(v), C(vi), and C(vii) obtained by
composing the reductions from the lemmas,
[NET,PKI]
(tls13c,tls13s),σ,(ε1,ε2)
==⇒
⊗
(I,J)∈P
J ∗   •nK(I,J),
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with ε1(D) :=
(|C|
2
) · 2−224 + ΓDC(GCR) + 2 · |C| ·∆DC′ (prf U384,F) and
ε2(D) := 2·
((n
2
)
+
(|C|
2
))
·2−224+ΓDC′′(Guf-cma)+n·|C|·∆DC′′′ ((gA, gB, gAB), (gA, gB, gC)))
+ 3 · ΓDC(iv)(GCR) + 4 · |C| ·∆DC(v) (prf U384,F)
+ 2 · |C| ·∆DC(vi)
(
Gaead0 ,G
aead
1
)
,
for all distinguishers D and with the set P defined as in Lemma 16.
Proof. The proof of the availability condition follows exactly the same scheme as above. A
similar argument holds for the security condition, with the exception that we lose a term
ΓDC(Guf-cma) while constructing the resource / −•N,ρ,F,SIG,n from the resources SNETN,ρ,n and
PKIF (see Lemma 10), and then a term n · |C| · ΓDC(GGapDHG ) in constructing the resource
MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n from the resources RO384 and / −•N,ρ,F,SIG,n (see Lemma 11). The remainder of
the proof is as above.
7 Conclusion and Lessons Learned
TLS can be seen as a composition of sub-protocols, each constructing a resource transmitting
the remaining TLS messages as its payload. This approach allows to prove TLS in a modular
way. In particular, we analyze all three unilateral key-exchange modes of TLS 1.2 in isolation,
independently of the remainder of the protocol. We also analyze the the handshake of the recent
TLS 1.3 draft. Interestingly, although the protocol has been changed considerably, we con use
the same decomposition and only need to re-prove the protocol steps that were changed between
the version. In both cases of TLS 1.2 and 1.3, we can (essentially) re-use statements on the
record layer protocol proven in previous work, and obtain the security of the full protocol by
the composition theorem of constructive cryptography. This approach, however, comes at the
expense of resource complexity and strong assumptions (random oracles for all of TLS 1.2 and
NR-PCA instead of OW-PCA for the RSA-PKCS handshake mode).
While the purpose of most security mechanisms used in the protocol seemed clear, actually
performing the decomposition, i.e. finding suitable boundaries for “cutting” the protocol and
specifying the assumed and provided guarantees at each layer, proved tedious and sometimes
impossible; our approach was limited by many of TLS’ design choices. The protocol uses many
techniques heuristically: the cryptographic keys intended to protect the payload are also used
for the confirmation (here called “finished”) messages in TLS 1.2, the pseudo-random function
is keyed with a key that is not a uniformly random bit string, and various protocol messages
are unnecessarily included in the confirmation messages, to name a few.
These unfortunate design choices severely complicated our analysis, at multiple levels. The
most straightforward example is that modules which (in the protocol description) consist of
several steps cannot be analyzed in isolation. This is the case for the construction of the master
secret key resource MSK in TLS 1.2, which is constructed by a sub-protocol corresponding
to the computation of both the premaster secret (PMS), and then of the master secret key
(MSK)—in the terminology of [DR08]. This construction step cannot be modularized any
further because the client (an untrusted entity, not authenticated in the case of unilateral
authentication) chooses its input to the secret key after the server; intuitively, an attacker can
at this point replace the client’s message by one that correlates the computed PMS with one
in a different session, because the employed schemes are potentially malleable. As suggested
in a previous version of this work, this issue is resolved in the current draft of TLS 1.3 [DR15]
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by making the client choose its input to the key exchange first—a protocol of this type is also
analyzed in [CMT13]). Alternatively, it would have been possible to use non-malleable (like
CCA-secure) primitives for the key exchange.
Another complication arises from the fact that protocol sessions become distinguishable only
at a late stage of the protocol, resulting in our resources providing for a multi-session scenario.
Our resources for the augmented network resource SNET and the master secret key resource
MSK have to provide for many sessions being run for pairs of nonces. This complication could
be relieved by cryptographically binding a unique property of the client, like the nonce, to the
messages exchanged in the protocol in earlier phases of the protocol. This would guarantee
that “higher layers” of the protocol would not have to be analyzed in a multi-session scenario.
Unfortunately, this criticism still applies to the current draft of TLS 1.3.
The fact that the “finished” messages use data from lower layers of the protocol (basically
the entire session transcript of the lower layers) is reflected in the auxiliary information that
is being passed through the layers, as well as in the numerous output values for each resource.
Nevertheless, using the RSA-PKCS ciphertext as an input in the “finished” messages ensures
that, in a monolithic analysis of the protocol, the OW-PCA assumption can be used (instead
of NR-PCA which we need to assume here). In other words, this provides evidence that the
lower level of modularity in the proof of [KPW13] for CCCA security of the TLS key extraction
mechanism is hard to avoid unless one is willing to make additional assumptions. Since our goal
was to preserve modularity, we proved the security of the MSK-generation resource under the
stronger NR-PCA assumption, introduced by [BFK+13b]. This issue is described more in detail
in Section 3.3.3. A solution for this seems actually using an IND-CCA-secure encryption scheme
for the key generation, rather than RSA-PKCS. Generally, values that are already authenticated
(like the certificates or the signed messages) should not be included in the finished message at
all; this complicates the analysis but does not contribute to the security of the protocol. The
parameters used in the “finished” message generation and processing should be minimal so as
to minimize the information passed from higher protocol layers. Furthermore, the well-known
issue of using the encryption and MAC keys in the confirmation message prohibits to view the
“finished messages” as part of the handshake protocol; rather, we view them as a first step in
the record layer protocol. The first criticism, namely that several messages are included in the
finished message unnecessarily, still applies to the current draft of TLS 1.3. The latter criticism,
namely that the messages are protected with the same keys as the actual payload messages,
does not apply anymore.
Our work also indicates that the sub-protocols cannot be fully decorrelated as long as TCP
is used for message transmissions. As TCP fragments are processed in order-of-arrival, each
of the resources has to permit further transmissions via two “insecure channels.” Finally,
another questionable design choice of TLS 1.2 is the use of Authenticate-then-Encrypt, which
is susceptible to timing- and other type of attacks [DP10]. This criticism has been addressed in
TLS 1.3 by the adoption of AEAD ciphers. Still, as suggested by Badertscher et al. [BMM+15],
by changing the way the AEAD cipher is used, the protocol efficiency can be improved.
Although various of the above mentioned obstacles could have been bypassed by modifying
the scheme, we kept our analysis close to the realistic TLS protocol. The result is a more
complicated analysis; however, the artifices are immanent to the protocol, not to our technique.
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A More Details on TLS
A.1 X.509 Certificates
In TLS, the server’s public key is always certified; optionally, the client may also be required
to certify his public key. The certificates used by TLS are X.509 v3 certificates [HPFS02],
in practice a chain of certificates starting form the user and ending at a valid certification
authority. In practice, each X509 v3 certificate consists of a sequence of three required fields:
the TBSCertificate, the AlgorithmIdentifier, and the BIT STRING fields (the latter being
a signature). We give more details about the concrete certificate structure below.
In this paper, we abstract the certification process to (user access to) a resource PKIF, which
takes as input the values that need to be certified, and outputs a certificate, i.e. a bit-string
which can be verified. The resource will choose a function f ∈ F and output a certificate of
the form (x, f(x)), where x is the input that needs to be certified. The function f can be
seen as an abstraction of the precise signature generation algorithm. Note that in the X509
certificates the values that are certified are encoded in DER encoding, in particular ensuring
that the encoding yields a unique value. The encoding consists of a type, the length of the
payload, and the payload itself, i.e. the input. We note that this encoding is implicitly assumed
in our PKI resource, i.e. the input value x is assumed to correspond to a single certificate.
Furthermore, the tbsCertificate field contains a unique identifier which bounds each input
to a single certificate (per resource), which means, the certificate authority can check whether
it has issued the certificate or not.
Finally, we note that in our assessment, we simplify the output of the verification of a
certificate to a single bit, i.e. the certificate is valid or invalid. This is a simplification since in
fact the output usually yields more information than this: there is a difference between e.g. a
valid, but revoked certificate, a certificate which has expired, and an invalid certificate.
We proceed to describe the concrete structure of the X.509 v3 certificates with three main
fields: TBSCertificate, AlgorithmIdentifier, and BIT STRING. The field TBSCertificate
consists of:
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• Version. The version of the certificate, i.e. 1, 2, or 3. If the version is 1, the value is
omitted. Already in version 2, the certificates had a unique identifier.
• Serial number. This is a unique serial number, which is a positive integer, 160 bits long.
• Signature. This field contains the signing algorithm, which must be the same as the one
specified in the AlgorithmIdentifier field; it may also contain additional parameters.
• Issuer. The name of the issuing identity, specified as a sequence of attributes such as
country, organization, state or province name, common name, serial number, etc.
• Validity. A sequence of two dates, a start and an end date for the validity.
• Subject. This field contains the (unique per each issuing CA) identifier of the owner of
the public key to be certified.
• Subject public key info. This sub-field contains the public key and the algorithm with
which the key should be used (e.g. RSA or Diffie-Hellman).
• Unique identifiers. These are the subject and issuer unique identifiers, which allow the
certification to handle repetitions of either the subject or the issuer fields.
• Extensions. The certificates generated in version 3 feature this field, which consists of a
sequence of one or more certificate extensions. Examples of such extensions are: subject
key identifier (which allows to identify certificates containing a certain public key), key
usage (which restricts the use of the key for particular purposes, such as digital signatures,
key agreement, etc.), subject alternative name (enabling additional identities to be bound
to the subject of the certificate), etc.
The AlgorithmIdentifier value contains the algorithm used to generate the signature.
The third field, BIT STRING is the signature over the DER encoding of the TBSCertificate
field.
A.2 RSA PKCS#7
A public-key encryption (PKE) scheme with message spaceM is typically described as three al-
gorithms PKE = (gen, enc, dec). The key-generation algorithm gen outputs a key pair (pk , sk),
the (probabilistic) encryption algorithm enc takes a message m ∈ M and a public key pk and
outputs a ciphertext c = enc(m; pk), and the decryption algorithm takes a ciphertext c and
a secret key sk and outputs a plaintext m = dec(c; sk). It is possible that the output of the
decryption algorithm is the special symbol ⊥; this indicates that the ciphertext c is invalid.
Below, we describe the RSA algorithms following the standard PKCS#7 [Kal98]. Let λ0 =
Θ(λ), λ1 = Θ(λ) with λ0 ≤ λ1 − 88. It is also assumed that λ1 is a multiple of 8. Strictly
speaking, PKCS#7 does not specify a key-generation algorithm gen, but assumes that some
RSA key pair is already available. Hence, all our security statements with respect to RSA-based
cipher suites are implicitly parametrized by the actual algorithm gen that was used to generate
the server’s key pair. Consider the following triple of algorithms RSA = (gen, enc, dec).
• gen(λ): Upon input the security parameter λ, output (pk , sk) := ((M, e), d) such that
ed ≡ 1 (mod φ(M)) and the modulus M has λ1 bits.
• enc(m; pk): Upon input a λ0-bit message m, pick a random padding P ∈ {0, 1}λ1−λ0−24
(such that none of the bytes of P equal ’00’ in hexadecimal notation), define x :=
00||02||P ||00||m, and output c = xe (mod M).
• dec(c; sk): Upon input c, attempt to parse cd (mod M) as a sequence of bytes of the form
00||02||P ||00||m such that P contains no zero bytes and m has exactly λ0 bits. If the
attempt is successful output m; otherwise output a special symbol ⊥.
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When used within TLS, λ0 is fixed to 384 (yielding a pre-master secret of 48 bytes), while λ1
is typically 1024 or 2048.
OW-PCA and NR-PCA. The RSA-PKCS-based version of the TLS protocol uses the above
defined PKE scheme. Earlier works analyzing the security of TLS-RSA relied on the assumption
that RSA-PKCS satisfies a special property called One-Wayness under Plaintext Checking At-
tacks (OW-PCA). This notion is reviewed in Appendix C.1. Not much is known on the validity
of this assumption for RSA PKCS#7. The only relevant paper trying to justify it is [JK02], via
a reduction to an RSA-like assumption (a.k.a. partial-domain RSA with decision oracle).23
Similar to [BFK+13b], our security proof for RSA-TLS relies on a stronger assumption called
Non-Randomizability under Plaintext Checking Attacks. As in the case of OW-PCA not much
is known on the validity of this assumption for RSA PKCS#7. See also Appendix C.1 for a
discussion.
A.3 Key Expansion
The key expansion procedure used in TLS relies on a pseudo-random function (based on HMAC).
This PRF with the SHA-256 hash function is used for all cipher suites defined in TLS 1.2 (see
Section 4). To expand the key, the following function is defined taking as input a secret, a seed,
and an identifying label (and produces an output of arbitrary length):
Phash(secret, seed) = HMAChash(secret,A(1) + seed) + HMAChash(secret,A(2) + seed)
+ HMAChash(secret,A(3) + seed) + · · ·
where + indicates concatenation. The function A(·) is defined as: A(0) = seed and A(i) =
HMAChash(secret,A(i− 1)). Note that Phash can be iterated as many times as necessary to produce
the required quantity of data.
B Further Notation and Preliminaries
This section contains further definitions which have been deferred from the main body of the
paper. The following Lemma, copied from [Mau13], states that if two games are equivalent, the
probability of winning is the same.
Lemma 25 (Mau13, Lemma 1). If S
g≡ T, then for any system D and any q,
ΓDq (S) = Γ
D
q (T).
More importantly, the following lemma states that if two systems are equivalent as games,
then the distinguishing advantage is upper bounded by the probability of winning the games.
This lemma, which originates from [Mau02], is instrumental for many of our proofs.
Lemma 26 (Mau13, Lemma 2). Let A be a MBO. If SA g≡ TA, then, for any distinguisher D
and any q,
∆Dq (S,T) ≤ ΓDq (SA).
The following lemma is also needed by some of our proofs. The intuitive interpretation is
as follows: For a tuple of games G1, . . . ,Gn which have individually defined MBOs but are
equivalent as games with respect to the disjunction of their MBOs, the sum of advantages of
winning the individual games is at least as large as the advantage for provoking the disjunction.
23It is not clear whether the result of [JK02] applies to RSA PKCS#7 with typical parameters as used in TLS.
However we remark that, since its introduction, no weaknesses on the assumption have been reported either.
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Lemma 27. Let G1, . . . ,Gn be a family of random systems (i.e., each Gi is described by a
family of pGiY q |Xq for q ≥ 1) and A1, . . . ,An be a family of monotone binary outputs defined on
these systems such that Aiq is independent of Yq. For i = 1, . . . , n, we write each monotone
output as Ai = (Ai1, Ai2, . . . ). Define A =
∨n
i=1Ai, with A = (A1, A2, . . . ) and Aq =
∨n
i=1A
i
q
(i.e., Aq becomes 1 as soon as there exists a monotone output Ai whose qth component is 1).
Assume that GAi
g≡ GAj for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. Then, for all adversaries A,
n∑
i=1
ΓAq (G
Ai
i ) ≥ ΓAq (GAii∗ ),
for any 1 ≤ i∗ ≤ n.
Proof. We define the monotone binary outputs A˜1, . . . , A˜n as
A˜iq = A˜
i
q−1 ∨
Aiq ∧ ¬
∨
j 6=i
Ajq−1
 ,
i.e., A˜i formalizes that Ai is (among) the first MBOs to become 1. Indeed, A˜iq = 1 if either:
(1) the MBO A˜i had already turned 1, i.e., A˜iq−1 = 1; (2) the qth value Aiq is 1, but no previous
value Ajq−1 of any other MBO Aj is 1. Still, A becomes 1 as soon as any one of the outputs Aiq
becomes 1 for some i, q. If this output becomes 1, there must be at least one A˜iq that became 1
first. Thus, A becomes 1 if and only if at least one A˜iq becomes 1, yielding A =
∨n
i=1 A˜i. Let now
1 ≤ i∗ ≤ n. It holds that: ∑ni=1 ΓAq (GA˜ii∗ ) ≥ ΓAq (GAi∗), since A is triggered if and only if it was
triggered first in one of the A˜i outputs. On the other hand, we also have Γ
A˜i
q (Gi) = Γ
A˜i
q (Gj)
since provoking A˜ implies provoking A while Gi and Gj are still behaving equivalently (since,
if A˜ was not triggered before, this means that A does not hold). Hence, we obtain
n∑
i=1
ΓAq (G
Ai
i ) ≥
n∑
i=1
ΓAq (G
A˜i
i ) =
n∑
i=1
ΓAq (G
A˜i
i∗ ) ≥ ΓA(GAi∗),
which concludes the proof.
B.1 Signature Schemes
A signature scheme is a triple of algorithms SIG = (gen, sign, vrf ). The key-generation algo-
rithm gen takes no input24 and outputs a pair (sk , vk) of a signature key sk and a verification
key vk . The signing algorithm sign takes as input a signature key sk and a message m ∈ M
of some message space M, and outputs a signature s = sign(sk ,m). The (often deterministic)
verification algorithm vrf takes as input a verification key vk , a message m, and a signature s,
and outputs a decision bit. A signature scheme is correct if for any key pair (sk , vk) generated
by gen and for all m ∈M, vrf (vk ,m, sign(sk ,m)) = 1.
The common security requirement for a signature scheme SIG = (gen, sign, vrf ) is called
unforgeability and is formalized in Section C.4.
using the following game GSIG :
1. Generate a key pair (sk , vk) = gen() and output vk to the adversary.
24For an asymptotic treatment, the algorithm takes as input the security parameter.
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2. (Repeatedly) Given a message m ∈M from the adversary, compute s = sign(sk ,m), store
m in an internal buffer B, and return s to the adversary.
3. Upon input a pair (m′, s′) with m′ /∈ B and vrf (vk ,m′, s′) = 1, output that the game is
won.
For ε ∈ [0, 1], a signature scheme is ε-secure with respect to a class D of adversaries if
ΓA(GSIG) ≤ ε for all A ∈ D.
C Game-based Definitions
This Appendix collects the relevant game-based definitions that are used in our analysis of TLS.
Game-based definitions specify a property of a cryptographic scheme based on an interaction
between two (hypothetical) entities: the game (or challenger) and the adversary. During the
interaction, the adversary may issue “oracle queries” to the challenger, the responses of which
model what information may be leaked to the adversary. The adversary’s goal is specified by the
game, and could be, e.g., forging a message or distinguishing encryptions of different messages.
If this game cannot be won by any (efficient) adversary, then the scheme is secure against the
considered type of attack. The formal definition of a game is given in Definition 6.
Bit guessing games Some games in the literature are bit-guessing games. These games
can often be described by a pair of systems G0 and G1, with the interpretation that in the
beginning of the game, a bit B ∈ {0, 1} is chosen uniformly at random. The adversary will
then be given access to GB, and the goal is to guess the bit B. The adversary can win such
a game with probability 12 trivially by simply guessing the hidden bit. Hence, we measure the
adversary’s success in terms of his advantage, that is, the (absolute) difference between A’s
probability of winning G and the success probability for these “trivial” strategies, formally
ΦA(G) = 2 · ∣∣ΓA(G)− 12 ∣∣. Note also that ΦA(G) = ∆A(G0,G1).
C.1 OW-PCA & NR-PCA
We review the notion of one-wayness against plaintext checking attacks [JK02]. Let PKE =
(gen, enc, dec) be a public key encryption scheme with message space M.
Consider the game of Figure 7.
Init() ChGen() PCA(m, c) GameOutput(m′)
(pk , sk)← gen() if Chal 6= ∅ if (m = ⊥) ∨ (Chal = ∅) if Chal = ∅
Chal ← ∅ return ⊥ return ⊥ return ⊥
W ← 0 else else if m = dec(c; sk) else
return pk m∗ ←M return 1 return Output = (m′ = m∗)
end. Chal← enc(m∗; pk) else end.
return Chal return 0
end. end.
Figure 7: The OW-PCA security game, Gow-pca
Definition 28. The encryption scheme PKE = (gen, enc, dec) is ε-OW-PCA with respect to
a class D of adversaries if for every A ∈ D it holds that ΓA(Gow-pca) ≤ ε.
Definition 28 intuitively says that it is hard to “invert” a ciphertext, even given access
to a plaintext checking oracle (i.e., an oracle allowing to check if a guess for the plaintext
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corresponding to some ciphertext is correct). As discussed in Section 3.3.3, our proof for TLS-
RSA also relies on the assumption that it is hard to re-randomize a ciphertext, even given access
to a plaintext checking oracle. The latter notion, also known as non-randomizability against
plaintext checking attacks (NR-PCA), was recently introduced in [BFK+13b]; the corresponding
game is depicted in Figure 8.
Init() ChGen() PCA(m, c) GameOutput(c′)
(pk , sk)← gen() if Chal 6= ∅ if (m = ⊥) ∨ (Chal = ∅) if Chal = ∅
Chal ← ∅ return ⊥ return ⊥ return ⊥
W ← 0 else else if m = dec(c; sk) else
return pk m∗ ←M return 1 return Output = (c′ 6= c ∧ dec(c′; sk) = m∗)
end. Chal← enc(m∗; pk) else end.
return Chal return 0
end. end.
Figure 8: The NR-PCA security game, Gnr-pca
Definition 29. The encryption scheme PKE = (gen, enc, dec) is ε-NR-PCA with respect to a
class D of adversaries if for every A ∈ D it holds that ΓA(Gnr-pca) ≤ ε.
Note that NR-PCA implies OW-PCA whenever the encryption algorithm is randomized, be-
cause if we can invert the challenge ciphertext we can also re-randomize it. The other direction
might not be true, as there might be easier ways to re-randomize a ciphertext than by invert-
ing it. [BFK+13b] conjectured that the NR-PCA assumption follows from the common-input
extractability assumption of [BPB12] and OW-PCA.
In TLS the message space is of the form M = version number × {0, 1}368. Note that
decryption may result in a message that is outside of the message space and that such invalid
plaintexts can still be checked using the PCA oracle.
C.2 Gap Diffie-Hellman
For some security statements, we use the gap Diffie-Hellman assumption, originally proposed by
Okamoto and Pointcheval [OP01], which essentially states that it is hard to compute gxy given
(g, gx, gy), even given access to a DDH verification oracle (·, ·, ·). We formalize this problem
parametrized by a distribution G over groups of finite order |G| = q, together with a (publicly-
known) generator g. The game is specified in Figure 9.
Init(G) DDH(ga, gb, C) GameOutput(Z)
draw (G, g)←$ G
draw x, y←$ {1, . . . , |G|}
return (G, g, gx, gy)
set W ← 0
end.
return (gab = C)
end.
W ← (Z = gxy)
end.
Figure 9: The GapDH security game, GGapDHG
Definition 30. A group distribution G ε-satisfies the Gap Diffie-Hellman assumption with
respect to the class D of adversaries and with error ε if for all A ∈ D : ΓA(GGapDHG ) ≤ ε.
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C.3 Collision Resistance
For the key expansion step in Section 4, the client and server use a hash function H . In order
to prevent the adversary from changing some of the protocol messages without modifying the
finished messages ξC , ξS , this hash function needs to be collision resistant.
GameOutput(x, x′)
W ← (x = x′)
end.
Figure 10: The collision resistance game, GCR
Definition 31. A hash function H is ε-collision-resistant for a class D of adversaries, if for all
A ∈ D it holds: ΓA(GCR) ≤ ε.
C.4 Unforgeability under Chosen-Message Attacks
The security condition for a signature scheme as defined in Section B.1 is a tuple of algo-
rithms SIG = (gen, sign, vrf ). The standard security requirement for a signature scheme is
unforgeability under chosen-message attacks (UF-CMA) and formalizes that no attacker may
be able to forge a signature, even if he is given access to a “signature oracle” that returns
signatures for arbitrary messages. (Of course, signatures returned by the oracle are not eligible
for winning the game.)
Init() Sign(m) Forge(m, s)
(sk , vk)← gen()
B ← ∅
W ← 0
return vk
end.
s← sign(m; sk)
B ← B ∪ {m}
return s
end.
if (m /∈ B) ∧ vrf (m, s; vk)
W ← 1
end.
Figure 11: The unforgeability game for the scheme SIG, Guf-cma.
Definition 32. A signature scheme is ε-existentially unforgeable under chosen message attacks
for a class D of adversaries, if for all A ∈ D it holds: ΓA(Guf-cma) ≤ ε.
C.5 Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
We define the security game for AEAD-schemes using the all-in-one formulation of Hoang et
al. [HKR15]. A scheme is considered secure if all valid and efficient adversaries have poor
advantage according to the following definition.
We describe two systems, a “real” one and an “ideal” one. In the “real” system, encryption
(resp. decryption) queries to the scheme are answered by encrypting (resp. decrypting) the
given message (resp. ciphertext) with respect to the given nonce and associated data. In the
“ideal” system, encryption queries are answered with a uniformly random string of appropriate
length (it is required that this only depends on the length—not the value—of the plaintext);
decryption queries are either answered with the corresponding plaintext (if they correspond to
outputs of a previous encryption query) or by a special “invalid” symbol. We refer to those
systems as Gaead0 and G
aead
1 , respectively.
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Init() Enc(n, a,m) Dec(n, a, c)
k ← K
B ← ∅
end.
c← enc(k, n, a,m)
B ← B ∪ {c}
return c
end.
if c /∈ B
m← dec(k, n, a, c)
return m
end.
Init() Enc(n, a,m) Dec(n, a, c)
k ← K
B ← ∅
end.
c← {0, 1}`(|m|)
B ← B ∪ {c}
return c
end.
if c /∈ B
m← ⊥
return m
end.
Figure 12: The security game for authenticated encryption, above Gaead0 , below Gaead1 .
Definition 33. An AEAD scheme is ε-secure for a class D of adversaries if for all A ∈ D, it
holds that ∆A(Gaead0 ,G
aead
1 ) ≤ ε.
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Resource Description Constructed from Sub-protocol Security Loss
Basic Resources:
− one-way, insecure chan-
nel; can read, change,
and inject messages at
E-interface.
assumed resource 0
PKIF Public-Key Infrastruc-
ture; provides certifica-
tion of PKs.
assumed resource 0
RO384 Random Oracle; out-
puts consistent random-
ness.
assumed resource 0
NET the insecure point-to-
point network; parallel
composition of − 
and  − channels; be-
have as for −  at E-
interface.
assumed resource,J[−, −]K(C,S/C)
for C ∈ ATCP
0
NAMEρ unique name resource;
associates each client in-
terface C ∈ C with a
unique nonce η, as ρ in-
dicates.
rnd
(|C|
2
) · 2−224
Intermediate TLS Resources
SNETN,ρ,n insecure network with
nonce exchange; asso-
ciates each client inter-
face C ∈ C with a
unique nonce η, as ρ in-
dicates.
NAMEρ,NET hec, hes
(
n
2
) · 2−224
/ −•N,ρ,F,SIG,n authenticated transmis-
sion network; network
with one-sided authen-
tication of the group pa-
rameters used in TLS-
DHE.
SNETN,ρ,n,PKIF vrf, sgn Γ
DC(Guf-cma)
master secret resource;
allows parties to obtain
the master secret. For
each session, MS can
either be injected or
honestly generated.
TLS-DH:
RO384,SNETN,ρ,n,PKIF
dhc, dhsG . ΓDC(G
GapDH
G )
MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n
TLS-DHE:
RO384, / −•N,ρ,F,SIG,n dhec, dhesG n|C| · ΓDC(G
GapDH
G ) +
ΓDC
′
(Guf-cma)
TLS-RSA:
RO384,SNETN,ρ,n,PKIF
rsac, rsas n|C| ·ΓDCqq (Gnr-pca)+ q2368
Final TLS Resources:
KSP,∗
= =• unilaterally authenti-
cated key; can inject
keys or allow them to
be honestly distributed.
MSKN,ρ,AUX ,n expc, exps |C| · ΓDC(GPRF) +
ΓDC
′
(GCR)
∗   • Unilaterally secure
2-party communication.
For each session,
adversary can either
interfere or not.
KSP,∗
= =• stream cipher 2·∆DC (stream Uk,U∗)+
2 · ΓDC′ (Gsuf-cma)
CBC 2 · ∆DC (bc Uk,P`) + 2 ·
ΓDC
′ (
Gsuf-cma
)
+ (ql)
2
2`−1
Figure 13: The resources used in this work
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